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FOREWORD 
I am pleased to introduce volume 2 of the NASA System Safety Handbook.   
This handbook fits within a set of activities sponsored by the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
aimed at the development of a more objectives-based assurance approach, in which the decomposition of 
top-level safety and mission success objectives into concrete sub-objectives and associated strategies, 
form the basis for the planning and review of assurance activities. 
This approach does not negate the use of trusted assurance standards, tools, and methods, but treats their 
application and results as means to substantiate claims that relevant objectives have been addressed. 
Being focused on a structured and comprehensive set of assurance considerations, rather than a prescribed 
collection of standards, techniques, and deliverables, is envisioned as a meaningful way to address current 
and future challenges associated with the safety and mission assurance function for NASA’s spaceflight 
missions by: 
 Providing a technical basis for adaptations of or changes to assurance standards and practices 
driven by new acquisition models, increased use of model-based systems engineering approaches, 
and other changes to space system development and operations.  
 Enhancing consistency and perceived value of assurance models and efforts by documenting how 
the use of safety and mission assurance standards, methods, and techniques contributes to the 
confidence in top-level overall safety (and mission success) of a system. 
 Further enhancing consistency by allowing considerations associated with various disciplines to 
be combined in a single assurance framework. 
 Explicitly considering quality aspects of the assurance argument, such as the credibility of models 
and data, and qualification of analysts and reviewers, as part of the claims made by provider and 
the independent evaluations conducted by assurance organizations. 
 Promoting accountability for safety (and mission success) on the part of acquirers, providers, and 
assurance organizations, by clarifying their roles, and by identifying the range of considerations 
that (should) underlie claims regarding safety and mission success and associated risks. This is 
increasingly important in situations where there is a diminished ability to rely on a wide variety of 
experts to bring concerns forward. 
The concepts and guidance in this document promote a better understanding of system safety by defining 
the term “adequate safety,” showing ways in which this abstract term may be broken down into more 
concrete considerations, thereby providing a model for related ensurance and assurance activities.  
I thank the handbook development team and the NASA System Safety Steering Group for their 
contributions to this document, and encourage the engineering and safety and mission assurance 
communities to evaluate how the concepts in this document can be adopted and used to improve the 
safety of NASA missions. 
 
Frank Groen, Ph.D. 
Director, Safety and Assurance Requirements Division 
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
June 2015 
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PREFACE 
The NASA system safety framework is in the process of change. A major motivation for this change is 
the desire to promote an objectives-driven approach to system safety that explicitly focuses system safety 
efforts on system-level safety performance, and serves to unify, in a purposeful manner, safety-related 
activities that otherwise might be done in a way that results in gaps, redundancies, or unnecessary work. 
An objectives-driven approach to system safety affords more flexibility to determine, on a system-specific 
basis, the means by which adequate safety is achieved and verified. Such flexibility and efficiency is 
becoming increasingly important in the face of evolving engineering modalities and acquisition models, 
where, for example, NASA will increasingly rely on commercial providers for transportation services to 
low-earth-orbit. An objectives-driven approach is also consistent with input from the Aerospace Safety 
Advisory Panel (ASAP), which in its 2012 Annual Report reiterated its belief that target levels of safety 
performance must be specified for NASA systems on a mission-specific basis, and that it is necessary to 
understand the tradeoffs between safety performance and performance in other domains (technical, cost, 
schedule) when programmatic decisions are made.  
System safety has heretofore tended to focus on identifying and controlling individual hazards. This type 
of focus is evident in existing standards such as MIL-STD-882, which has been a primary reference 
document for system safety since it was initially released in July 1969. The focus of this NASA handbook 
is on the framework within which activities such as those prescribed in MIL-STD-882 are conducted, so 
that such activities are adequate to ensure the achievement of system-level safety performance objectives, 
and decision-makers are provided with sufficient information, clearly communicated, to enable them to 
make appropriately informed decisions concerning safety throughout the system life cycle. As such, it is 
the intent of this NASA handbook to build upon, rather than replace, standards such as MIL-STD-882, by 
addressing NASA-specific needs that go beyond those addressed by existing documents. 
The cost of implementing the framework described in this handbook within a given program or project is 
a concern to some, and so a word or two on that subject is needed. The use of a graded approach to the 
implementation of this framework, based on the criticality of the mission and the concerns or scenarios 
being investigated, should serve to ensure that the overall cost of implementation for a particular system 
is no more than a small percentage of the overall cost of developing, building, and operating the system. 
This notion is expected to prove true regardless of the scale or complexity of the system. It is anticipated 
that the cost of implementing this framework will be on the order of one percent of the system life cycle 
cost. Such an amount could routinely be included within the initial budget of a program or project as the 
cost for assuring system safety. Moreover, it is expected that this framework will, in time, result in 
reduced system life cycle costs through the reduction in unnecessary or duplicative work, more efficient 
and effective life cycle reviews, and fewer and less consequential mishaps. In practice, it will take some 
experience, beginning with pilot studies, to determine how the costs compare, and to refine the framework 
and its implementation to maximize its cost-effectiveness. 
The approach to system safety presented in this handbook represents a significant evolution from the 
traditional approach. It is important to recognize that the transition from today’s approach to the new one 
will not take place at once. Over a period of time, implementation plans will be developed with the broad 
participation of Agency personnel, and the plans will be implemented gradually but steadily. During this 
transition, the new concepts will be piloted, lessons will be learned, and the content of this handbook will 
be updated as necessary to continually reflect a vision of system safety that is optimal for the Agency. 
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1. Introduction 
This is the second of two volumes that collectively comprise the NASA System Safety Handbook. 
Volume 1 (NASA/SP-2010-580) [1] was prepared for the purpose of presenting the overall framework for 
System Safety and for providing the general concepts needed to implement the framework. Toward this 
end, Volume 1 addressed the following topics: 
 The fundamental principles of adequate safety  
 Derivation of operational safety objectives 
 System safety activities and their relationships to safety objectives 
 Special topics pertaining to integrated safety analysis and to risk-informed allocations of safety 
thresholds and goals 
 General considerations in the collaborative development of controls 
 Elements in the development of a risk-informed safety case (RISC), and associated examples 
 Elements in the evaluation of a RISC 
Volume 2 provides guidance for implementing these concepts as an integral part of systems engineering 
and risk management. This guidance addresses the following functional areas: 
1) The development of objectives that collectively define adequate safety for a system, and the 
safety requirements derived from these objectives that are levied on the system 
2) The conduct of system safety activities, performed to meet the safety requirements, with specific 
emphasis on the conduct of integrated safety analysis (ISA) as a fundamental means by which 
systems engineering and risk management decisions are risk-informed 
3) The development of a RISC designed to ensure that significant gaps or faults that could lead to 
safety deficits are identified and corrected  
4) The evaluation of the RISC (including supporting evidence) using a defined set of evaluation 
criteria, to assess the veracity of the claims made therein 
1.1 Motivation for the Approaches to System Safety Discussed in the Handbook 
The principal motivation for developing Volumes 1 and 2 of this handbook is to prepare the path for 
transitioning system safety at NASA from present practices to those needed to conduct NASA’s mission 
over the next 10 years and beyond. 
Considering the increased complexity of NASA’s future missions (e.g., landing and sustaining humans on 
Mars; capturing and redirecting an asteroid), it was the intent of Volume 1 to develop a system safety 
framework that fosters the following set of desired attributes: 
 A system-level approach to safety that understands that safety is an emergent property that is 
more than the sum of the parts 
 An objectives-driven approach to system safety that focuses system safety efforts on the 
achievement of an adequately safe system, rather than a product-driven approach that focuses on 
the production of deliverables 
 Explicitly addressing system-level considerations (e.g., aggregate risk, adverse sub-system 
interactions) 
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 System safety integrated into systems engineering decision making as an aspect of risk 
management 
 A "probabilistic thinking" mindset that emphasizes effective treatment of uncertainties 
 Appreciation for the potential magnitude of unknown and underappreciated risks 
 A “graded approach” to system safety, in order to match the resources and depth of safety 
analysis to the complexity and importance of decisions being addressed, as well as to save on the 
cost of the analysis 
 Model-based system safety as an integrated aspect of model-based systems engineering (MBSE), 
rather than process-based system safety 
 Coherent and compelling presentation of safety-related information at relevant decision forums 
(e.g., milestone reviews), rather than as a set of prescribed deliverables that are treated as check-
the-box questions 
 A systematic and principled attempt to identify failure causes and control them 
Furthermore, with the increased emphasis on transferring much of the technology for space flight to the 
private sector and conducting collaborative missions with private enterprises, it appears clear that system 
safety will also need to foster the following attributes: 
 Effective lines of communication between NASA as an acquirer and private companies as 
providers that lead to mutually shared and accepted agreements regarding the development of 
safety requirements and verification that they have been met 
 Accommodation of a variety of insight/oversight acquisition models such as those related to 
commercial transportation services without over-constraining provider design, product 
realization, and operations & sustainment practices 
In addition to this list of desired attributes, which formed the original rationale for the handbook, NASA’s 
System Safety Steering Group (S3G) members were asked in September 2013 to complete a questionnaire 
seeking to identify areas where improvement in current practices are needed in order to achieve NASA’s 
future goals. The most commonly cited areas were as follows: 
 Adequacy of discussions of the substance of system safety results in project forums 
 Integration among system-safety related disciplines; e.g., hazard analysis, reliability analysis, 
probabilistic risk assessment, and risk management 
 Early involvement of system safety in life cycle activities 
 Integration of system safety across Centers and projects 
 Differentiation between system safety requirements for crewed versus uncrewed missions 
 More effective analysis of cross-system interactions 
 Adequacy of time allotted to system safety activities 
 Better reporting of system safety results to higher levels of the organizational hierarchy 
 Better treatment of uncertainties 
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These needs and desirable attributes form the principal motivators for Volume 2. They can be summed up 
in the following five statements of rationale: 
Rationale 1 
One of the foremost motivators for the guidance in Volume 2 is the desire to support the core strategic 
goals, objectives, and values of the Agency. Specifically, the guidance promotes an objectives-driven 
approach to system safety, in accordance with NASA’s library of directives, procedural requirements, and 
handbooks, explicitly focusing system safety efforts on the achievement of systems that are adequately 
safe. At the same time, it is designed to allow flexibility in the means by which system safety is achieved, 
thereby accommodating next-generation engineering modalities and promoting innovation (a value that is 
highly emphasized in NASA’s 2014 strategic plan). In the process, it also promotes technical rigor where 
needed in safety assessments and safety rationale, in order to enhance the credibility of these products, 
thereby facilitating decision makers’ acceptance of the system safety information. 
Rationale 2 
The guidelines in Volume 2 are also motivated by a desire to promote an approach which explicitly serves 
to unify safety analysis activities that otherwise might be done in a way that results in gaps, redundancies, 
or unnecessary work. The guidelines in this handbook promote a means for organizing existing, often 
disparate, system safety products such as hazard analyses (HAs), failure modes and effects analyses 
(FMEAs), finite element analyses (FEAs), cross-system fault-failure analyses, and probabilistic risk 
assessments (PRAs) into a single, integrated, system-level safety analysis that comprehensively 
characterizes the hazards and associated accidents that could credibly occur and adheres to the credibility 
criteria put forth in the NASA Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Standard. This integrated safety analysis 
should be scenario-based so that effective controls can be derived, should evolve over the life cycle of the 
system so that it remains current with accumulating test and operational experience, and should be 
developed to a level of rigor sufficient to support risk-informed decision making throughout the life of the 
system. Such areas of decision-making include: design trades; optimization of hazard control strategies; 
designation and management of safety-critical items; allocation of safety-related performance 
requirements into sub-systems and components; and determination and maintenance of a safe operating 
envelope that is resistant to normalization of deviance.  Each of these areas benefits from the holistic 
perspective afforded by a comprehensive, system-level safety analysis. 
Rationale 3 
The guidelines are also motivated by a desire to promote a coherent approach to risk acceptance decision-
making at Key Decision Points (KDPs) through a comprehensive, cased-based approach to safety 
assurance that focuses on demonstrating satisfaction of safety objectives to the system (or service) 
acquirer, rather than on the production of a set of prescribed safety-related deliverables. A case-based 
approach places the burden on the provider to argue that the safety objectives are met, using system 
information and system safety products as evidence to substantiate the claims made in the safety 
argument. It also provides a rational basis for identifying assurance deficits due to flaws in the safety 
argument and/or inadequacies in the evidentiary support of the constituent claims. 
Rationale 4 
Another motivator is a desire to be consistent with existing practices and processes within NASA’s 
systems engineering and safety assurance functions in areas where they have succeeded to date and are 
likely to succeed in the future. Thus, the guidelines in Volume 2 support the requirements in NPR 
7123.1B (NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements) by providing appropriate system 
safety contributions to the systems engineering process throughout the project life-cycle. This includes 
providing safety ensurance within the current systems engineering framework, providing documentation 
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for the technical review process at key decision points, and adhering to the technical review success 
criteria. The guidelines also align with processes already exercised by the safety assurance function 
within NASA. They support the role of the technical authority (TA) in providing safety assurance and in 
promoting the integrity of the risk acceptance function at the highest levels of NASA, and they support 
the safety goal policy, which introduces probabilistic considerations into the requirements and places 
emphasis on conducting a broad integrated safety analysis. 
Rationale 5 
The final motivator is a desire to streamline system safety activities (e.g., safety analysis activities) in 
order to reduce redundancies and potential inconsistencies, thereby increasing the likelihood of the 
program/project staying within schedule and budget. 
1.2 Principal Themes of the Handbook 
The following are some of the main themes underlying the guidance provided in this handbook: (1) that 
safety is an emergent property of a system that arises when system components interact with each other, 
and with the environment in which the system is operated, and with the system operators themselves; (2) 
that engineering, operational, and management activities which affect system safety should be informed 
by an integrated safety analysis (ISA) to help ensure that scenarios that cut across subsystem boundaries 
are fully addressed; (3) that while a system should meet its specified safety requirements and should be as 
safe as reasonably practicable (ASARP), it should also be affordable with a high degree of confidence; (4) 
that the greatest threats to safety, cost containment, schedule adherence, and technical performance are 
not from the risks that are known and fully appreciated, but from the risks that are unknown and/or known 
but underappreciated, that are best controlled through organizational and managerial means and through 
reliance on best engineering practices such as robust margins, adherence to codes and standards, etc.; (5) 
that the blanket imposition of unnecessary requirements on historical grounds alone may lead to sub-
optimal results, (6) that to provide confidence that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to 
demonstrate, through a convincing set of arguments backed by evidence, that the system meets its safety 
objectives; (7) that thorough evaluation of the safety claims and supporting evidence by an assurance 
entity that possesses expertise in the areas covered by the safety case is essential for the approval 
authority to make an informed decision; and (8) that because of the inductive nature of safety cases, the 
evaluation should include a rigorous, interrogative attempt to identify flaws in the safety argument, rather 
than attempting to prove it in some absolute sense. 
Another theme of the handbook is that new opportunities for improving safety should be exploited when 
the improvement in safety justifies the sacrifice that might be entailed in cost, schedule, or technical 
performance. New opportunities may arise from various sources, including design improvements, 
diagnostic improvements, and testing improvements that are enabled by new equipment, new technology, 
or new applications of an existing technology. The handbook recommends that the management of new 
safety opportunities be integrated with the management of safety risks. It is suggested that the framework 
for safety risk and safety opportunity management should be integrated because new opportunities 
frequently evolve from new risks, and new risks are an expected byproduct of new opportunities. 
Taken as a whole, the approach to system safety presented in this handbook represents a significant 
evolution from the traditional approach that remains in use throughout NASA at the time of publication. It 
is not expected for the transition from today’s traditional or baseline approach to the new one to take 
place overnight, or for all aspects of that approach to disappear. Rather, this handbook is intended to 
provide a vision or objective for how system safety should function perhaps ten years from now. Between 
now and then, implementation plans will be developed with the broad participation of Agency personnel. 
These plans will be thoughtfully implemented to assure a gradual but steady evolution of system safety 
practice from today’s baseline to the way it is described in this handbook. Some aspects of the new 
approach will be easy and quick to realize, while others will take more time. During the transition, many 
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of the new concepts seen here will be piloted, progress will be made, lessons will be learned, and the 
content of this handbook will be updated as necessary to continually reflect the optimal vision of system 
safety for the Agency. 
1.3 Relationship to MIL-STD-882 
System safety has traditionally focused on identifying and controlling individual hazards, as exemplified 
by standards such as MIL-STD-882 [2], which has been a primary reference document for system safety 
since its initial release in July 1969. MIL-STD-882 identifies the Department of Defense systems 
engineering approach to eliminating hazards, where possible, and minimizing risks where those hazards 
cannot be eliminated. It covers hazards as they apply to systems, products, equipment, and infrastructure 
(including both hardware and software) throughout design, development, test, production, use, and 
disposal. The intent of the guidance in this handbook is to build upon, rather than replace, standards such 
as MIL-STD-882 by addressing NASA-specific needs that go beyond those addressed in existing 
documents. It is in this context that Volume 2 of the System Safety Handbook, like Volume 1, goes 
beyond an approach to system safety in which “risks” are individually identified and prioritized for 
management based on worst-case consequence likelihood. Instead, it advances an approach in which 
individual “risks” are integrated into an analysis of the system’s aggregate safety performance, enabling 
decision makers to focus on the drivers of aggregate risk when making systems engineering and/or risk 
management decisions. This approach recognizes that safety performance is intrinsically a system-level 
attribute whose characterization requires a holistic perspective. For example, this handbook provides 
guidance to implement a recommendation of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) in its 2012 
Annual Report, that target levels of safety performance be specified for NASA systems on a mission-
specific basis, and that the tradeoffs between safety performance and performance in other domains 
(technical, cost, schedule) be understood when programmatic decisions are made. 
1.4 Relationship to Other Standards and Safety Disciplines 
A number of existing mission-type-specific and discipline-specific standards levy requirements deemed 
necessary to the safety of the particular missions and disciplines to which they apply. These standards 
tacitly implement a graded approach to safety, and it is not the intention of the guidance in this handbook 
to supersede them. 
Among these safety-related disciplines for which other standards exist, reliability/maintainability (R/M) 
and quality assurance (QA) are cross-cutting processes that support fulfillment of multiple fundamental 
objectives (such as those relating to safety and performance). Reliability engineering comprises the set of 
pursuits aimed at assessment and improvement of reliability performance of systems during their 
missions. Maintainability engineering consists of the assessments and verification of the system design 
characteristics and maintenance processes so that downtime is minimized when maintenance action is 
necessary. Quality assurance consists of the assessments that provide additional independent assurance 
that risks associated with noncompliance are minimized to an acceptable level. 
While this handbook does not suggest comprehensive guidance for them, there are extremely important 
system safety concerns involving R/M and QA that are discussed herein. One such concern is decision-
making about the deployability of new, complex, large-scale systems for which integrated performance 
experience is lacking, and cannot feasibly be obtained before a decision is made whether to allow crewed 
flights (i.e., it is infeasible to conduct a large number of full-scale tests to measure system-level reliability 
empirically). In such a case, the assessment of system-level safety performance is itself a complicated 
endeavor, for which diverse types of evidence will be needed. The problem is not just one of assessing 
performance at the system level based on subsystem performance, but additionally examining interactions 
between subsystems. Moreover, while this problem is difficult enough when only one institution is 
involved, its difficulty is compounded when the system delivered to NASA is put together by a 
contractor, assembling subsystems delivered by yet other contractors.  
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1.5 Intended Uses/Users of the Handbook 
Historically, the organizations to which guidance of this type has been applicable have resided within the 
NASA organizational hierarchy, e.g., programs, projects, and elements. However, NASA is increasingly 
relying on commercial service providers for cargo and crew transportation, to low Earth orbit (LEO) in 
particular. This handbook is intended to support such commercial services by providing guidance that 
supports risk-informed development of safety performance requirements, while allowing flexibility in the 
particular means by which the requirements are met, and in the means by which safety performance is 
substantiated via the RISC. 
This document is intended to be used by personnel engaged in any systems engineering common 
technical process, where decisions are made that potentially affect safety, and by decision-makers at all 
levels of the organization. Common technical processes are enumerated in NPR 7123.1B [3]. It is not the 
intent of this document to imply that system safety personnel are solely responsible for the safety 
performance of the system; safety is a team effort. Rather, the view of this handbook is that system safety 
entails developing an understanding of the safety performance of the system and of the safety 
implications of decisions regarding the system, proposing system or operational changes when deemed 
advisable to improve safety, and communicating this understanding and rationale for changes to decision 
makers as part of a risk-informed decision making process that jointly considers all domains of system 
performance, including safety along with technical, cost, and schedule, as discussed in NPR 8000.4A [4]. 
Decisions should prioritize safety, but nevertheless must be informed by their effects over all mission 
execution domains because measures optimized for only one domain may negatively (or positively) 
impact performance in other domains. 
This handbook is intended for all systems where NASA acts as Acquirer. The guidance set forth in 
Chapter 4, Safety Objectives and Associated Requirements, is formulated for all such systems. Beyond 
this minimum set, implementation of the guidance in Chapters 4 through 7 may need to be tailored to the 
specific circumstances, since it is impractical to promulgate a generic means for implementing detailed 
guidance that will apply optimally to a broad range of system types. Although the guidance in this volume 
is intended to suggest what the Acquirer should be seeking, the Acquirer retains the flexibility to decide 
whether to accept or reject the safety risk for any system regardless of whether or not this guidance is 
followed. The intent of the guidance, which is essentially system-safety-specific implementation of the 
general risk management requirements in NPR 8000.4A, is to help the Acquirer make the most 
appropriate safety risk acceptance decision, recognizing the pitfalls of excessive conservatism on the one 
hand, and inadequate vigilance on the other. Because implementation of the guidance in this document 
entail costs to the system, it is essential that they be applied in a cost-effective, graded manner. 
1.6 Coverage and Organization of the Handbook 
Chapter 2 presents a number of key concepts used throughout this handbook, namely: 
 System safety, risk, and safety performance 
 Acquirers and Providers 
 Adequate safety 
 Relationship of system safety to systems engineering and risk management 
 The risk-informed safety case 
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Chapter 3 presents an overview of the System Safety framework and concepts for implementation. It 
includes a summary description of the following topics: 
 Setting objectives and requirements 
 Performing system safety analyses 
 Developing, evaluating, and approving the RISC 
 Managing interactions between the Acquirer and Provider 
 Managing system safety throughout the system life cycle  
Chapter 4 concerns the Acquirer’s role in setting operational objectives and deriving requirements from 
these objectives. The following pursuits pertaining to this topic are addressed in Chapter 4: 
 Setting thresholds and goals for the probabilities of loss or harm 
 Developing probabilistic requirements for known hazards 
 Developing margins to accommodate unknown and underappreciated hazards 
 Levying deterministic engineering and process safety requirements 
 Performing a System Safety Requirements Analysis 
 Setting procedures for verifying that the requirements are satisfied 
An example at the end of Chapter 4 illustrates how realistic safety thresholds, goals, margins, and 
requirements for new systems may be developed using a combination of historical experience and 
analyses applicable to other systems. In this example, operational experience attained for the Space 
Shuttle, the detailed probabilistic risk assessment developed for the Shuttle, failure experience obtained 
from early launch vehicles, and phenomenological analyses for the Ares 1 launch abort system are used to 
develop candidate probabilistic safety requirements for a new low-earth-orbit system. 
Chapter 5 addresses system safety activities performed by the Provider. The following topics are 
addressed: 
 Developing and implementing a System Safety Management Plan (SSMP) 
 Conducting a System Safety Requirements Analysis (SSRA) 
 Implementing a graded approach in the Integrated Safety Analysis 
 Integrating fault management and software considerations into the analysis 
 Adhering to modeling and simulation standards 
 Developing tailored, derived, and allocated requirements  
 Identifying and protecting safety critical items 
 Maintaining adequate safety performance throughout the life cycle 
 Taking advantage of emerging opportunities 
The last section in Chapter 5 presents an example pertaining to application of the “As-Safe-As-
Reasonably-Practicable” principle to decide upon options for improving safety. The example concerns the 
tradeoffs involved in deciding whether or not to incorporate a crew escape pod into a new system based 
on a design similar to that considered originally for Apollo missions. 
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Chapter 6 concerns the development of a RISC by the Provider to demonstrate that the system is 
adequately safe. Topics addressed include: 
 Developing safety claims that align with safety objectives 
 Incorporating programmatic, managerial, and organizational considerations into the RISC 
 Developing the body of evidence 
 Self-assessing assurance deficits in the evidence 
 Assigning qualified personnel 
 Integrating subsystem RISCs into the system-level RISC 
 Applying a graded approach in the development of the RISC 
 Life-cycle considerations, including maintaining and updating the RISC 
 Addressing weaknesses, limitations, and unresolved safety issues 
 Documenting the RISC 
 Optional use of Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
The last section in Chapter 6 provides an example RISC fragment that pertains to the use of a new electric 
thruster technology on a deep-space science mission. The example illustrates how a safety claims tree 
might be developed to make the case that the designed spacecraft propulsion system is adequately 
protected against wearout failure, and how evidence might be accumulated to support the base claims in 
the tree.  
Chapter 7 addresses the evaluation of the RISC by the Acquirer to verify that the RISC is sufficiently 
robust to make the case for safety. Topics covered in this chapter include: 
 Providing the technical basis for decision making on whether and how to proceed to the next 
phase. 
 Different levels of review 
 The composition and independence of the evaluation team 
 Evaluators’ assessment of assurance deficits and their importance 
 Rating the evaluators’ overall confidence in the RISC 
 Using Value-of-Information methods to analyze options for reducing uncertainty 
 Documenting the evaluation findings 
The next-to-last section in Chapter 7 continues the example of Chapter 6 concerning the use of a new 
electric thruster technology on a deep-space science mission. The example illustrates how the evaluators 
might develop their rationale for ranking assurance deficits in the RISC submitted by the Provider and for 
assessing their overall confidence in the RISC. 
The last section of Chapter 7 provides a generic RISC evaluation tree that has been incorporated by 
NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) into a new NASA software tool called RISC 
Evaluation Management Tool [5]. The generic evaluation tree provides the evaluator with a means for 
performing an independent assessment of the Provider’s RISC. 
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2. Key Concepts 
2.1 System Safety, Risk, and Safety Performance 
System safety is defined within NASA as the application of engineering and management principles,1 
criteria, and techniques to optimize safety2 and reduce safety risk within the constraints of operational 
effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle [6]. System safety is more than 
just the pursuit of safety performance; it also entails making the case to relevant decision makers that the 
pursuit of safety performance is on track to be successful throughout the system life cycle. 
TERMS PERTAINING TO THE DEFINITION OF SYSTEM SAFETY 
 Safety – Safety is defined as freedom from those hazards that can result in failure to meet one or 
more safety objectives by causing death, injury, or illness in humans, adversely affecting the 
environment, and/or causing damage to or loss of equipment or property. 
 Safety Performance – In this handbook, safety performance is the complement of the probability of 
harm, i.e., one minus the probability of adverse safety consequences. Thus, a system need not have 
perfect safety performance in order to eliminate safety risk; it need only achieve the safety 
performance specified in the levied safety performance requirements. 
 Safety Performance Requirement – A safety performance requirement is the specification of a 
minimum acceptable level of safety performance (i.e., a maximum acceptable value for the 
probability of harm). 
 Risk – The use of the term risk in this handbook is consistent with its use in NPR 8000.4A [4], 
namely that risk is the potential for performance shortfalls, which may be realized in the future, with 
respect to achieving explicitly established and stated performance requirements in any one or more of 
the mission execution domains of safety, technical, cost, and schedule. 
 Safety Risk – Safety risk (sometimes referred to as “safety performance risk”) is the potential for 
shortfalls with respect to safety performance requirements. This differs from the common use of the 
term risk in a safety context as being the probability of some form of harm (e.g., as expressed by 
measures such as the probability of loss of crew (LOC), the probability of planetary contamination, or 
the public casualty expectation). Safety risk only arises to the extent that there is uncertainty as to 
whether the system’s safety performance meets requirements. 
 Risk Burndown – Risk burndown refers to the expectation that as a program/project evolves over 
time, mitigations are implemented; and as risk concerns are retired and the state of knowledge about 
the performance measures improves, uncertainty should decrease, with an attendant lowering of risk. 
   
                                                            
1 The “application of management principles” includes management’s function in both ensuring (promoting) safety 
and assuring (verifying) safety. These terms will be defined further in Section 2.2. 
2 The term “optimize safety” is interpreted here to be equivalent to the term “achieve adequate safety,” with the 
implication that both include being as safe as reasonably practicable (ASARP) and meeting minimum tolerable 
levels of safety. 
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2.2 Acquirers and Providers 
For the purposes of this handbook, the personnel and organizations with responsibilities relating to system 
safety are generically separated into two basic roles: Acquirers and Providers. 
ACQUIRERS AND PROVIDERS 
AND THEIR ROLES RELATIVE TO SAFETY ASSURANCE AND SAFETY ENSURANCE 
• Acquirers - An Acquirer is a NASA organization that tasks another organization (either within NASA 
or external to NASA) to produce a product or deliver a service. The Acquirer is responsible for safety 
assurance, i.e., the development of confidence that safety has been sufficiently ensured by the 
Provider, such that a decision can be made to accept the safety risk of the system. It is the 
responsibility of the Acquirer to articulate expectations regarding the performance of the product or 
service in question, including safety performance, by developing a comprehensive set of performance 
requirements that the Provider is expected to meet. It is also the responsibility of the Acquirer to 
evaluate the product or service delivered, or proposed to be delivered, in terms of the degree to which 
it satisfies those requirements. Correspondingly, by accepting a product or service from a Provider, the 
Acquirer is also accepting as adequate its assessed safety performance, as well as the risk that its actual 
safety performance might be less than its assessed performance. 
• Providers – A Provider is a NASA or contractor organization that is responsible for safety ensurance, 
i.e., the reduction and elimination of system hazards and the achievement of adequate safety 
performance through design, procurement, fabrication, construction, and in the case of a service 
provider, operation. A Provider is tasked by a customer or supervising organization (i.e., the Acquirer) 
to produce a product or service. It is the responsibility of the Provider to deliver a product or service 
that is consistent with the stated requirements, including safety performance requirements. To 
substantiate that the product or service is indeed consistent with these requirements, and to convey to 
the Acquirer what resources and pursuits are needed in order to achieve and maintain the committed 
level of safety performance, the Provider develops a RISC to support Acquirer decision making 
regarding the acceptability of the safety performance of the product or service. 
 
In cases where the Provider organization tasks another organization to produce a product or deliver a 
service it needs to fulfill its requirements, the Provider organization takes on the role of an Acquirer with 
respect to the tasked organization, with all the organizational responsibilities that this entails. 
Although Acquirers and Providers represent distinct entities, a key message of this handbook is that they 
work together towards a common goal of achieving a safe system. Correspondingly, it is expected that 
relationships between Acquirers and Providers will be cooperative, involving timely communication and 
coordinated action as needed to best achieve the desired result. For both the provider and the acquirer, 
there is presumed to be a systems engineering function and a system safety function that that are 
technically independent but work together to provide a product that is timely, cost effective, accomplishes 
the technical objectives of the mission, and is safe. Agreements negotiated between the acquirer and the 
provider are sometimes referred to colloquially in this volume as a “handshake.” 
2.3 Adequate Safety 
For the purposes of this document, safety is defined as freedom from those conditions that can cause 
death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the 
environment.3 Although this definition is broad, it focuses exclusively on physical, rather than functional, 
consequences. For systems such as non-recoverable spacecraft, damage to or loss of equipment may be 
meaningful only insofar as it translates into degradation or loss of mission objectives. Therefore, it is also 
                                                            
3 This definition of safety is consistent with NPR 8715.3C and MIL-STD-882E. 
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reasonable to include, within the definition of safety, freedom from conditions that can cause loss of 
mission (LOM). In any case, the specific populations included in the definition of safety are context 
dependent, and it is up to the involved parties, including stakeholders, to unambiguously define what 
constitutes safety for a given application in a given environment. Figure 2-1 illustrates a decomposition of 
safety into a specific set of at-risk populations. 
 
Figure 2-1. Example Set of At-Risk Populations with Respect to Safety 
Just as the scope of conditions relevant to safety is application specific, so too is the degree of “safety” 
that is considered acceptable. NASA does not expect to attain absolute safety, but the Agency strives to 
attain a degree of safety that fulfills obligations to at-risk populations and addresses Agency priorities. An 
adequately safe system is not necessarily one that completely precludes all conditions that can lead to 
undesirable consequences. Rather, an adequately safe system is one that adheres to the following 
fundamental safety principles: 1) meeting minimum tolerable levels of safety; and 2) being ASARP (see 
Figure 2-2). These two principles must be maintained throughout all phases of the system life cycle. 
Opportunities to improve safety exist from concept studies to closeout, and efforts to that end must be 
operative throughout the life cycle. 
 
Figure 2-2. Fundamental Principles of Adequate Safety 
2.3.1 Meeting Minimum Tolerable Levels of Safety Performance 
Minimum tolerable levels of safety performance serve a risk acceptance function. Setting these levels 
involves consideration not only of societal issues relating to risk tolerance, but also of what is feasible 
given current capabilities and technological development potential. It involves the conduct of safety 
studies by the Acquirer during pre-Formulation to better understand the safety risks involved, recognizing 
that conceptual studies in the early stages of development are often notional due to the large uncertainties 
involved. The results of such studies should be the starting point for the development of minimum 
tolerable levels of safety, not as a means of establishing them directly. It is important to set levels of 
safety that are feasible to achieve and to assure, given technological, cost, and other constraints, but 
without compromising NASA’s “safety-first” core value policy. 
These minimum tolerable levels of safety performance are not necessarily constant over the life of a 
system. As a system is operated and information is gained as to its strengths and weaknesses, design and 
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operational modifications are typically made, which, over the long run, improve its safety performance. 
This is typically the case for production line items where operating experience can inform the design and 
operation of future units, and for reusable systems that can be modified prior to reuse. It is less the case 
for one-time, non-recoverable systems where the opportunity to modify the system is limited to, e.g., 
software upgrades from the mission control center. 
In particular, an initial level of safety performance may be accepted for a developmental system, with the 
expectation that it will be improved as failure modes are “wrung out” over time. In such cases the level of 
tolerable safety can be expressed as a safety threshold against which initial system performance is 
assessed, and a safety goal against which future performance will be assessed. The application of safety 
thresholds and goals for this purpose is addressed, for example, in NASA guidance and requirements 
related to the ISS and to human rating [7, 8]. Figure 2-3 illustrates a safety threshold and safety goal for a 
generic safety performance measure. 
 
Figure 2-3. Safety Threshold and Safety Goal for a Generic Safety Performance Measure 
SAFETY THRESHOLDS AND SAFETY GOALS 
Safety Threshold – The level of safety performance against which initial system performance is assessed 
(i.e., the maximum tolerable probability of harm or loss from all sources of risk when the system is first 
put into operation) 
Safety Goal – A target level of safety performance that is expected from continuous safety upgrades and 
improvements to the system (i.e., the maximum tolerable probability of harm or loss from all sources of 
risk when the system has been operational long enough to uncover and correct significant unknown and 
underappreciated risks)  
 
KNOWN, UNKNOWN, AND UNDERAPPRECIATED RISKS 
Known Risk – A scenario affecting safety performance that has been correctly identified and accurately 
assessed with respect to its likelihood of occurrence and potential severity of harm or loss 
Underappreciated Risk – A scenario affecting safety performance that has been correctly identified but 
for which the likelihood of occurrence and/or potential severity of harm or loss are underestimated 
Unknown Risk – A scenario affecting safety performance that has not been identified and is therefore 
unknown at the time of analysis 
Minimum tolerable levels of safety need not be defined for every safety performance measure defined for 
the system. They are most appropriate for safety consequences considered catastrophic by the relevant 
stakeholders. Such consequences may include human death, planetary contamination, or loss of vital 
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assets. For safety consequences of lesser severity, such as loss of a replaceable asset, ASARP 
implementation may be sufficient for adequate safety. 
2.3.2 Being As Safe As Reasonably Practicable 
An adequately safe system is as safe as reasonably practicable (ASARP).4 A determination that a system 
is ASARP entails weighing its safety performance against the commitments and tradeoffs needed to 
further improve it. The system is ASARP if an incremental improvement in safety would require an 
intolerable or disproportionate deterioration of system performance in other areas. Thus, a system that is 
ASARP is one where safety is given the highest priority within the constraints of operational 
effectiveness, time, and cost, throughout all phases of the system life cycle. Figure 2-4, a close adaptation 
of Figure 3-4 in Volume 1, illustrates the ASARP region for a generic set of alternatives. 
Being ASARP is a separate and distinct consideration from meeting a minimum tolerable level of safety. 
ASARP makes no explicit reference to the absolute value of a system’s safety performance or the 
tolerability of that performance. It is strictly concerned with the system’s safety performance relative to a 
comprehensively identified set of other alternatives. ASARP reflects a mindset that values safety 
improvement regardless of the current level of safety. It is an integral aspect of a good systems 
engineering process that guides risk-informed decision making throughout the system life cycle. 
Correspondingly, the condition of ASARP is demonstrated to some extent through process 
considerations. 
 
Figure 2-4. As Safe As Reasonably Practicable (ASARP) 
                                                            
4 The ASARP concept is closely related to the “as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA) and “as low as 
reasonably practicable” (ALARP) concepts that are common in U.S. nuclear applications and U.K. Health and 
Safety law, respectively [9, 10]. 
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2.3.3 State of the System with Respect to Adequate Safety 
Table 2-1 illustrates the four possible states of a system with respect to adequate safety, based on whether 
or not it meets the minimum tolerable level of safety and whether or not it is ASARP. 
Table 2-1. Possible Combinations of Meeting the Minimum Tolerable Level of Safety and Being ASARP 
 
Table 2-1 illustrates that: 
 A system that meets or exceeds the minimum tolerable level of safety, and is also ASARP, is 
deemed adequately safe (upper left quadrant). Such a system not only meets existing expectations 
of safety performance (for a system of its type), but to the extent that it exceeds them, it raises 
safety performance expectations going forward. Few, if any, technologies have inherent limits on 
their safety performance. The ASARP principle is the driver of safety growth over the long-term, 
and in its wake, minimum tolerable thresholds of safety rise as stakeholders revise their 
understandings about what levels of safety performance are possible and, consequently, expected. 
 A system that meets or exceeds the minimum tolerable level of safety, but is not ASARP, is sub-
optimally safe as designed (lower left quadrant). Opportunities to improve safety are still 
available within the existing program constraints and should be pursued. 
 A system that does not meet the minimum tolerable level of safety, despite being ASARP, 
represents an inherently unsafe system type in that minimum safety is not achievable without 
intolerable sacrifice of performance in other domains (upper right quadrant). 
 A system that neither meets minimum tolerable level of safety, nor is ASARP, is unsafe as 
designed (lower right quadrant). Modifications that make the system ASARP may or may not 
also result in meeting the minimum tolerable level of safety. 
2.4 Relationship of System Safety to Systems Engineering and Risk Management 
In NPR 7123.1B, the systems engineering approach is defined as: “the application of a systematic, 
disciplined engineering approach that is quantifiable, recursive, iterative, and repeatable for the 
development, operation, and maintenance of systems integrated into a whole throughout the life cycle of a 
project or program.” 
The approach to system safety articulated in this handbook recognizes the substantial overlap between 
systems engineering, risk management, and system safety. Risk management and systems engineering are 
both concerned with the achievement of defined objectives. Broadly speaking, systems engineering is the 
means by which the objectives are met, and the role of risk management is to provide a control function 
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for systems engineering to assure that the development is, and will remain, on track to meet the 
objectives, across all mission execution domains.5 This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2-5. 
  
Figure 2-5. Relationships among Risk Management, Systems Engineering, and System Safety in a 
Program/Project Context 
System safety is an input to both systems engineering and risk management. Considering that the safety 
performance of a system is a stakeholder concern in much the same way that technical performance 
capabilities such as payload mass to orbit are stakeholder concerns, system safety ensurance is an integral 
part of systems engineering efforts to develop a system that satisfies stakeholder objectives across all 
domains of performance, including safety, technical, cost, and schedule. System safety assurance is an 
evaluation activity that maintains functional independence from systems engineering in order to be most 
effective in providing confidence that the system is indeed adequately safe. Transfer of information 
between the ensurance and assurance parts of system safety occurs through the natural interactions 
between provider and acquirer, as will be discussed in Section 3.6, and both parts contribute to risk 
management efforts to identify and respond to conditions that may arise and threaten the achievement of 
the system’s baselined safety performance. 
Although each of the mission execution domains of safety, technical, cost, and schedule have unique 
characteristics, system performance in the safety domain is of particular concern to NASA, as reflected in 
safety being a NASA core value according to NPD 1000.0A, Governance and Strategic Management 
Handbook [11]. Moreover, safety performance is typically probabilistic, in that adverse safety 
consequences occur only sporadically, which means that 1) safety performance is not directly observable, 
but must be inferred; and 2) assessments of safety performance are inherently uncertain, since they are 
subject to the same margin of error considerations that apply to stochastic phenomena generally. 
Accordingly, while system safety is carried out as an integral part of systems engineering and risk 
management, Chapters 4 through 7 of this volume provide guidance that incorporate the risk management 
requirements in NPR 8000.4 and the systems engineering processes in NPR 7123.1 into system safety 
activities. 
                                                            
5 Technical risk management, which is a subset of risk management, is a systems engineering technical control 
process as discussed in NPR 7123.1B. 
System Safety EnsuranceSystem Safety Assurance
Systems EngineeringRisk Management
Manage all program/ project risks over all 
mission execution domains
Evaluate the safety case, ascertain the degree of 
confidence  possessed by independent knowledge‐
able experts that the system is adequately safe, and 
identify additional information needed to provide 
the confidence that the decision maker needs
Support development of systems that satisfy 
explicit safety requirements and additionally are 
as safe as reasonably practicable, and develop the 
safety case necessary to support decisions ranging 
from KDP reviews to operational decision‐making
Do the best possible job meeting overall mission/ 
program/ project goals and striking the appropriate 
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execution domains
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2.5 The Risk-Informed Safety Case 
A key element of this objectives-driven approach is the use of the risk-informed safety case (RISC): a 
structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible, and 
valid case that a system is or will be adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. The 
RISC addresses each of the objectives defined for the system, providing a rational basis for making 
informed risk acceptance decisions at relevant decision points in the system life cycle. The RISC is not an 
add-on to today’s system safety practices; it is a means of organizing existing, often disparate, system 
safety products such as HAs and PRAs into a unified, coherent, evidence-based argument that the 
required level of safety has been attained. In addition to furnishing the risk acceptance rationale, the RISC 
can serve as a roadmap for risk management during deployment, including pursuits such as precursor 
analysis, a process for learning from flight experience that is now considered a necessity for risk 
management of human space flight. RISCs are prepared for the purpose of making the case for safety at 
Key Decision Points (KDPs). 
The term “risk-informed,” within the acronym “RISC,” is intended to convey the idea of a safety case that 
not only attempts to argue inductively that the system is adequately safe, but also attempts to argue 
deductively that all credible scenarios that could lead to a significant risk of system failure have been 
identified, rigorously analyzed, and conscientiously responded to. One of the principal intents of a RISC 
is to prevent or mitigate “confirmation bias,” a term used to denote the tendency to favor information that 
confirms one's prior beliefs or hypotheses, thereby preventing analysts from using the safety case as 
“simply a paper exercise that repeats what the engineers are most likely to have already considered” [12]. 
Confirmation bias is addressed by approaching safety ensurance from two complementary directions: 
first, by attempting to discover the ways in which the system may be unsafe (by looking at possible 
failure scenarios), and second, by attempting to show that the system is safe nonetheless (by formulating 
the overall safety argument). 
SAFETY CASES AND RISK-INFORMED SAFETY CASES 
 Safety Case - In general, a “safety case” is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence 
that provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is or will be adequately safe 
for a given application in a given environment. 
 Risk-Informed Safety Case - The term “risk-informed” is used here to emphasize that a 
determination of adequate safety is the result of a deliberative decision making process that necessarily 
entails an assessment of risks and tries to achieve a balance between the system’s safety performance 
and its performance in other areas. The RISC, which evolves over the course of the system life cycle, 
supports decision making at system life-cycle reviews and other major decision points. 
Because one of the functions of the RISC is to argue that a comprehensive effort has been made to 
identify all credible and significant accident scenarios, the RISC provides a means for helping to ensure 
that all significant hazards that could lead to system failure have been accounted for, properly analyzed, 
capably managed, and adequately controlled. In addition, because the RISC emphasizes a holistic system-
wide approach, it fosters attention to hazards whose causes and/or effects may cut across subsystems and 
emerge at system level rather than subsystem level. In this sense, the development of the RISC serves as a 
self-assessment aid for the providers of the RISC, helping them to ensure that all important knowable 
scenarios have been identified and that all important knowable interactions between different parts of the 
system have been analyzed. 
Equally important, the RISC submitted by a provider undergoes thorough evaluation by an independent 
evaluation team, acting for the acquirer, consisting of both subject matter experts and people who are 
highly knowledgeable about the system. This evaluation of the RISC by a qualified, independent team 
helps provide the assurance needed by decision makers who are called upon to either accept or reject the 
safety risks. 
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A RISC consolidates and organizes the applicable body of evidence into a valid case that argues that a 
system is (or will be) adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. The applicable body 
of evidence may include (but not necessarily be limited to): 
 Safety analyses 
 Safety-critical item designations 
 Test results 
 Safety management program elements 
 Qualifications of the workforce 
 Verification and validation procedures 
 Adherence to norms and standards 
 Attention to best practices and lessons learned 
 Risk-informed justification for seeking waivers 
 Adequacy of margins 
Much, if not most, of this evidence derives from safety ensurance activities that need to be conducted 
regardless of whether or not a RISC is produced. The job of the RISC is to use such evidence to 
maximum effect in communicating the safety of the system.  
In the context of NASA systems engineering, RISC refers to the totality of safety-related documentation 
submitted to a given technical review. As such, the documentation requirements of the RISC are 
consistent with the entrance criteria for the relevant review, as itemized in NPR 7123.1B, NASA Systems 
Engineering Processes and Requirements. Similarly, the criteria for evaluating the adequacy of the RISC 
are consistent with the corresponding technical review success criteria in the same NPR. 
The RISC supports the informed acceptance of safety risk by the various parties who need to accept the 
risk. It enables a structured, critical, and skeptical evaluation by the system acquirer, facilitating the 
identification of specific assurance deficits whose remediation may be designated as a condition of further 
system development or use. It organizes the relevant evidence into a coherent case for safety, supporting 
the needs of decision makers as the system moves through life-cycle reviews and other major decision 
points. Properly formulated, the RISC meets the needs of foreseeable “certification” processes, e.g., for 
human rating or for autonomous systems. 
A RISC is not a “one-shot deal” that sits on a bookshelf or hard drive once it has been completed. When 
significant programmatic changes occur (e.g., budget reductions or unanticipated technological 
challenges), the existing safety case may no longer be valid and may need to be changed to reflect 
evolving realities. An updated RISC is presented at each major milestone, making it a living document 
that evolves over the system life cycle in tandem with system evolution and operational experience. This 
use of a RISC is compatible with NASA's established practices of critical review and evaluation by 
experts tasked with assessing the adequacy of the system's safety on behalf of the decision makers and at-
risk communities. 
Within a planning context, a RISC may also be used to facilitate evaluation of the effects of proposed 
programmatic changes on the case for safety. This use of a RISC is compatible with NASA’s desire to be 
prepared for new challenges or new opportunities before they manifest. 
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3. Overview of the System Safety Framework 
The NASA system safety framework, introduced in Volume 1, provides a structured model for planning, 
conducting, and documenting system safety activities in a manner that meets stakeholder objectives and 
provides the technical basis for decision making, including risk acceptance.  
The framework consists of the following system safety elements as illustrated in Figure 3-1 (which is a 
modified version of Figure 2-4 in Volume 1): requirement setting, safety ensurance, safety assurance, and 
risk acceptance (see color-coded Key to Figure 3-1). Objectives and requirements, RISC evaluation, and 
risk acceptance decisions are the within the purview of the Acquirer, whereas ensurance activities and 
RISC preparation are within the purview of the Provider. The handbook provides guidance for all 
elements of the system safety framework except for risk acceptance. The acceptance of risk is a decision 
process that is intended to be informed by the RISC and by the evaluation of the RISC (i.e., RISC-
informed) but not constrained by the RISC or by its evaluation (i.e., not RISC-based). 
 
 
Figure 3-1. The NASA System Safety Framework  
3.1 Top-Level Objectives and Associated Requirements 
As discussed in NPR 8000.4A, at the outset of a program or project, the objectives, deliverables, 
performance measures, baseline performance requirements, resources, and schedules that define the task 
to be performed are negotiated between the organizational unit performing the task (Provider) and the 
organizational unit sponsoring the task and responsible for oversight (Acquirer). As part of this process, a 
set of safety objectives is negotiated consistent with the two fundamental safety principles discussed 
above, namely meeting minimum tolerable levels of safety and being ASARP. 
These two principles are decomposed into specific safety objectives to be met by the system. By 
specifying safety objectives down to a level where they can be clearly addressed by systems engineering 
processes, an operational definition of safety is created that enables the processes to be developed and 
evaluated in terms of the safety objectives. By adequately meeting these so-called operational safety 
objectives, then by virtue of their derivation from fundamental safety principles, the system can be said to 
be adequately safe. 
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Figure 3-2 illustrates the derivation of generic operational safety objectives, including the application of 
safety performance margin to minimum tolerable levels of safety, so that safety requirements can be 
developed that maintain a reserve for the expected presence of unknown and/or underappreciated (UU) 
scenarios. The figure shows that even in the absence of minimum tolerable levels of safety, the ASARP 
principle is still operative. Traditional, deterministic safety practices such as requiring redundancy where 
practical, have implicitly recognized the ASARP principle as fundamental to system safety. 
Figure 3-2 also implies that organizations provide the framework in which safety is achieved, since 
objectives such as "Prioritize safety during design/realization/operation decision making" and "Be 
responsive to new safety-related information" imply that the organization puts safety first and that it is 
structured to respond to safety-related opportunities. The reader will find many organizational factors 
throughout the document that have the ability to affect the achievement of safety objectives. 
Organizational factors are crosscutting and have the ability to affect the achievement of safety objectives 
across the objectives hierarchy. 
The development of safety requirements is the purview of the Technical Requirements Definition Process 
of the NASA Systems Engineering Engine [13]. It is carried out collaboratively between the Provider and 
the Acquirer, but the evaluation regarding the appropriateness of the collection of safety requirements 
resides with the Acquirer. Early in the system life cycle, the Provider conducts a System Safety 
Requirements Analysis (SSRA).6 The SSRA serves to clarify the detailed requirements (including, but not 
limited to, engineering requirements) that the Provider expects to address in the ensuing development, and 
which form the basis of the Provider’s System Safety Management Plan (SSMP). In addition, the SSMP 
focuses on the collection of process requirements. 
Figure 3-3 illustrates the interaction/iteration between the Acquirer and Provider during the development 
of system-specific safety requirements. 
The transition from safety objectives, which are defined by the Acquirer, to system safety ensurance 
activities, which are conducted by the Provider, is accomplished by translating the objectives into safety 
requirements that the Acquirer then levies on the Provider. Broadly speaking, these requirements fall into 
the following categories: top-level safety performance requirements, lower-level safety performance 
requirements, safety-related engineering requirements, and safety-related process requirements. 
3.1.1 Top-Level Safety Performance Requirements 
Requirements associated with minimum tolerable levels of safety performance are typically probabilistic, 
because the safety performance measures that they explicitly constrain are typically probabilistic or 
statistical, such as the probability of loss of crew, the probability of loss of mission, or casualty 
expectation.7 Such probabilistic requirements are often verified by synthetic analysis methods such as 
PRA, which quantify the system’s safety performance based on explicit identification of scenarios leading 
to adverse safety consequences. This is particularly true in aerospace applications, where the relatively 
low numbers of flights are insufficient in and of themselves to provide a statistically sound basis for 
claims of satisfaction of safety performance requirements. 
Verification of probabilistic requirements is particularly challenging, because synthetic methods8 are 
vulnerable to incompleteness of scenario identification as well as an incomplete understanding of the
                                                            
6 The SSRA is similar in function to the System Requirements Hazard Analysis (SRHA) of MIL-STD-882E, Task 
203. 
7 In addition to probabilistic requirements, top-level safety performance requirements generally include top-level 
functional requirements, which describe the capabilities of the system (what the system must do). 
8 By “synthetic analysis methods” we mean methods that produce system-level risk estimates by aggregating the 
effects of explicitly identified individual contributors to that risk. 
 
 
21
 
Figure 3-2. Objectives-Driven Requirements Development (notional) 
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Figure 3-3. Interaction/Iteration between the Acquirer and Provider during the Development 
of System-Specific Safety Requirements 
probability of occurrence, leaving a potentially substantial portion of the actual safety risk unaccounted 
for by the verification protocols. 
The factors that tend to increase the likelihood of UU scenarios have been extensively studied in various 
contexts, and it has been found that the principal risk factors that affect safety also affect cost, schedule, 
and technical performance risks. For example, the following factors are often cited as having a strong 
influence on the ability to meet requirements pertaining to all of these mission execution domains [14-
27]: 
 Over-optimism, complacency, and discounting of risk 
 Diffusion of responsibility and authority with inadequate oversight 
 Limited communication channels and poor information flow 
 Lack of testing and modeling at as-flown or as-claimed conditions 
 Poor or missing specifications 
 Unnecessary complexity 
 Reuse of technologies without appreciation for the differences in how they are applied 
 Inadequate review 
 Pressures to meet budget and schedule constraints that are not only tight but also changing 
Therefore, safety management cannot be accomplished in isolation, and is affected in a positive way by 
managing risk to costs, schedule, and technical performance. 
To account for the contribution of UU scenarios to the system’s actual (though unknown) safety 
performance, safety performance margins are introduced between the minimum tolerable levels of safety 
(initially the safety threshold), which refer to actual safety performance, and the (more stringent) safety 
performance requirements against which the results of synthetic analyses are compared (see Figure 3-4). 
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Therefore, if the system meets the safety performance requirements levied on it, and if the safety 
performance margins used to develop the requirements have a sound basis (e.g., consistency with 
historical experience), then there is a rational basis for the claim that the system’s actual safety 
performance is within minimum tolerable levels. 
SAFETY PERFORMANCE MARGIN 
Safety Performance Margin – An incremental margin subtracted from the safety threshold or goal to 
account for the estimated total effects of unknown, un-quantified, and under-evaluated hazards. It is 
estimated from analysis of historical experience with similar technologies taking into account the 
complexity of the system, the degree to which new technology is being used, and the degree to which new 
operating environments are being introduced. The size of the margin decreases with time in operation as 
unknown and underappreciated risk scenarios are uncovered and corrected. 
 
Figure 3-4. Relationship between the Initial Safety Performance Requirement, Initial Safety Performance 
Margin, and Safety Threshold 
Both the safety threshold and the safety performance margin normally diminish to lower values as safety 
information is gained through both testing and actual flight experience, and as both preventive and 
corrective actions are undertaken to make the system increasingly safe. For example, Figure 3-5 illustrates 
how the safety performance requirement and margin might vary within a defined profile for the minimum 
tolerable level of safety that moves over time from the safety threshold (for initial flights) to the safety 
goal (for long-term operation). Initially, given a concept of operations, an analysis is performed to 
determine a reasonable value for the safety performance margin (the height of the light blue bar at time 
A). Subtraction of this margin from the safety threshold leads to the limit on the explicitly quantified risk 
(the point marked A1). In addition, a “first-order” risk analysis is performed on the preliminary system 
design to scope out the mean value of risk due to known scenarios (the point marked A2). Since the value 
of the safety measure at A2 exceeds the value at A1, the system does not satisfy the minimum tolerable 
level of safety. 
To remedy the situation, the following actions may be taken: 1) the safety performance margin may be 
reduced by making provisions to reduce the UU risks (B1); and/or 2) the system design details may be 
refined and controls may be added to further mitigate the explicitly quantified risk and improve safety 
(B2).9 At this point an initial safety requirement for explicitly quantified risks is specified (B3) as being 
                                                            
9 The two are not independent. Organizational, programmatic, and design philosophy changes can impact the 
quantitative assessment of risk, and design refinements can impact the factors that affect safety performance margin. 
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equal to the value of the safety measure at point B1. Additionally, a decreasing safety performance 
margin profile can be derived from historical experience and subtracted from the profile for the minimum 
tolerable level of safety, to obtain a safety requirement profile against which the explicitly quantified risk 
will be assessed over the operational life of the system. At time “C” the known risk of the as-built system 
satisfies the safety requirement. At time “D,” newly discovered scenarios are added to the risk analysis, 
increasing the explicitly quantified risk beyond the safety requirement. Mitigations are introduced and the 
system is re-analyzed (E) to demonstrate that the known risk has been brought back within the 
requirement.10 During system operation, proactive safety upgrade and improvement programs reduce the 
risk in increments (F) until the safety goal is met (G). 
 
*  The bars represent the value of an appropriate statistic that reflects an acceptable degree of certainty that the safety 
requirement is met. 
Figure 3-5: Relationship between the Safety Performance Requirement, Safety Performance Margin, and 
Minimum Tolerable Level of Safety as the System Matures 
3.1.2 Lower-Level Safety Performance Requirements 
To facilitate the achievement of the high-level probabilistic requirements without requiring multiple 
design iterations, it is common practice for probabilistic allocations to be made from the top level down to 
the lower elements of the system. In this way, the ownership of the safety requirements is similarly 
allocated from program/project level down to the lower organizational units supporting the 
program/project. 
Approaches for allocating top-level safety performance requirements to lower levels were discussed in 
Section 4.4 of Volume 1. 
                                                            
10 If the risk could not be brought within the requirement, the issue would be elevated according to the 
program/project risk management process, and could potentially be resolved by rebaselining the safety requirement, 
if organizational and/or programmatic changes provide an adequate basis for reducing the safety performance 
margin. 
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3.1.3 Safety-Related Engineering and Process Requirements 
In addition to setting probabilistic requirements at various levels of the system, there must be assurance 
that the assumptions used in the analysis of potential accident scenarios are valid, e.g., that controls have 
the capabilities, reliabilities, and availabilities that they are credited with. Therefore, verifiable, system-
specific engineering and process requirements are levied on those attributes of the system that 
demonstrably contribute, via safety analysis, to that performance. It is the combination of satisfactory 
safety analysis (per agreed-upon analysis protocols) and compliance with safety-related engineering and 
process requirements that counts as compliance with probabilistic safety performance requirements. 
Safety-related engineering requirements are those that are related to observable system attributes that the 
Acquirer levies on the Provider either as derived requirements or as a matter of best practice (e.g., a 
particular level of failure tolerance or a particular design safety factor). 
ALLOCATED REQUIREMENTS 
• Allocated requirements are quantitative requirements that are apportioned from system or subsystem 
level to lower levels, where the units of measure remain the same as at the higher level. For example, 
the overall maximum allowable probability of LOC during abort may be apportioned to the failure 
probabilities of the abort motor, the jettison motor, the attitude control motor, other subsystems, and 
their interfaces, since it is important not only that they work correctly individually, but also that their 
composition works correctly when the individual subsystems work correctly. The maximum failure 
probabilities at the lower level are allocated to stay within the maximum failure probability at the 
higher level. 
 
DERIVED REQUIREMENTS 
• Derived requirements may be quantitative or qualitative and are developed at a lower level of a 
system to implement a higher-level requirement. Derived requirements arise from constraints, 
consideration of issues implied but not explicitly stated in the Acquirer’s requirements, or factors 
introduced by the selected architecture or the design. For example, it may be determined that in order 
for the overall probability of LOC during abort to be less than X, the maximum acceleration during 
abort must be less than Y. The limit on acceleration is a derived requirement. 
Safety-related engineering requirements need not have an explicit basis in the ISA. They may also be 
levied on the basis that not doing so would be inconsistent with best practices and lessons learned. The 
levying of such requirements is considered part of ASARP in the objectives decomposition of Figure 3-2. 
They typically reflect the application of consensus engineering codes and standards where these are 
deemed to promote good performance in the system. However, the blanket imposition of requirements 
that are historical in origin has the potential to lead to sub-optimal results, or even to over-constrain the 
system, particularly if the system is novel in some respect. Therefore, the ASARP principle also requires 
the ability to tailor the set of safety requirements to modify or remove those that are counterproductive in 
the particular application in question. 
Safety-related process requirements are those that specify particular processes intended to support system 
safety. They specify how the system is designed, realized, or operated, rather than the system attributes 
themselves. Process requirements may relate to risk management, quality assurance, accident precursor, 
testing, training, or other processes and programs that affect safety. 
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3.2 System Safety Ensurance Activities to Achieve a Safe System 
System safety ensurance activities are conducted by the Provider as part of overall systems engineering 
technical process activities and are focused on the achievement of the stated safety objectives. System 
safety ensurance activities not only ensure the safety of the system, but also produce the evidence of 
safety that will be used to support claims in the RISCs provided to the Acquirer at key decision points in 
the system life cycle. 
Because of the diversity of Providers, each with its own particular set of systems engineering, system 
safety, and risk management processes, NASA recognizes the need for flexibility in the nature and 
composition of system safety activities, as long as they are able to achieve their operational safety 
objectives.  
Within the current framework, system safety activities typically fall into the following categories: 
conducting an integrated safety analysis; requirements development support; system design support; 
program control and commitments support; and performance monitoring support. 
3.2.1 Conducting an Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA)11 
ISA refers to the development and analysis of potential accident scenarios that can credibly affect the 
safety performance of the system. ISA adheres to two key principles: 
1. ISA is Scenario Based – ISA entails the development of a comprehensive set of accident 
scenarios that may lead to adverse consequences with respect to safety. ISA includes methods for 
identifying and analyzing these scenarios. This includes accident causes, contributing factors, 
effectiveness of controls (both existing and proposed), subsystem interactions, analysis of 
physical responses of the system to the environments it encounters, and analysis of the probability 
that the undesirable consequences will be realized. Conducting a scenario-based ISA is essential, 
because it is only by developing an understanding of how adverse safety consequences can be 
produced that effective measures can be taken to prevent (or mitigate) them. 
2. ISA is Conducted at the System Level – ISA is by definition a system-level analysis that aims at 
comprehensively identifying all credible safety-related accidents associated with the system in the 
context of its intended operation. The scope of ISA is somewhat broader in this context than is 
sometimes invoked within NASA by the term integrated hazard analysis (IHA), which is typically 
used to describe the coordinated analyses between projects or elements that address those hazards 
or causes that are controlled by a project or element other than the one who is producing the 
analysis. The term “ISA” in this handbook defines an evolution of this more narrow definition, 
wherein it becomes an analysis of the whole system rather than a set of separate analyses to fill in 
gaps that remain after analyses of the subsystems.  
ISA integrates different types of safety analyses (e.g., HA, PRA, phenomenological modeling) to the 
greatest extent possible. The ISA consolidates these separate analyses to produce a single comprehensive 
set of quantified safety performance measures that can be used to assess the standing of the system with 
respect to the levied safety performance requirements. The ISA is then used to risk-inform system design 
and operational decision making. 
The ISA must be tailored to the particular phase in the life cycle at which it is conducted. As the system 
design evolves, the ISA is kept current, typically through the use of progressively more rigorous analysis 
                                                            
11 The term “integrated safety analysis” and acronym ISA used in this handbook should not be confused with the 
term “integrated design and safety analysis,” which has been used elsewhere with reference to the determination of 
failure tolerance requirements and the required amount of redundancy in design. IDSA in this sense refers to only a 
part of ISA. 
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techniques that model the system at progressively finer levels of detail. The ISA is maintained during 
system realization so that it can be used to inform decisions related to safety, such as test protocols. 
During system operation, the ISA is updated to reflect such things as design modifications and 
accumulating operational experience, including anomalies. 
A principal use to which the ISA is put is demonstration of satisfaction of requirements, including safety 
requirements such as those derived from NASA safety thresholds and goals, and additional requirements 
derived or allocated from top-level requirements or levied independently by the Acquirer. As such, the 
ISA must conform to any analysis protocols that have been established for quantifying the safety 
performance measures used to assess compliance. 
The focus of the ISA is on safety; however, in order to risk-inform trade studies and other decisions 
ensuring that the system is ASARP, the ISA must be integrable with other performance models in the 
mission execution domains of cost, schedule, and technical performance, as discussed in the NASA Risk 
Management Handbook [28]. 
3.2.2 Requirements Development Support 
System safety activities support requirements development in a number of distinct ways. Through the 
early conduct of an SSRA, the Provider identifies applicable requirements by reviewing NASA, military, 
and industry standards and specifications, historical documentation on similar and legacy systems, etc. 
Additionally, using the ISA, the Provider translates any system-level probabilistic safety performance 
requirements levied by the Acquirer into objectively verifiable system-specific derived requirements (and 
associated verification procedures) that protect the assumptions underlying the system’s assessed safety 
performance. Such derived requirements may involve, for example, prescribing specific levels of 
component reliability, specifying limits on environments produced by components such as particulate 
emissions or vibrations, or requiring a certain level of failure tolerance in a subsystem. In cases where the 
flowdown of requirements crosses organizational boundaries, the ISA provides a rational basis for 
allocating requirements from higher to lower levels of the system, and thereby from program/project level 
to subordinate organizations. 
It may be the case that a levied requirement proves to be overly burdensome (such as by adding too much 
mass to the system) or sub-optimal (e.g., where alternate means are available to meet the intent of the 
requirement). System safety plays a role in these cases by assessing the potential consequences of 
tailoring the requirement, both through explicit modeling of safety performance using the ISA, and by 
qualitative consideration of the potential erosion of protection against unknown and underappreciated 
scenarios. This provides a technical basis for tailoring the requirement. 
REQUIREMENT TAILORING 
Tailoring refers to the process of adjusting or seeking relief from a levied requirement. Tailoring may be 
thought of as a process for winnowing down the sum total of best practices and lessons learned to those 
that are specifically relevant to the mission and/or system being investigated. The tailoring process results 
in the generation of deviations and waivers depending on the timing of the request.  
3.2.3 System Design Support 
It is generally recognized that an effective way that system safety activities promote safety is through the 
influence they can have over system design when properly integrated into the systems engineering 
process. System design support is of two broad types: best-practice-informed and ISA-informed. Best-
practice-informed design support promotes safety by identifying applicable historically-applied safety-
related engineering requirements and by assuring that proven strategies for optimizing safety are 
considered during system design decisions. ISA-informed support promotes safety by risk-informing 
  
 
28
design decisions with an assessment of the safety performance of each contending alternative. These two 
types of design support work synergistically to achieve a design that is ASARP. 
One traditional approach to design support is to apply a system safety design order of precedence. For 
example, MIL-STD-882E specifies that safety risk should be reduced by (in order): elimination of 
hazards through design selection; risk reduction through design alteration; incorporation of engineered 
safety features; provision of warning devices; and/or incorporation of signage, procedures, training, and 
personal protective equipment (PPE). However, this approach presumes that the strategies are ordered in 
terms of decreasing effectiveness, which might not be true in a specific application. This handbook takes 
the position that the strategies enumerated in such orders of precedence represent potentially fruitful 
design approaches, but that their relative impacts on safety performance should be analyzed as part of a 
risk-informed decision making process.  
3.2.4 Program Control and Commitment Support 
System safety promotes the development of program controls and commitments needed to ensure that the 
framework for safety is backed by sound administrative and management practices. Of particular 
importance to the maintenance of the system’s safety performance is the identification of safety-critical 
items (SCIs) that are explicitly relied on for safety. A major vehicle for SCI identification is the ISA, 
which is used to identify the hardware, software, human, operational, and managerial system features 
upon which safe system operation depends. Such items can be explicit in the ISA (e.g., redundancies, 
backup systems) or they can be implicit (e.g., assumptions regarding component structural integrity). In 
either case, designating these items as safety-critical protects their safety functions by imposing rigorous 
and highly visible safety management provisions on them. 
In the context of system safety, critical items have a broader meaning than in the context of reliability and 
maintainability. SCIs can include any element or attribute of the system that is important to safety, 
including hardware, software, interfaces between hardware and software, the human interface, operating 
procedures, and management practices. Therefore, SCIs have to evolve from a top-down approach that 
starts from an integrated system model. This is somewhat orthogonal to the more standard approach for 
deriving a critical items list, where a bottom up approach such as failure modes and effects analysis is 
used exclusively. 
SCIs are, by definition, those items that have to function to ensure safety. They include any item whose 
failure could cause critical safety consequences, regardless of the likelihood of failure. For cases where 
the threat to safety involves harm to humans or to the environment, SCIs are the items that have to be 
managed to high standards in order to ensure safety. On the other hand, for cases where the threat to 
safety involves loss of equipment, property, or mission objectives without involving harm to humans or to 
the environment, this handbook (within the discretion of the decision maker) recommends that items to be 
managed to high standards be defined in terms of risk drivers rather than SCIs. A risk driver is any 
significant contributor to safety performance risk. Because the definition of risk drivers is based on the 
combination of probability and consequence (i.e., risk), rather than just consequence, there are fewer risk 
drivers than SCIs. Thus, the focus on risk drivers when the measure of safety does not involve harm to 
humans or to the environment results in fewer items to be managed with associated cost savings. In 
should be emphasized, however, that even SCIs that are not risk drivers have to be continually monitored 
to ensure that the basis for their not being risk drivers remains intact. 
The ISA is a necessary, though not necessarily exclusive, basis for safety-critical item designation. The 
ISA-based SCIs may be thought of as the items that have to be made to come true so that the ISA results 
will, in turn, also come true. Functioning of SCIs at properly allocated levels of capability, reliability, and 
availability assures that the likelihood of adverse safety consequences is reduced to the required level. 
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As the program or project evolves, the designation of SCIs may evolve to include elements that are 
identified in the RISC as being critical to the safety case even though they may not be explicitly 
considered in the ISA. Some of these additional SCIs might then be incorporated into the next iteration of 
the ISA if they have an impact on the analysis of safety performance. In this way, the formulation of 
models for the ISA and the development of the RISC work in tandem. 
The adequacy of safety-critical item designation is ultimately at the discretion of the Acquirer, and may 
include (for example) items associated with safety-related engineering requirements levied for reasons 
such as defense-in-depth or margin preservation, independent of the ISA. Other aspects of program 
controls and commitments covered within the system safety framework, but not necessarily as part of an 
ISA, include configuration management, quality assurance, training and certification of personnel, use of 
best practices and lessons learned, and assurance that safety requirements are being complied with. Any 
specific levied requirements, controls, and commitments that are considered critical to safety could be 
designated as SCIs. 
SAFETY CRITICAL ITEMS 
Safety critical items (SCIs) are elements or attributes of the system that are important to safety, including 
hardware, software, interfaces between hardware and software, the human interface, operating 
procedures, and management practices. This definition is somewhat broader than the definition in MIL-
STD-882E, which states that an SCI is “a hardware or software item that has been determined through 
analysis to potentially contribute to a hazard with Catastrophic or Critical mishap potential, or that may be 
implemented to mitigate a hazard with Catastrophic or Critical mishap potential.” In this handbook, the 
set of SCIs is defined to include all things that need to be assured if the RISC is to be valid, and in 
particular, if the Acquirer’s safety requirements are to be met with the needed assurance.  
SCIs pertains to safety in the context of freedom from harm to humans or to the environment, but it may 
not always be necessary to apply SCIs in the context of safety that pertains to freedom from loss of 
equipment, property, or mission objectives. The decision maker may determine that safety in the latter 
context may be assured by attending to risk drivers, a subset of SCIs that, in addition to being critical to 
safety, have to have a high enough failure probability or probability of occurrence to be significant 
contributors to the safety performance risk. SCIs that are not risk drivers may not have to be managed to 
the same level of certification when the threat to safety does not involve harm to humans or the 
environment, but still have to be monitored to ensure that the basis for their not being risk drivers remains 
intact. 
The Administrator’s letter to the NASA staff dated April 19, 2013, provides a rationale for accepting 
higher risk tolerance for loss of mission or loss of equipment than for loss of crew or harm to workers. 
Quoting from part of that letter: “… As long as we ensure that our people are protected we can manage 
and tolerate failures as part of the price of progress. … As we prepare to undertake the many challenges 
offered in the President’s 2014 budget for our agency, I ask you to continue to think about how we can 
identify and seize opportunities to make progress quickly and affordably, identify and manage risks, learn 
fast and adapt our plans to take the next steps. While we do this, we must constantly balance our risks and 
rewards and always, always put the lives and safety of our people first.” 
3.2.5 Performance Monitoring Support 
System safety supports effective performance monitoring, both in the development of monitoring 
protocols and in responding to performance data. The ISA is used to risk-inform the selection of system 
attributes that will be monitored, to ensure both that significant uncertainties are reduced as experience 
accumulates and that important performance-related assumptions in the ISA remain valid over the system 
life cycle. Anomalous performance data are scrutinized for their potential impact on safety (e.g., via 
accident precursor analysis [29]) and managed accordingly. 
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3.3 Development of the RISC (Argument for Safety) 
A RISC is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, 
comprehensible and valid case that a system is or will be adequately safe for a given application in a 
given environment. It addresses each of the operational safety objectives of the system, including plans 
for achieving safety objectives that are applicable to later phases of the system life cycle. RISCs are 
prepared for the purpose of making the case for safety at KDPs. 
The elements of the RISC are [30]: 
 An explicit set of safety claims about the system(s), for example, the probability of an accident or 
a group of accidents is low 
 Evidence justifying the claims, for example, representative operating history, redundancy in 
design, or results of analysis 
 Structured safety arguments that link claims to evidence using logically valid rules of inference 
The interaction of these elements is illustrated in Figure 3-6 for a safety claim supported by two 
independent arguments. 
 
Figure 3-6. A Safety Claim Supported by Two Independent Arguments 
3.4 Evaluation of the RISC  
Upon submittal of the RISC to the Acquirer, the Acquirer, usually through a designated Evaluation Team 
(referred to as the Evaluator), conducts an evaluation of the RISC to determine the technical adequacy of 
its safety claims. RISC evaluation is carried out based on defined evaluation protocols for the system at a 
particular point in its life cycle. For each claim in the RISC, it is the task of the Acquirer to: 
 Understand the evidence behind the claims. 
 Evaluate the evidence to determine its validity. 
 Provide judgment as to validity of the claims. 
In other words, to evaluate the RISC, the claims in the RISC are critically reviewed, thereby making use 
of the collected evidence related to the safety of the system. The Evaluator ultimately rates the RISC 
overall as being Acceptable or Unacceptable. In order to provide rationale that the RISC is acceptable, the 
Evaluator must be able to infer from the evidence in its totality that the truth of the top claim (e.g., that the 
system is adequately safe) has been demonstrated with high confidence. The ability to make this inference 
is based on the Evaluator’s knowledge of the system as a whole and of the various combinations of 
requirements that have to be satisfied in order for the system to be demonstrably safe. 
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In the evaluation process, it is important for the reviewer(s) to evaluate the RISC from a critical 
viewpoint, examining the supporting evidence as necessary to develop confidence in the claims at all 
levels. The output of the RISC evaluation is a set of evaluation findings summarizing the review and 
indicating potential areas of weakness in the RISC.  
Safety case evaluation is part of the Acquirer’s safety assurance and risk management processes. It is a 
particular instance of supporting a risk acceptance decision. 
RISC development an iterative process that is complete when the Acquirer is satisfied that the technical 
basis of the RISC is sound. The completed RISC, communicated in the form of a RISC Report, and the 
RISC evaluation, communicated in the form of a RISC Evaluation Report, become the safety-specific 
technical bases supporting the decision for which the RISC was developed. 
RISC submittal entails a commitment to maintaining its validity, upon which the Acquirer’s decision will 
be predicated. As such, the commitments and understandings captured in the RISC become part of the 
performance baseline to be managed subsequently under the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) 
elements of NPR 8000.4A. The risk of a shortfall in safety performance relative to this baseline is 
managed under the same risk management process within which all other performance risks are managed. 
If thresholds have been established for safety performance measures, then risk elevation will be required 
should threshold satisfaction be threatened by emergent conditions. 
As mentioned earlier, the RISC is not intended to be the sole basis for the decision-maker’s risk 
acceptance decision. The acceptance of risk is a decision process that is intended to be informed by the 
RISC and by the evaluation of the RISC (i.e., RISC-informed) but not constrained by the RISC or by its 
evaluation (i.e., not RISC-based). 
3.5 Interactions between the Acquirer and Provider  
In one sense, the Acquirer-Provider paradigm defines a division of responsibilities, where the Provider is 
responsible for developing the safety case and the Acquirer for evaluating it. In another sense, it also 
defines a collaborative environment wherein the setting of requirements at a program or project level and 
the means for verifying them depend upon agreements forged between the Provider and the Acquirer. The 
collaboration is consistent with the fact that the missions for space exploration are becoming more 
complex and the risks are increasingly cross-cutting. 
Toward this end, the Provider of a system is asked to conduct an SSRA early in the system life cycle, 
which serves as a basis for subsequent communication with the Acquirer about the necessity and 
sufficiency of the requirement set that is agreed to. This collaboration continues throughout the life cycle 
in the form of periodic reviews, requests for additional information (RAIs), and compliance with such 
requests. At each KDP, the objective is to provide the decision-making-authority within the acquiring 
organization with sufficient confidence to justify a decision to proceed to the next KDP. 
In describing the interactions between the two, there is presumed to be a systems engineering (SE) 
function or its equivalent and a system safety (SS) function or its equivalent for both the Acquirer and the 
Provider, that together provide an integrated product. Their interactions with respect to system safety are 
summarized in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 and described below. 
As shown in Table 3-1, the interactive process starts with the Acquirer’s SE function, in consultation with 
the Acquirer’s SS function, specifying a set of requirements including safety requirements that are 
deemed to be achievable within the technical, cost, and schedule constraints of the program/project. These 
requirements and their rationale are documented in the system’s requirements documents as specified in 
the Systems Engineering Handbook [13]. 
The Provider's SE function, in consultation with the Provider's SS function, develops the framework for 
the design, realization, and operation of the system and determines whether or not the safety requirements 
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specified by the Acquirer's SE function can be achieved. The Provider’s framework for design, 
realization, and operation and the justification for claiming that they will meet the Acquirer’s 
requirements are documented in the Provider’s System Safety Management Plan. If the Provider believes 
that it is not possible to satisfy all the Acquirer’s requirements, there may be a need for the Acquirer and 
Provider to negotiate and reach an agreement on how to resolve this problem. The results of the 
negotiation should be promptly documented in a Memorandum of Understanding, and if the negotiation 
results in a rebaselining of the requirements, the appropriate system requirements documents should be 
updated to reflect this rebaselining. 
Table 3-1. Interactions between the Acquirer’s and Provider’s Systems Engineering and System Safety 
Functions during Formulation of Requirements 
 
The SSRA facilitates this process. It serves to clarify the detailed requirements (including allocated and 
derived requirements) that the Provider expects to address in the ensuing development of the system, and 
evaluates whether the satisfaction of these requirements will provide satisfaction of the top-level 
requirements. It also serves to facilitate negotiations between the Acquirer and Provider concerning the 
Acquirer-levied safety requirements. 
Upon further development and maturation of the system design concept by the Provider’s SE function, the 
Provider's SS function develops a RISC, as shown in Table 3-2. The RISC demonstrates how the 
following aspects of system safety have been and/or will be treated during the program/project 
development and operation: 
 Objectives-based safety claims 
 Integrated analysis and testing, including implementation of a graded analysis approach 
 Modeling and simulation credibility assessment 
 Safety risk margin assessment 
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 Incorporation of relevant best practices and lessons learned from present and previous programs/ 
projects 
 Processes to evaluate departures from the plan 
 Design, programmatic, and organizational provisions to reduce UU risks 
 Risk-informing of key system safety decisions through a risk-informed decision making (RIDM) 
process, and continuous management of the implementation of those decisions through a CRM 
process 
 Risk-informing of important system safety support activities including testing, training, quality 
control, and maintenance 
 Processes for tailoring and allocating requirements 
 Implementation of the ASARP philosophy 
 Implementation of levied requirements 
The Provider documents the RISC in a RISC report.  
Table 3-2. Interactions between the Acquirer’s and Provider’s Systems Engineering and System Safety 
Functions during Preparation and Evaluation of the Risk-Informed Safety Case 
 
At the behest of the Acquirer’s SE function, the Acquirer's SS function evaluates the RISC and 
determines whether the system is adequately safe for its intended mission(s). The results of this evaluation 
are documented in the RISC Evaluation Report. If the Acquirer's SE and SS functions believe that the 
system may be adequately safe but the Provider has not sufficiently demonstrated it, then the Acquirer 
and Provider will negotiate the remaining evidence to be developed by the Provider in order to 
demonstrate adequate safety. The Provider’s SE function develops the additional evidence, and the 
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Provider’s SS function incorporates it into the RISC and updates the documentation in the RISC report 
accordingly. 
This negotiation between the Acquirer and Provider after the evaluation of the RISC may include 
discussions of possible architectural and design changes, additional controls, relaxation of technical, cost, 
and/or schedule constraints, and/or relaxation of the safety requirements that are not satisfied. The results 
of such negotiations should be promptly documented in a Memorandum of Understanding and should 
later be included in the final documentation of the RISC. 
The Acquirer’s SE function, in consultation with the Acquirer’s SS function, provides their judgment of 
whether the system has been demonstrated to be adequately safe, and the Acquirer’s decision making 
authority makes the decision whether or not to authorize the Provider to proceed. 
These processes and the associated interactions are repeated between each major program/project review 
and the documentation is updated accordingly. 
3.6 System Safety throughout the System Life Cycle 
NASA programs and projects are managed to life cycles, the division of the program’s and project’s 
pursuits over the full lifetime of the program or project, based on the expected maturity of information 
and products as they move through defined phases in the life cycle. Figure 3-7 shows a simplified version 
of a project’s life cycle to illustrate the relationship between the phases, the key decision points and 
application of the system safety framework. (Program and project life-cycle phases are described in NPR 
7123.1B.) The vertical thickness of each shape in the figure is intended to notionally indicate the level of 
effort and/or rigor of each activity. In general, it is expected that adequate safety performance is best 
assured when system safety activities are conducted beginning early in the system life cycle. 
 
Figure 3-7. Life-Cycle Perspective on the System Safety Framework (Notional) 
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4. Setting Safety Objectives and Associated Requirements: The 
Acquirer’s Role 
This chapter provides guidance and examples that expand upon the overview for specifying safety 
objectives and associated requirements presented in Section 3.1. The following subjects from that 
overview are discussed sequentially in Sections 4.1 through 4.4: 
 Setting minimum tolerable levels of safety performance at the system level: the total probability 
of loss 
 Developing safety performance requirements at the system level: the probability of loss from 
known risks 
 Levying deterministic engineering and process safety requirements 
 Setting verification procedures for each requirement 
4.1 Setting Minimum Tolerable Levels of Safety Performance at the System Level: 
the Total Probability of Loss  
4.1.1 The Acquirer’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The areas to be addressed in setting minimum tolerable levels of safety at the system level, and the depth 
to which they should be addressed, depend upon the value of the system to NASA. For a system that is of 
critical value, minimum tolerable levels of safety should be developed with the following considerations: 
 They should address the total probability of loss, including loss from known risks and loss from 
UU risks. 
 They should reflect appropriate stakeholder input. 
 They should span the set of adverse safety consequence types, including death, injury, 
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, degradation or loss of mission 
objectives, or damage to the environment. 
 They should be informed by the safety performance of applicable baselines (e.g., Shuttle). 
 They should be informed by an assessment of what is feasible (e.g., via ISA). 
 They should be balanced against the potential rewards of system use. 
 They should include limits imposed by applicable requirements and standards. 
 For crewed systems, they include limits on the probability of loss of crew (P(LOC)) 12. 
 They should be decomposed into safety thresholds that specify a minimum tolerable initial safety 
performance, safety goals that specify a minimum tolerable level of long-term safety 
performance, and timeframes or safety growth profiles that define long-term for each safety goal 
(e.g., for systems that experience design maturation over the long term). 
 For systems without a defined mission, they should be defined on a suitable alternate basis (e.g., 
the safety associated with executing a specific system function or capability). 
                                                            
12 NASA has established minimum tolerable levels of safety for crew transportation missions to the International 
Space Station (ISS) [7]. Minimum tolerable levels of safety for crew transportation to other destinations may be 
developed as matters of policy as mission concepts develop. 
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For systems of lower (noncritical) value, the Decision Maker in combination with the Technical Authority 
should select which of these areas of consideration apply. 
This next subsections address the following topics pertaining to the setting of minimum tolerable levels of 
safety performance: 
1. Establishing sub-cases for different key mission objectives (KMOs) 
2. Developing system safety risk margins for each KMO 
3. Developing thresholds and goals for the total loss probability for each KMO 
4. Justification of the use of ratios 
4.1.2 Establishing Sub-Cases for Different Key Mission Objectives (KMOs) 
In general terms, the missions that NASA is concerned with include single-objective missions and 
multiple-objective missions. A single-objective mission may involve a single launch with a single 
purpose (e.g., the launch of the Hubble satellite) or could include multiple launches with a single purpose 
(e.g., multiple launches of the same system to deliver supplies to the ISS). The distinguishing feature of a 
single-objective mission from the point of view of this handbook is that a single safety case suffices. 
On the other hand, there are missions with multiple objectives, where the decision maker needs to be 
presented with safety sub-cases for different mission objectives in order to make decisions affecting the 
program/project as a whole. When there is a need for the safety case to be divided into sub-cases, it is 
usually not necessary for the various sub-cases to stand alone. The same set of arguments may cover more 
than one sub-case as long as the differences between the different sub-cases are recognized and accounted 
for. For example, separate safety sub-cases may appear in the form of separate claims within the same 
RISC or in the form of separate evidence within the same claim. The key point is that the differences in 
the safety arguments and evidence required for different mission objectives are highlighted and explained. 
Two examples of multiple objective missions are noted below: 
 For a planetary exploration mission that lasts for years and has many rendezvous events, a safety 
sub-case would be needed for each major rendezvous event. For example, in the case of the 
Galileo mission, a safety case might be provided for the Jupiter probe shock wave crossing, for 
rendezvous with Jupiter’s moons (Ganymede, Callisto, Europa, and Io), and for final impact with 
Jupiter. Failure to rendezvous with Io might not be considered as critical as failure to rendezvous 
with Europa, because the Europa rendezvous occurs prior to the Io rendezvous and is considered 
more important from a scientific perspective. Thus, there might be a decision to proceed even if 
the safety sub-case for Io rendezvous were weak, as long as the sub-case for Europa rendezvous 
was strong. 
 For a mission consisting of many flights with each flight having one destination, a safety sub-case 
should be provided for any flight that marks a significant change from previous flights. For 
example, in the case of the Space Shuttle, separate safety sub-cases would be expected for the 
Hubble repair mission as opposed to ISS missions. On the basis of these safety sub-cases, the 
decision maker might opt to proceed with one but not the other. 
For purposes of this handbook, the objectives for which separate safety sub-cases are required are referred 
to as key mission objectives (KMOs) and are specified by the Acquiring organization. They are not the 
same as KDPs as defined in the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [13], as most of the KDPs occur 
prior to initial operation, whereas most KMOs refer to different operational states. 
Consistent with the notion that there may be a need for separate safety sub-cases for different KMOs, the 
Acquirer may also wish to specify different requirements for different KMOs. Generally speaking, the 
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requirements will be presented in terms of a set of requirements that are applicable to all KMOs 
augmented by sets of requirements that are applicable only to specific KMOs. 
The safety cases for different KMOs are initially prepared during preliminary design and then updated at 
key reviews during the design, realization, and operation of the system. For example, updates might be 
required at Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical Design Review (CDR), System Integration 
Review (SIR), Critical Events Readiness Reviews (CERRs), and Decommissioning Review (DR). 
4.1.3 Developing Safety Performance Risk Margins 
Risk model completeness has long been recognized as a challenge for synthetic methods of risk analysis 
such as PRA as traditionally practiced [8]. These methods are generally effective at identifying system 
failures that result from combinations of component failures that propagate through the system due to the 
functional dependencies of the system that are represented in the risk model. However, they are 
understandably deficient at identifying system failures that result from unexpected or underappreciated 
scenarios, frequently involving complex intra-system interactions that may have little to do with the 
intentionally engineered functional relationships of the system. Such underappreciated interactions (along 
with other factors) were operative in both the Challenger and Columbia disasters [31, 32].  
Because of the nature of UU risks, involving interactions between subsystems, they tend not to be 
revealed by subsystem testing [33]. Full-up testing has the potential to reveal them, but the cost of full-up 
testing in as-flown environments is generally too high to allow a quantity of tests that would demonstrate 
low probabilities of occurrence. 
It is possible, however, to gain major insights into the historical importance of UU risks, as compared to 
known and fully analyzed risks, by examining programs for which there is a history of catastrophic 
accidents and/or near misses13.  
NASA’s probabilistic safety thresholds do not explicitly address the question of how to account for UU 
risks. Yet, the accepted expectation is that the demonstration of safety threshold satisfaction is to be based 
on the actual risk, which includes both known, adequately modeled sources, as well as UU risks. 
Volume 1 introduces the concept of safety risk reserve as an approach for compensating for UU risks, and 
states that there are methods for estimating how large the reserve should be. In this section of Volume 2, 
we are concerned with how such reserves should be estimated. Also in this section, we use the term 
“margin on the loss probability” in place of the term “safety risk reserve” to emphasize the fact that the 
thresholds and goals are expressed in terms of maximum allowable loss probabilities, which are concrete 
measure of safety performance. Aside from this semantic distinction, there is no real difference between 
the meanings of the two terms. 
Safety performance margins were defined in Section 3.1.1 and their relationship to safety thresholds and 
safety requirements were depicted in Figure 3.4. A safety performance risk margin is a resource 
(programmatic) margin similar to mass margins and management budgetary reserves, not a desired design 
(physical) margin on the end product (such as a margin on load carrying capacity of a structural element). 
Likewise, applying a margin on loss probability to account for the risk from UU scenarios is analogous to 
the systems engineering approach of using margins to protect against exceeding established limits in the 
technical, cost, and schedule mission execution domains [13, 34-38]. In all cases, the main purpose of the 
margin is to accommodate unknown or underappreciated conditions or events that tend to arise during 
design, development, fielding, and operation. This principle applies to any metric that has a numerical 
constraint: i.e., technical metrics (launch mass, payload mass, power, thrust, throughput, etc.), safety 
metrics (probability of LOC, LOV, LOM, or equipment loss), cost, and schedule. 
                                                            
13 Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 will provide examples of how such assessments might be conducted. 
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 Comparison of System Safety Risk Margins with Mass Margins and with Cost and Schedule 
Reserves 
Mass margins are adopted for use within NASA Systems Engineering during the design phase of a project 
in order to insure that the total vehicle mass stays within its allowable limit as the design progresses. The 
policy for specifying and adhering to mass margins is expressed in [35], wherein the following terms are 
used: 
 Mass Limit: The maximum mass that is physically consistent with the system’s operating 
constraints (e.g., the maximum mass that the launch vehicle can accommodate) 
 Mass Margin: A contingency or reserve intended to mitigate potential mass increases during the 
design process emanating from omissions or refinement of existing design requirements 
 Mass Growth Allowance (MGA): An allowance for the expected mass growth during the design 
process resulting from lack of maturity in the current design data 
 Customer Reserve: A mass contingency reserved by NASA 
 Basic Mass: The current calculated mass based on an assessment of the most recent baseline 
design. The designers are required to ensure that the basic mass of the design is enough below the 
mass limit to accommodate the margin, the MGA, and the customer reserve. 
According to [35], the recommended amount of mass margin varies depending upon the complexity of the 
design and the degree to which it emanates from a heritage design (i.e., whether the space system is a new 
system, a modified system, or a production system). It also varies according to the risk that the procuring 
authority and the contractor are willing to accept. Tables of recommended values for MGA and margins 
based on historical mass growth due to both anticipated and unexpected sources are provided in [33]. The 
recommended values are intended to cover the upper limit of the uncertainty in the predicted mass. Thus, 
the margin is expected to provide high confidence that the total mass of the design prior to the first launch 
will not be greater than the mass limit, although there is no specific numerical confidence level cited in 
the reference. 
Cost and schedule margins, or reserves, are governed by the Joint Confidence Level (JCL) rule. The 
NASA Cost Estimating Handbook [39] states that at Confirmation Reviews and Authority to Proceed 
decision points, the cost estimate must include an appropriately chosen level of unallocated future 
expense (UFE)/reserves. The term “reserves,” according to [39], includes “funding, performance, 
manpower, and services allocated to and managed by the program/project manager for the resolution of 
problems normally encountered to mitigate risks while ensuring compliance to the specified 
program/project scope.” 
There are six activities associated with developing UFE/reserves: 
 Determine the project’s cost drivers with input from the project manager and staff. 
 Develop probability distributions for the cost model uncertainty. 
 Develop probability distributions for the technical and schedule cost drivers. 
 Run the risk model. 
 Identify the probability that the actual cost is less than or equal to the point estimate. 
 Recommend sufficient UFE/reserves to achieve a 70% confidence level for both cost and 
schedule. 
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Unlike the mass margin or the reserves for cost and schedule, the magnitude of the margin for loss 
probability can be interpreted as a best estimate of the effect of UU scenarios on the actual, or total, risk. 
The use of a best estimate rather than a high-confidence estimate is consistent with the fact that the 
inclusion of UU risks together with known risks in defining the threshold introduces an element of high 
uncertainty and corresponding arbitrariness that would make a high-confidence estimate difficult to 
justify. Furthermore, whereas the possibility of over-mass, over-budget, or behind-schedule conditions 
can potentially be showstoppers for a mission, the implications of over-threshold for P(LOC), P(LOV), or 
P(LOM) are not so clear-cut. 
4.1.4 Developing Thresholds and Goals for the Total Loss Probability	
As mentioned in Section 4.1.3, the safety threshold (i.e., threshold value for the loss probability) should 
reflect an achievable expectation for the actual probability including both known risks and UU risks. The 
known risks are generally quantified using PRA methods, which may be more or less detailed depending 
on the criticality of the mission14. Realistic expectations for the UU risks are inferred from historically 
verifiable margins. Separate considerations apply for low earth orbit missions compared to other 
missions. 
 Safety Thresholds for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Missions 
In the absence of a launch abort system (LAS), a reasonable threshold value for LEO missions may be 
inferred from a combination of the Space Shuttle known risk at the time of the first launch and the 
appropriate multiplier to account for UU risks15. An argument can be made that the same threshold would 
also be appropriate for loss of vehicle for robotic missions involving LEO, since vehicle failure during 
LEO might result in threats to public safety on Earth. 
Because all future crewed missions will have to have LAS capability by virtue of the human-rating 
requirements for space systems [40], the threshold for P(LOC) for future crewed missions will be more 
stringent than the value that is achievable without LAS capability. An estimate for the likelihood that a 
LAS would save the crew in the event of an accident that results in LOV can be inferred from existing 
analyses available in the public literature [41-46]16.  
 Safety Thresholds for Other Types of Missions 
Known risks for new systems intended for missions other than LEO can be estimated by extending risk 
models for existing systems intended for LEO to include additional design elements and mission profiles 
that characterize the new system in the new mission. As a reasonable approximation, it could be assumed 
that the safety performance factors17 to account for UU risks are the same as those derived for LEO 
systems. 
 Safety Goals 
The safety goal is the goal value for the loss probability and should reflect an achievable expectation for 
the total loss probability after the system has matured. The goal is relevant for missions that involve many 
individual flights and presumes that after a sufficient number of them, the loss probability will have 
decreased to a steady-state value. By this time, significant contributions from UU risks will have been 
uncovered and corrected for (i.e., infant mortality effects will have been wrung out). In general, based on 
                                                            
14 The level of detail based on mission criticality will be discussed further in Section 5.2.4. 
15 An example will be provided in Section 4.5.5. 
16 Use of these analyses to derive a realistic threshold for P(LOC) including LAS capability will be explored further 
by way of example in Section 4.5.5. 
17 The safety performance factor is the ratio of the loss probability from all risks to the loss probability from known 
risks 
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experience in the Space Shuttle program and for launch vehicles, steady state can be assumed to have 
been achieved after 100 to 150 flights18. 
Wringing out the significant UU risks is a safety growth process. Safety growth is analogous to reliability 
growth, but the former focuses on reducing system level failures, whereas the latter has tended to focus on 
reducing subsystem and component level failures. Historical evidence for Shuttle and for some of the 
earlier launch vehicles (Soyuz/Molniya and Delta) indicates that during the period of safety growth, the 
loss probability from known risks decreases at the same time as the loss probability from UU risks, 
though not as rapidly. A factor-of-2 reduction in loss probability from known risks during this period is 
typical19. Thus, it is reasonable for the safety goal to be more-or-less a factor of 2 less than the initial loss 
probability from known risks. This reduction in the known risks over 100 to 150 flights is attributable to 
improvements in hardware, software, and processes that occur normally during the operational phase as 
part of ASARP implementation. 
4.1.5 The Use of Ratios	
In estimating the margin to account for UU risks, it is helpful to think that the ratio of the loss probability 
from all risks (known plus UU) to the loss probability from just known risks correlates, at least 
qualitatively, with various design, organizational, and programmatic factors. Although it is not necessary 
to assume that the correlation applies only when using a ratio, it simplifies the process. The example in 
Section 4.5 and its subsections (particularly Section 4.5.4) will explore the degree to which the ratio 
appears to correlate with knowable design, organizational, and programmatic factors and will provide a 
rationale for why this may be a reasonable supposition. 
4.2 Developing Safety Performance Requirements at the System Level: the 
Probability of Loss from Known Risks 
4.2.1 The Acquirer’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
For a system that is of critical value, safety performance requirements should be developed in concert 
with the following considerations: 
 They should address the probability of loss from known risks. 
 They should consider each consequence type, including death, injury, occupational illness, 
damage to or loss of equipment or property, degradation or loss of mission objectives, or damage 
to the environment. 
 They should reflect the application of safety performance margins relative to minimum tolerable 
levels of safety, to account for unknown and underappreciated sources of safety performance risk. 
 For crewed systems, they should include a limit on the probability of loss of crew (i.e., P(LOC)). 
 They should be consistent with any safety growth or degradation profiles that have been 
specified.  
 They should be reevaluated and possibly rebaselined if changes to the system or its management 
invalidate the bases upon which the safety performance margins were developed. 
 They should apply to all milestone reviews for which a RISC is required. 
                                                            
18 This inference will be demonstrated in Section 4.5.2. 
19 This inference will also be demonstrated in Section 4.5.2. 
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 They should be accompanied by specification of safety verification methods (e.g., analysis, 
demonstration, inspection, or test) according to which the Provider may argue compliance, and 
according to which the Acquirer may deem the requirement to have been satisfied. 
For systems of lower (noncritical) value, the Decision Maker in combination with the Technical Authority 
should select which of these areas of consideration apply. 
4.2.2 Developing Performance Requirements for the Probability of Loss from Known 
Risks 
Continuing the thread from Section 4.1 and its subsections, the requirement for the probability of loss 
from known risks at the time of the first flight is related to the safety threshold and the safety performance 
factor as follows: Initial Requirement = Safety Threshold Divided by Safety Performance Factor. For 
example, if the safety threshold for total loss probability is 0.01 and the safety performance factor is 5 
(reflecting a belief that the loss probability from unknown and underappreciated risks is four times the 
loss probability from known risks), then the initial requirement for the known loss probability is 0.01 / 5 = 
0.002. 
If the mission consists of many flights so that all significant UU risks are wrung out by the time of the last 
flight, then at the time of the last flight the value of the requirement should be reduced to the value of the 
safety goal. If, as is typical, the expected loss probability for the matured system is assumed to be half the 
initial known loss probability, then the mature-system requirement for the known loss probability would 
be 0.002 / 2 = 0.001. 
Between the first and last flights, the requirement decreases at a rate that is consistent with the burndown 
of known risks that has been observed for other space missions. It typically takes about 125 flights for the 
system to reach full maturity and the burndown relationship is exponential20. 
4.3 Levying Deterministic Engineering and Process Safety Requirements 
4.3.1 The Acquirer’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Acquirer’s responsibility in levying deterministic and process safety requirements can be summarized 
as follows: 
 Based on the System Safety Requirements Analysis (SSRA) that the Acquirer develops as per 
Section 3.1 and on current best practices, identify and baseline safety-related engineering 
requirements and process requirements that comport with fulfillment of the needed level of safety 
performance and reflect application of the ASARP principle. 
The following two topics pertaining to this responsibility are discussed in the next subsections: 
1. Levying deterministic safety requirements 
2. Tailoring deterministic safety requirements 
4.3.2 Levying Deterministic Safety Requirements 
Deterministic safety requirements (which include both engineering and process requirements) are based 
on the Acquirer’s understanding of best practices and lessons learned from relevant experience. There are 
many sources of information pertaining to best practices and lessons learned from NASA’s experiences 
with spaceflight.  
                                                            
20 These observations will be demonstrated in Section 4.5 (Figures 4-4 through 4-6, and 4-8). 
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Of these, the following provide a suitable starting point: 
 Design best practices: GSFC-STD-1000F (The Goddard Open Learning Design (GOLD) Rules), 
“Rules for the Design, Development, Verification, and Operation of Flight Systems,” Feb 2013 
[47]. 
 Design and test best practices: “NASA Preferred Practices for Design and Test of Robust 
Systems,” Jet Propulsion Laboratory, http://oce.jpl.nasa.gov/preferred_practices.html#test [48]. 
 Program and project management best practices, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project 
Management Handbook,” May 2013 [49]. 
 Reliability and maintainability best practices, NASA Technical Memorandum 4322, “NASA 
Reliability Preferred Practices for Design and Test,” and NASA Technical Memorandum 4628, 
“Recommended Techniques for Effective Maintainability,” see website 
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/rm/prefprac.htm [50, 51]. 
 NASA Lessons Learned System, NASA Engineering Network, see website http://llis.nasa.gov 
[52]. 
As described in the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [13], deterministic engineering requirements 
may be of several types or categories. Some of these are summarized below: 
• Functional requirements define what the system (element/subsystem/component) must do. For 
example, a requirement that the system must provide crew abort capability from ground to low 
earth orbit (LEO) is a functional requirement.  
• Constraint requirements limit or restrict the function or performance of the system. For example, 
a requirement that the acceleration on astronauts during an abort not exceed 7g’s is a constraint 
requirement. 
• Verification requirements establish how functional, performance, and constraint requirements 
will be verified. For example, a requirement for performance and constraint requirements on the 
Launch Abort System to be demonstrated through modeling and simulation is a verification 
requirement.  
• Interface requirements concern constraints involving interconnections between components or 
subsystems, interfaces with support and test equipment, and interfaces between the system and 
the external world. For example, a requirement concerning the signals that a Launch Abort 
System receives from a Flight Control Computer is an interface requirement.  
4.3.3 Tailoring Deterministic Safety Requirements 
A tailoring process (to be discussed here and in Section 5.3.2) is used to winnow down the sum total of 
best practices and lessons learned to those that are specifically relevant to the mission and/or system being 
investigated. Because the list of safety requirements levied on a program or project can be very long (e.g., 
see Constellation Architectural Requirements Document [53]), there can be considerable savings in time 
and cost if some of the requirements levied by the Acquirer can be excluded based on their not being 
relevant or not being practicable for the system being developed. The Acquirer should therefore attempt 
to avoid levying requirements that are not relevant and/or not capable of being applied to the program or 
project or to a specific system or component. The Acquirer may also opt not to levy requirements that 
would normally be supported by best practices/lessons learned for either or both of the following reasons: 
• They do not provide an evident or discernible net increase in safety for the present mission. 
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• They lead to a disproportionate or impracticable penalty in cost, schedule, and/or technical 
performance. 
When a relevant best practice or lesson learned is not translated into a levied requirement, the Acquirer 
should state the associated rationale for not doing so. The process for reporting the tailoring of 
requirements should follow the procedures in NPR 7120.5E [34]. 
Section 5.3.2 will provide additional information and examples relating to the conditions under which 
levied requirements corresponding to best practices and/or lessons learned may be opted out based on 
ASARP considerations. 
4.4 Setting Verification Procedures for the Safety Requirements 
4.4.1 The Acquirer’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Acquirer’s responsibility in setting verification procedures for the safety requirements can be 
summarized as follows: 
 For every safety requirement levied, establish a safety verification method (e.g., analysis, 
demonstration, inspection, or test), negotiated with the Provider as part of the SSRA process. 
The following two topics pertaining to this responsibility are discussed in the next subsections: 
1. Setting initial verification procedures for the safety requirements 
2. Negotiating with the Provider to rebaseline requirements and reset verification procedures 
4.4.2 Setting Initial Verification Procedures 
Because safety is an emergent property of a system, which involves discovery on the part of both the 
Provider and the Acquirer as the system is designed, built, and operated, there is no catch-all set of 
verification procedures that can be prescribed during the initial requirement development phase that will 
assure ultimate achievement of the top operational safety objective: namely, that the system is adequately 
safe throughout all phases of the program/project. For example, if during the substantiation of the safety 
case, the results of testing and analysis are different from what is expected, future testing and analysis 
plans may need to be modified or reformulated. With this understanding, however, it is possible and 
desirable to set preliminary verification procedures with the expectation that as the program/project 
progresses, these verification procedures will evolve. Just as the requirements may need to be rebaselined 
as new information surfaces, the verification procedures may need to be rebaselined. 
The Acquirer initially specifies a set of tests, demonstrations, analyses, reporting procedures, or other 
approaches that the Acquirer posits as being sufficient if there are no surprises. The general process is for 
specific safety tests and analyses to be integrated into appropriate system Test and Evaluation (T&E) 
plans, including verification and validation plans. Where system-level integrated safety tests are not 
feasible, the Acquirer may specify that verification of compliance will be demonstrated using engineering 
analyses, analogies, laboratory tests, functional mockups, or models and simulations. The Acquirer will 
also specify what is expected in the way of review plans and the documentation of safety verification 
results. 
As part of the verification of requirements, per NPR 7123.1B [3], the Acquirer will specify a set of 
measures of performance (MOPs) and technical performance measures (TPMs) by which the safety of the 
overall system will be judged. Typical MOPs for probabilistic requirements might include the computed 
probability of loss of the system and the mean failure rates of major subsystems or components for 
specified conditions. For deterministic requirements they might include proof that design specifications 
  
 
44
have been met (e.g., that a certain subsystem is two-failure tolerant) or values of induced environmental 
parameters (e.g., accelerations, temperature, pressure, radiation). 
TPMs are used for progress measurement and generally meet the following criteria: (1) be a significant 
qualifier of the system to be monitored at critical events (e.g., inspections, planned tests); (2) be 
measurable both in terms of present values and in terms of projected progress profiles; and (3) include (as 
subsets) both leading indicators and margins. 
4.4.3 Negotiating with the Provider to Rebaseline Requirements and Reset 
Verification Procedures 
As mentioned earlier, there may be a need for the Acquirer and Provider to renegotiate on safety 
requirements and on verification procedures. The need centers around the fact that safety is an emergent 
property of a system that involves a discovery process as the system is developed and later operated. 
Guidelines for rebaselining performance requirements are provided in Section 2.3.2 of the RM Handbook 
[28]. The decision to request a rebaselining occurs within the Provider’s CRM activity, where disparities 
between requirements and the ability to satisfy them are first perceived.21 The concern is elevated within 
the Provider’s organization to the appropriate management authority. If the adjustments to requirements 
are straightforward and easily resolved, they may be agreed to by the appropriate level of management 
within the Acquirer’s organization and the agreement may be recorded in the SSMP and in the 
appropriate program’s/project’s requirements document. If the amount of change in the requirements is 
sufficiently large, however, the RIDM process should be invoked by the Provider to produce a proposed 
set of rebaselined requirements to present to the Acquirer. The Acquirer will then initiate a formal 
decision making process in accord with NASA procedural requirements. 
A decision to rebaseline certain safety requirements carries with it a need to reset the verification 
procedures that accompany those requirements. In addition, a need to reset verification procedures may 
occur even when there has been no change in the requirements, if it is discovered that the current 
verification procedures will not provide the desired confidence that the system is adequately safe. The 
process for resetting the verification procedures starts out similarly to the process for rebaselining 
requirements. The decision to request new or modified verification procedures initiates in the Provider’s 
CRM activity where the need is first recognized, and the concern is elevated within the Provider’s 
organization to the appropriate management authority. The negotiated agreement between the Provider 
and the Acquirer may involve little more than a handshake with an accompanying documented entry in 
the SSMP. Changes in verification procedures would not require a formal decision making process.
                                                            
21 The term 'Provider' here refers to the organization responsible for providing the system. The system provider can 
also be an acquirer with respect to contracted subsystem providers and may determine that a system level 
requirement needs to be rebaselined if a contractor’s allocated requirement cannot be met. 
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4.5 Example for Chapter 4  Deriving Safety Risk Margins, Safety Thresholds and 
Goals, and Probabilistic Safety Requirements 
In this example, the Acquirer uses knowledge gained from the historical record of successes and 
failures for the Space Shuttle, Atlas, Delta, Soyuz, and Molniya launch systems, together with 
results from the comprehensive Shuttle probabilistic risk assessment and general observations 
about organizational and programmatic failure causes from the literature to assist in the 
development of realistic safety performance risk margins, safety thresholds and goals, and 
probabilistic safety requirements. 
Although this example uses real data to infer plausible safety performance margins, we wish to 
emphasize that it is intended to illustrate a method and manner of thinking rather than argue for 
particular values for the margins. Alternative views on how to select and interpret the data may be 
equally valid. Different ways of looking at the data contribute to our perspective on the 
uncertainty, and these different perspectives are a fundamental consideration to be addressed in 
the development and evaluation of the RISC. 
A summary version of the analyses presented below may also be found in [54]. 
4.5.1 Space Shuttle Experience 
A recent JSC study by Hamlin, et al., [55] provides a basis for comparing the actual risk of LOC for the 
Space Shuttle prior to each flight with the risk of LOC that would have been calculated using known risks 
only. The calculations utilize the most recent Space Shuttle full-scope PRA model [56] in a retrospective, 
or backward-looking, mode. The risk model, since it was created after the Columbia accident, includes the 
knowledge gained from the Challenger and Columbia accidents, as well as from all the other flights that 
occurred during the Shuttle lifetime. Accordingly, the JSC authors were able to use the risk model to 
estimate, in hindsight, what the total risk of LOC was at the time of each launch up to the very last one.
The result is shown in Figure 4-1. 
	
Figure	4‐1.	Results	of	a	Retrospective	Analysis	of	P(LOC)	for	the	Space	Shuttle	Compared	to	Earlier	PRA	
Predictions,	from	Hamlin,	et	al 
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Also shown in Figure 4-1 are results for P(LOC) obtained from various risk assessments exercised in a 
predictive mode. These include the following results: 
 In 1982, J. H. Wiggins Co. estimated P(LOC) for the Space Shuttle to be between 1/1000 and 1/10000 
based on engineering judgment [57]. 
 In 1983, R. K. Weatherwax of SERA Inc. applied more of a database analysis to the Wiggins 
approach to estimate P(LOC) at ~1/35 [58]. 
 The first in house limited-scope PRA for the Shuttle in 1995 included ascent and entry/ landing and 
covered 3 Orbiter systems and the propulsion elements. It resulted in P(LOC) = 1/131. 
 An unpublished analysis in 1998 using QRAS was similar to the 1995 analysis but had no integration 
of elements. It resulted in P(LOC) = 1/234.	
 The full-scope PRA models developed and applied post-Columbia between 2003 and 2010 have 
resulted in P(LOC) values between 1/61 and 1/90. 
	
Figure	4‐2.	Correlation	of	Shuttle	Risks	from	Retrospective	Analysis	with	Changes	in	Design,	
Fabrication,	and	Operation	
The jagged nature of the retrospectively estimated total risks in Figure 4-1 is caused by responses to 
unexpected events that resulted in changes to the design, fabrication, or operation of the system. These are 
shown on Figure 4-2. The first major change was the re-design after the Challenger accident, which 
resulted in a reduction of the total risk of LOC by about 40%. Following soon after was a modification to 
the SRB nose cap to provide protection against debris impacts, resulting in a further reduction in the total 
risk by about 53%. Little change occurred thereafter until STS-86, when NASA’s compliance with an 
OSHA directive to discontinue the use of Freon in applying foam to the external tank unexpectedly caused 
a significant increase in the number of debris strikes on the Orbiter and raised the total risk of LOC by 
about 80%. The inclusion of vent holes in the foam to alleviate this problem led to a risk decrease of about 
a factor of 2.2. Return-to-flight changes after the Columbia accident during STS-114 resulted in a further 
risk decrease of about 35%. 
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The model used in the JSC analysis provided probabilities for all modeled accident scenarios that could 
lead to LOC. A list of the top accident scenarios and their probabilities prior to the first flight, STS-1, is 
reproduced in Table 4-1. Original values were calculated by Hamlin, et al., using the full-scale Shuttle 
PRA model modified to account for the design features at the time. Also shown in red are edited values 
based on assuming the Challenger and Columbia accidents had not occurred. The difference between the 
original and edited values is the effect of underappreciated risks based on the knowledge available at the 
time of STS-1.	
Using the process illustrated in Table 4-1 for all of the Shuttle flights, it is possible to construct a second 
curve on top of the one in Figure 4-2 that represents the historical variation of known risks for the Shuttle.
The result is shown in Figure 4-3. As a point of reference, the actual risk before the 25th flight (STS-51L) 
was about a factor of 5 times the risk that would have been predicted if a detailed PRA had been conducted 
based on information known before the Challenger accident. Similarly, the actual risk before the 87th flight 
(STS-86) was about a factor of 3 times the risk that would have been predicted. 
Table	4‐1.	Modification	of	Assessed	Probabilities	of	the	Top	Accident	Scenarios	Leading	to	LOC	at	the	
Time	of	the	First	Shuttle	Flight	Assuming	the	Challenger	and	Columbia	Accidents	Had	Not	Occurred	
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Figure	4‐3.	Comparison	of	Retrospective	Analyses	of	Shuttle	Risks	Accounting	for	Versus	Not	
Accounting	for	Revealed	LOC	Accidents	
Unknowns had been fairly well wrung out prior to STS-1 because the technology used in the Space 
Shuttle program was fairly mature. First, the Shuttle launch vehicle was based to a large extent on the 
design of the Titan launch vehicle and its successors, comprising a large liquid fuel booster with attached 
solid rocket motors. Features on the Shuttle that were essentially new (e.g., a payload that included the 
use of heat protective ceramic tiles) were extensively tested prior to the first crewed flight through both 
ground testing and unmanned flight testing. 
4.5.2 Launch Vehicle Experience 
For programs where there are large numbers of catastrophic accidents, it is possible to compare observed 
system failure rates early in the program with observed failure rates much later in the program to infer 
estimates of the magnitude of UU risks initially and how they burn down with time. By examining how 
these estimates vary across different launch systems, it is possible to draw insights about the attributes of 
the system and the management of the program/project that contribute to higher ratios of UU risks to 
known risks. 
There has been a long history of launch vehicle successes and failures since the 1950s. Between 1957 and 
1999, for example, there were 390 launch vehicle failures out of 4378 attempts throughout the world [59].
With such a large sampling of successes and failures, it is possible to perform meaningful statistical 
analyses of how the system failure rate has varied with time for a number of launch systems. 
At least four analyses of launch vehicle failure data across various systems have been performed 
previously. Two used a Bayesian methodology [60, 61] and the other two a frequentist methodology [62,
63]. In the example that follows, we utilize a simple frequentist approach to illustrate, for each of three 
launch systems, the observed failure rate near the beginning of the operational phase, the observed failure 
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rate after the UU risks were wrung down, and the number of launches that it took to reach the latter.* The 
purpose of using a simple approach in this example when other more rigorous statistical methods are
available is to increase the tutorial benefit; i.e., to illustrate the thought process with a minimum amount 
of mathematical complexity.  
It should be recognized that because there are different ways of looking at the data (e.g., Bayesian versus 
frequentist), significant differences in results might be obtained depending on the method used. Rather 
than viewing these differences as representing a flaw in one analysis approach versus another, they should 
be viewed as contributing to our perspective on the uncertainty associated with the analysis of the data.
Thus, such differences provide a contribution to the evaluation of the confidence of the RISC 
	 	Soyuz	and	Molniya	
The data for Soyuz and Molniya are shown in Figure 4-4. They are grouped together both here and in [59]
because they are of the same family and are very similar in design. Molniya was the predecessor for 
Soyuz. Between the two systems, as of 1998, there were 1458 launches with 69 failures. The 
Soyuz/Molniya system is an example of a launch system that was developed under very high time 
constraints during the early phase of the Cold War by an entity that did not possess a strong safety culture 
(i.e., the Soviet Government in the late 1950s and early 1960s), and thus it is not surprising that the initial 
total risk divided by the initial known risk appears in Figure 4-4 to be considerably larger than for the 
Shuttle in Figure 4-3. 
Atlas	
Atlas is an example of a launch system that was developed under significant time constraints during the 
early phase of the Cold War by an entity that placed more-or-less equal emphasis on safety and schedule 
(i.e., the U.S. Government in the late 1950s and early 1960s). Based on the data for Atlas shown in Figure
4-5, the ratio of the initial total risk to the initial known risk appears to be about the same as that for the 
Shuttle in Figure 4-3. However, both the numerator and the denominator in this ratio were about a factor 
of 5 higher for Atlas than for the Shuttle. 
Delta	
Unlike Soyuz/Molniya and Atlas, Delta is an example of a launch vehicle that was based on heritage 
technology. It was developed starting from the Thor vehicle with the objective of being more reliable. To 
accomplish this objective, components found to be unreliable in Thor were replaced by more reliable ones 
in Delta. The ratio of total initial risk to known initial risk for Delta in Figure 4-6 appears to be 
considerably less than for the Shuttle in Figure 4-3, as would be expected from the fact that Delta was 
more of a heritage system than the Shuttle.** 
	
____________________________________________	
*	The specific approach we used to develop the illustration in this example was to take a running snapshot of the 
number of launches required to produce 10 failures, using launch data provided in the International Reference Guide 
to Space Launch Systems [59]. For example, the Atlas launch vehicle had the first ten failures occurring within the 
first 19 flights, so we took a failure rate of 10/19 = 0.53 as being representative of the first 19 flights. 
** The first five Thor flights were failures but the next five were successes. By comparison, the first Delta flight 
was a failure but the next 22 were successes. The failure on the first Delta flight was due to an avionics problem, not 
a propulsion system problem. 
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Figure	4‐4.	Failure	History	for	the	Soyuz	and	Molniya	Launch	Vehicles	
	
	 		
Figure	4‐5.	Failure	History	for	the	Atlas	Launch	Vehicle	
Mature P(LOV) Level
Initial P(LOV) Level from Known Risks
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 500 1000 1500
P(LOV)
Chronological Flight Numer
Running Average 
over 10 Failures
Initial P(LOV) Level from All Risks 
(Note that there are 3 almost 
overlapping data points at this level)
KUI
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 50 100 150 200 250
P(LOV)
Chronological Flight Numer
Running Average over 
10 Failures
Mature P(LOV) Level
KUI
Initial P(LOV) Level 
from Known Risks
Initial P(LOV) Level from All Risks 
(Note that there are 2 almost 
overlapping data points at this level)
  
 
51
	
	
Figure	4‐6.	Failure	History	for	the	Delta	Launch	Vehicle	
4.5.3 Initial Loss Probability Margin 
Table 4-2, adapted from [54], provides suggested guidelines for specifying safety performance margins 
based on attributes of the system design, the project priorities, and the management culture. These 
guidelines were developed using a set of evidence that included but was not limited to the analyses in 
Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 of this handbook. It also included operational experience with commercial 
nuclear reactors and military systems, as well as human reliability experience as encoded within 
performance shaping factors. The suggested guidelines were not meant to be prescriptive for all 
applications but rather to give an indication of the magnitudes of safety performance margins that are 
typical based on a wide variety of experience. As mentioned earlier, alternative estimates based on other 
data sources and other analysis methods may be used when considered appropriate. 
As indicated in the parenthetical note under the title in Table 4-2, the applicability of the factors in the 
table is based on the assumption that the known probability of loss evaluated for the present system (i.e., 
the denominator in each factor) is consistent with results from analogous systems that have substantial 
operating experience accompanied by full-scope PRAs. Clearly the Space Shuttle and the ISS are 
examples of potential analogous systems. The factors in the table do not apply if the known probability of 
loss is evaluated only from a limited-scope PRA or other analysis method that consciously neglects 
potentially important sources of risk. 
4.5.4 Justification for the Use of Ratios 
As mentioned earlier in Section 4.1.4, it is convenient to suppose that it is the ratio of the total loss 
probability (from known and UU risks) to the loss probability from just known risks that correlates with 
the qualitative factors cited in Table 4-2. The results from the preceding sections in this example appear 
to corroborate this supposition. The discussion below provides a rationale for why it makes sense.	
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Table	4‐2.	Suggested	Guidelines	for	Estimating	the	Ratio	of	the	Initial	Probabilistic	Safety	Performance	
Margin	to	the	Initial	Loss	Probability	from	Known	Risks	
(Assumes	that	the	known	risk	evaluated	for	the	present	system	is	consistent	in	likelihood	with	results	
from	analogous	systems	that	have	substantial	operating	experience	accompanied	by	full‐scope	PRAs.)	
Safety 
Performance 
Factor* 
Margin 
Ratio**  Applicable Conditions Justification 
1 0 
Systems that can take credit for at least 125 actual cycles of 
operation of the same or equivalent systems with positive 
indication that the risk has leveled off to a mature system value 
Results for Shuttle, 
Atlas, Delta, 
Molniya/ Soyuz 
after 125 flights 
~2  ~1 
New systems that are developed and operated under at most 
mild time pressure, with reliability and safety having a higher 
priority than cost and schedule, with an inclusive management 
structure, and with a design philosophy that does not involve 
significantly new technology or new integration of an existing 
technology or scaling of an existing technology beyond the 
domain of knowledge or tight functional coupling 
Results for Delta, 
first 75 flights*** 
~3  ~2 
New systems that are developed or operated under at least 
moderate time pressure, with cost and schedule having at least 
an equal priority with reliability and safety, and with a tendency 
for the management structure to be hierarchical, but with a 
design philosophy that does involve significantly new 
technology or new integration of an existing technology or 
scaling of an existing technology beyond the domain of 
knowledge or tight functional coupling 
Results for Atlas, 
first 75 flights*** 
New systems that are developed or operated under significant 
time pressure, and with a design philosophy that involves either 
new technology or new integration of an existing technology or 
scaling of an existing technology beyond the domain of 
knowledge or tight coupling, but with reliability and safety 
having a higher priority than cost and schedule, and with an 
inclusive management structure, 
Results for Shuttle 
retrospectively, first 
75 flights, if post-
Columbia return-to-
flight improvements 
had been in 
place*** 
~5  ~4 
New systems that are developed or operated under significant 
time pressure, with cost and/or schedule having at least an equal 
priority with reliability and safety, with a tendency for the 
management structure to be hierarchical, and with a design 
philosophy that involves either new technology or new 
integration of an existing technology or scaling of an existing 
technology beyond the domain of knowledge or tight coupling. 
Results for Shuttle, 
first 75 flights. 
Anecdotally nuclear 
reactor experience 
and human 
reliability 
experience*** 
~10 ~9 
New systems that are developed or operated under extreme time 
pressure, with cost and/or schedule having significantly higher 
priority than reliability and safety, with a highly hierarchical 
management structure, and involving either new technology or 
new integration of an existing technology or scaling of an 
existing technology well beyond the domain of knowledge 
Results for Molniya/ 
Soyuz first 75 
flights. Factors of 
this magnitude and 
larger are also 
suggested in [63]. 
				*	 Safety	Performance	Factor	is	the	loss	probability	from	all	risks	divided	by	the	loss	probability	from	known	
risks	before	the	first	flight	
		**	 Margin	Ratio	is	the	loss	probability	from	UU	risks	divided	by	the	loss	probability	from	known	risks	before	
the	first	flight.	Margin	Ratio	=	Safety	Performance	Factor	–	1.	
***		Ratios	of	2	to	5	are	also	consistent	with	historical	reliability	growth	estimates	cited	in	Table	I	of	MIL‐
HDBK‐189A	for	commercial	and	military	systems.	
  
 
53
When an accident occurs, the pursuits undertaken to prevent further accidents of that type involve 
identifying the causes of the accident and instituting design changes, operational changes, and/or 
administrative controls to prevent them from happening again. Most of the time, these changes and controls 
are formulated to affect a broader spectrum of accidents than just the one that is promulgating the action.
For example, after the Columbia accident, one of the main corrective actions was to photographically scan 
the surface of the Shuttle while in orbit to detect damage caused by foam debris so as to be able to initiate 
astronaut extra-vehicular activities to repair any damage that might be significant enough to endanger re-
entry. This corrective action had the effect of protecting not only against foam debris impacts but also 
against damage caused by micrometeoroids and orbital debris (MMOD), which is considered to be one of 
the main sources of risk for orbiting space vehicles. In addition, the return-to-flight activities associated 
with Columbia included a restructuring of the management within NASA to address generic shortcomings 
identified in the CAIB report [32]. These types of corrective action have a generic character that provides 
protection against many potential accident scenarios. 
The implication is that the reduction of known risks also reduces UU risks. Clearly, however, that 
reduction is only possible when the protection against the known risks has a generic character as was the 
case for Columbia. It would not be the case if the reduction of known risks was focused very narrowly on 
the specific events contained in a known scenario. 
4.5.5 Safety Threshold for LEO Missions 
For LEO missions without LAS capability, an achievable threshold for P(LOC) for crewed missions or for 
P(LOV) for high-cost robotic missions might be inferred by combining the value of P(LOC) for known 
risks for the Shuttle in Figure 4-3 with the appropriate multiplier for UU risks in Table 4-2. For example, if 
it can be argued that the system is developed under moderate time pressure, with reliability and safety 
having the top priority over cost and schedule, and involving new integration and significantly new 
technology, then an initial loss probability of about 2.0 times the early known loss probability for the 
Shuttle (0.02) would be considered achievable based on Table 4-2. This would suggest a threshold value 
for initial operation of around 2.0 x 0.02 = 0.04. 
For LEO missions with LAS capability, results from the study performed by NASA Ames [41] can be
used. In the Ames study, the analysts calculated that if a LAS were integrated with the Ares 1 launch 
vehicle, the probability of LOC given a scenario that produced LOM during ascent would be reduced by 
another 80% ; i.e., the probability of LOC given LOM is about 0.2 (see Figure 4-7). The study considered a 
long list of launch system scenarios that could lead to the need to abort and their probabilities of 
occurrence. It also considered the effects of the harsh environment on the LAS and its passengers (blast 
wave, heat, fragments) which could kill the crew even if the abort initiation was successful. More 
information about this study will be provided in Section 5.2.6. 
All in all, the evaluation of abort effectiveness for a LAS should include several factors: 
 The probability of failure of the LAS to initiate abort (as considered, for example, in [45]) 
 The possibility of false positives (abort being initiated when not needed, see [46])  
 The possibility of unintended interactions between the LAS and the launch vehicle (e.g., 
interactions between the control software for each vehicle, see [64]) 
 The effects of the harsh environment on the LAS and on the crew inside the LAS as considered, for 
example, in the cited Ames study) 
 The probability of the crew failing to survive during or after touchdown or splashdown 
 UU scenarios from other sources 
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Figure	4‐7.	Loss	of	Mission	and	Loss	of	Crew	Probability	Contributions	by	Accident	Scenario	for	an	
Example	Launch	System	with	a	Launch	Abort	Capability,	from	NASA	Ames	Study	
Given the harshness of a significant fraction of the abort environments and the fact that the analysis of 
these environments employs conservative assumptions, it is possible to argue that in most cases the 
probability of loss of crew given an accident that causes LOM during ascent will be dominated by the 
effects of the harsh environment on the LAS and the crew rather than by the other factors listed above.
Thus, the assessment that the LAS reduces the probability of LOC from accidents during ascent by around 
80% is likely valid despite the fact that some potential sources of accidents such as false positives and 
system-wide interactions were not considered. 
In addition to the abort effectiveness for accidents during ascent, the overall effectiveness of the LAS for 
LEO missions must consider accidents occurring during other phases of the mission, such as orbit, docking 
with another craft such as the ISS, and entry. In the case of the Space Shuttle, about 23% the probability of 
LOC from known risks at the time of the first flight was assessed to be due to accidents initiated during 
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orbit and during entry. (This figure is calculated using the data in Table 41 by adding 5.3E-3 + 3.1E-3 + 
2.4E-3 and dividing the total by 2.4E-2.) To be specific, about 11.5% of the total P(LOC) from known risks 
was associated with impacts of micrometeoroids and orbital debris (MMOD) occurring during orbit, and 
roughly an equal amount was attributable to APU failure occurring during entry (see Table 4-1). Increasing 
the total probability of LOC by 23% causes the conditional probability of LOC given LOM to change from 
0.2 to 0.24, a small effect that is within the noise of the calculation. (The value of 0.24 is calculated by 
dividing 0.2 x 1.23 by 0.2 x 1.23 + 0.8.) 
Given this information, an achievable threshold for crewed missions with launch abort capability might be 
estimated by multiplying the Shuttle loss probability from known risks (0.02) by the appropriate factor in 
Table 4-2 and by the conditional probability of LOC given LAS initiation obtained from the Ames study 
(around 0.2). For cases where the system is developed under moderate time pressure, with reliability and 
safety having the top priority over cost and schedule, and involving new integration and significantly new 
technology, an achievable threshold for initial operation using this logic would be around 0.02 x 2.0 x 0.2, 
or 0.008. 
The achievable threshold value of 0.008 is not necessarily a limit that applies to all LEO systems. A lower 
safety threshold could be justified for cases where the LAS could be designed to handle a larger fraction of 
the accident scenarios initiated during ascent, or for cases where a capability for crew escape during orbit 
and entry could be designed into the system. 
4.5.6 Safety Goal for LEO Missions 
The example in Section 4.5.5 indicated that typical values for known risk for an LEO mission prior to the 
first flight would be around 0.02 for systems without a LAS (including both crewed and high-cost robotic 
systems) and 0.004 for systems with a LAS (crewed missions only). The value for systems without a LAS 
was based on the retrospectively derived known risk for the Shuttle prior to the first flight (Figure 4-3), and 
the value for systems without a LAS was 80% lower based on results for abort effectiveness from the 
NASA Ames study. This implies that an achievable safety goal for systems without a LAS would be 
around 0.5 x 0.02 = 0.01, and for systems with a LAS would be around 0.5 x 0.004 = 0.002. These goals 
compare to achievable threshold values of around 0.04 and 0.008 respectively (as quoted in Section 4.5.5), 
assuming the system is developed under moderate time pressure, with reliability and safety having the top 
priority over cost and schedule, and involving new integration and significantly new technology. 
4.5.7 Probabilistic Loss Requirement for LEO Missions 
Between the first and last flights, the requirement decreases at a rate that is consistent with the burndown of 
total risks that has been observed for other space missions. The burndown rate for the total loss probability 
for the Shuttle and for several launch vehicles has been displayed earlier in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 (see 
Figures 4-3 through 4-6). The relevant data are collected in a single chart in Figure 4-8, where it may be 
seen that the burndown rate tends to follow an exponential relationship. As noted earlier, the total loss 
probability tends to reach its steady state value after about 125 flights. Thus, it is reasonable to specify that 
the burndown rate for the requirement follows an exponential decay starting at the initial value prior to the 
first flight and ending at the final steady state value after the 125th flight. A graph of this relationship in 
log-linear form is shown in Figure 4-9. 
Per the example presented in Sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.5 for an LEO mission with launch abort capability, 
suppose the safety threshold value has been specified at 0.008, the safety performance factor at 2.0, and the 
safety goal at 0.002. Then the safety requirement varies from a value of 0.008 / 2.0 = 0.004 prior to the first 
flight to a value of 0.002 after the 125th flight according to the following relationship: Requirement = 0.004 
exp (− 0.0055 N). If the safety performance factor were 5, consistent with a system that is developed under 
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significant time pressure, with cost and/or schedule having an equal priority with reliability and safety, and 
involving new integration and significantly new technology, and if the threshold value and goal were 
specified at 0.03 and 0.001, respectively, then the pertinent relationship would be: Requirement = 0.006 
exp (− 0.014 N). 
	
Figure 4-8. Correlation of Total Loss Probability with Chronological Flight Number 
 
Figure 4-9. Loss Probability Requirement as a Function of the Number of Completed Flights 
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5. Performing System Safety Ensurance Activities: The Provider’s 
Role 
System safety ensurance activities are conducted by the Provider and support the design, development, 
and operation of a safe system that meets the safety performance requirements levied on it. System safety 
ensurance differs from system safety assurance, which is a responsibility of the Acquirer and evolves 
from the review by the Acquirer’s evaluation team of the Provider’s RISC submittal. System safety 
assurance is covered in Chapter 7. 
Each system safety ensurance activity may address or influence one or more operational safety objectives, 
and conversely, each operational safety objective may be addressed by one or more system safety 
ensurance activities. Table 5-1 indicates the relationship between system safety ensurance activities and 
the operational safety objectives they address. The set of system safety ensurance activities is the same as 
in Section 3.2, with an additional system safety ensurance management activity to provide a management 
function over the other activities. 
The following subjects from the overview in Section 3.2 are discussed sequentially in Sections 5.1 
through 5.6: 
 Developing a System Safety Management Plan (SSMP) and maintaining an auditable system 
safety program  
 Conducting an Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and assessing the performance of Safety Critical 
Items (SCIs)  
 Support of requirements development including tailoring of requirements and development of 
derived and allocated requirements  
 System design support, including hazard elimination and control, implementation of failure 
tolerance, safing, emergency operations, and design phase testing  
 Support of program control and commitments and performance monitoring throughout the life 
cycle 
 Exploiting opportunities to improve safety 
5.1 Developing and Implementing the System Safety Management Plan (SSMP) 
5.1.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Provider’s responsibilities in developing and implementing the SSMP can be summarized as follows: 
 Prepare the SSMP content as established by the Acquirer, and agreed to by the Provider, to 
accomplish some or all of the following objectives: 
o Provide the link between baselined safety requirements (including associated corollary 
process requirements) and system safety activities. 
o Detail the specific actions and arrangements required to operate a System Safety Program and 
define system safety milestones for the project. 
o Delineate the framework for the Provider’s organization to direct and control its safety 
management activities, including the organizational structure, processes, procedures, 
techniques and methodologies. 
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Table 5-1. Cross Reference from Operational Safety Objectives to Provider System Safety Ensurance 
Activities22 
Operational Safety Objectives 
Provider System Safety Ensurance Activities 
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Establish safety performance margins X X     
Establish minimum tolerable levels of safety for 
known risks X X     
Maintain appropriate safety performance margins 
for the as-designed system X    X X 
Maintain minimum levels of safety for known 
risks for the as-designed system X X X X X X 
Maintain appropriate safety performance margins 
for the as-built system X    X X 
Maintain minimum levels of safety for known 
risks for the as-built system X X X X X X 
Maintain appropriate safety performance margins 
for the as-operated system X    X X 
Maintain minimum levels of safety for known 
risks for the as-operated system X X X X X X 
Prioritize safety during design solution decision 
making X X  X   
Prioritize safety during product realization 
decision making X X  X   
Prioritize safety during system operation 
 and sustainment decision making X X  X   
Risk-inform safety requirements allocation 
decisions X X X X   
Be responsive to new safety-relevant information 
during system realization X X  X X  
Be responsive to new safety-relevant 
 information during operation/sustainment X X  X X X 
Incorporate safety-related best practices into 
system design X   X   
Minimize the introduction of hazards during 
system realization X   X X  
Minimize the introduction of hazards during 
system operation/sustainment X   X X X 
 
  
                                                            
22 For more information, see Chapter 4 of [1]. 
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o Describe, in appropriate detail, plans for development of the RISC for each major milestone 
review as determined by the Acquirer. 
o Address the activities necessary to ensure safety throughout the system life cycle. 
 Incorporate a Product Assurance Plan into the SSMP. 
 Review and update the SSMP regularly throughout the life of the system, especially as safety 
requirements are rebaselined. 
 Address those aspects of the systems engineering approach that affect safety, and those aspects of 
the risk management approach related to safety. 
 Ensure that the SSMP is coordinated with the Systems Engineering Management Plan, if one 
exists, and with the governing Risk Management Plan. 
The following topics pertaining to these responsibilities and areas of consideration are addressed in 
Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.6: 
 Conducting an SSRA and setting requirements for the SSMP 
 The general contents of the plan 
 Specifying roles and responsibilities within the plan 
 Configuration control and data management planning 
 Addressing management buy-in within the plan 
5.1.2 Conducting a System Safety Requirements Analysis (SSRA) and Setting 
Requirements for the SSMP 
If the development work being undertaken has an inter-organizational character, then externally imposed 
requirements on planning processes may be appropriate.23 Organizational units providing a system or 
service to other organizations as part of a large-scale development effort are subject to numerous 
requirements imposed by the acquiring organizational unit, or deriving from higher-level agency 
requirements (e.g., safety thresholds) or institutional requirements (e.g., NPR 8000.4), or external 
requirements (e.g., environmental regulations). Satisfaction of all these requirements will need to be 
planned in a coordinated fashion, and isolated plans for each cannot therefore serve. 
For those reasons, the conduct and evaluation of a System Safety Requirements Analysis (SSRA) is 
essential. Subsequent to that process, the set of safety requirements can be baselined. Once that occurs, 
the Provider finalizes a System Safety Management Plan (SSMP) or its equivalent that lays out the 
process for satisfying the baselined safety requirements. The SSMP is submitted to the Acquirer for 
approval. Just as the SSRA serves as the safety requirements handshake between Acquirer and Provider, 
an SSMP developed according to the following guidelines can serve as the process handshake between 
the Acquirer and the Provider. The SSRA may be included within the SSMP or may be a stand-alone 
document, in which case it is referenced by the SSMP. 
Unless the safety risks are trivial, the case for risk acceptance needs to be based on a combination of 
demonstrated product attributes (e.g., test results) and development process attributes (QA, validation and 
verification, peer review, etc.) which, essentially by definition, need to have been planned, and whose 
execution needs to have been documented. It may be possible to establish product performance after the 
fact in a small number of tests, but an emergent property such as safety cannot be established in that way. 
                                                            
23 This would not usually be the case for a single organization carrying out an activity in isolation for its own 
reasons. A written plan would be strictly that organization’s concern, just as its project management practices would 
be its own concern. 
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System safety process cannot, by itself, assure safety either, but many acquisition decisions need to be 
supported, at least in part, by evidence of process. Planned and documented process is evidence in the 
RISC. 
It is not strictly necessary to address the above content within a single stand-alone document; the Acquirer 
may prefer to see portions of it incorporated into the Systems Engineering Management Plan, and other 
portions incorporated into the Risk Management Plan. 
5.1.3 General Contents of the SSMP 
Following is a listing of topics that may be addressed in the SSMP. This list is consistent with the 
discussions in the preceding subsections, and is also informed by the Johnson Safety Center Safety & 
Health Handbook [65]. Each program/project may have different requirements for an SSMP. The list 
below generically summarizes the expectations of an SSMP for a program/project that has high 
criticality24. The SSMP for a high criticality program/project should: 
1. Describe the mission and the scope of the program/ project. 
2. Describe the system being analyzed and the general safety philosophy of the design and operation 
of the system. 
3. List any documents and specifications that the system safety effort will use either as directives or 
as guidance. 
4. Describe the operational safety objectives of the program/project. 
5. Describe the system safety organization or function, including charts to show the organizational 
and functional relationships and lines of communication. 
6. Describe the responsibility, authority, and accountability of system safety personnel and other 
organizations (including contractors and subcontractors) involved in the system safety effort. 
7. Assign an organizational unit for each task and an authority for resolving each unresolved safety 
issue. 
8. Describe how the system safety organization is staffed for the length of the program/project, 
including labor loading. 
9. Describe the qualifications of key personnel including both technical and managerial personnel. 
10. Describe the interfaces between the system safety organization and other related disciplines such 
as systems engineering, reliability, and quality assurance at all levels of the program/ project 
(NASA, contractor, and subcontractor). 
11. Identify safety milestones and reviews of the effectiveness of the system safety effort at critical 
safety checkpoints (e.g., design reviews, self-evaluations, operational readiness reviews, audits, 
etc.). 
12. Schedule safety tasks, show start and finish dates, report dates, review dates, and labor loading, as 
they relate to other program/project milestones. 
13. Identify other engineering tasks such as design analyses, tests, or demonstrations that also apply 
to the system safety program, and identify the system safety personnel who will participate in 
these tasks. 
                                                            
24 Expectations associated with programs/projects of different levels of criticality will be defined further in Section 
5.2.4 
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14. List the safety standards, system specifications, and levied requirements the program/project 
either must follow or will adopt. 
15. Describe the procedures for assessing risk, including the acceptable risk levels for the 
program/project. 
16. Describe the management controls to make sure the program/project follows safety requirements, 
including the process for making management decisions, the level of management required to 
accept different levels of risk, and methods to make management aware of and take action on 
risks. 
17. Describe the past experience of the organization in managing large programs/projects similar to 
the one being addressed herein. 
18. Describe the analysis techniques and format to be used to identify risks, their causes, their effects, 
and recommended responses. 
19. Identify when each analysis technique will be used. 
20. Describe how system safety analyses from different organizations such as contractors and 
subcontractors will be integrated. 
21. Describe how cross-system interactions and interfaces between hardware, software, and the 
human element will be factored into the system safety analyses. 
22. Describe how fault management will be included in the design and operation of the system and 
how these provisions will be factored into the system safety analyses. 
23. Describe how software safety concerns will be factored into the system safety analyses. 
24. Describe how system safety analyses will be graded according to the criticality of the mission and 
the importance of the risk scenarios being investigated. 
25. Describe how the system safety analyses will be updated throughout the life cycle as relevant new 
information emerges. 
26. Describe the approach for researching, distributing, and analyzing historical hazard or mishap 
data, best practices, and lessons learned. 
27. Describe the approach for identifying and tracking precursors, anomalies, and near misses during 
the course of the program/project and for incorporating knowledge gained from these events into 
the system safety analyses. 
28. Describe how safety critical items (SCIs) and risk drivers will be derived from the results of the 
integrated safety analyses and how these SCIs and risk drivers will be managed throughout the 
program/project life cycle. 
29. Describe how a risk-informed safety case (RISC) will be developed and how the arguments will 
be structured to provide confidence that the system is adequately safe for each key mission 
objective. 
30. Describe how the principles of the minimum tolerable level of safety and as-safe-as-reasonably 
practicable (ASARP) will be implemented for the system. 
31. Describe how the potential contributions from unknown and underappreciated risks will be 
incorporated into the RISC and how these will be minimized by incorporating relevant best 
practices and lessons learned. 
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32. Describe how evidence will be gathered to support the RISC and how the evidence will be 
evaluated. 
33. Describe how the credibility assessment scale (CAS) factors in the NASA Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S) Standard and Handbook will be used to assess validity of the evidence. 
34. Describe how emerging opportunities to improve safety will be considered within the ASARP 
context and how they will be implemented into the system design and operation when shown to 
be effective and practicable. 
35. Identify the data management needs and methods for making risk-informed safety decisions.  
36. Describe the verification and audit requirements and procedures to make sure that the system 
safety program has been implemented and that the levied requirements have been satisfied, 
37. Describe the procedures to make sure that safety information is available for management and 
engineering review and analysis. 
38. Describe the review procedures to make sure that hazardous tests, and especially tests involving 
human test subjects, are conducted safely.  
39. Describe training, techniques, and procedures to make sure that engineers, test subjects, 
technicians, operators, and support (including maintenance) personnel understand the objectives 
and requirements of the system safety program. 
40. Identify and describe any reviews by experts outside the program/project.  
41. Describe how the SSMP will be updated whenever new information emerges that would affect 
the conduct of the safety program or change the results of the risk-informed safety case, and how 
comments from program/project reviews will be incorporated and resolved. 
42. Describe how the content of the SSMP has been integrated with the program/project system 
engineering and risk management plans and how they collectively address the needs of system 
safety, systems engineering, and risk management. 
5.1.4 Specifying Roles and Responsibilities, Controls, Processes, and Protocols 
As discussed in [33], information to be provided in the SSMP should include, for each organizational unit 
in the structure: 
• Roles and responsibilities 
• Controls 
• Process model requirements 
• Coordination and communication protocols 
• Contextual (environmental and behavior-shaping) factors that might bear on the unit’s ability to 
fulfill its responsibilities 
• Inputs and outputs to other units in the control structure 
Roles and responsibilities for safety management is part of the safety control structure for the 
organization. The SSMP should provide information about where the responsibility for implementing 
each safety requirement rests. If there is a current safety organization with roles and responsibilities 
assigned at different levels of the organization, a gap analysis should be performed to identify where 
requirements are not being implemented (enforced) anywhere. Thereafter, the safety control structure 
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needs to be evaluated to determine whether it is potentially effective in enforcing the system safety 
requirements and constraints. 
The SSMP should be able to show that the control structure is capable of allocating responsibility to 
continuously demonstrate, as the program/project progresses, that the safety claims made in the RISC are 
satisfied. Providing assurance that the safety claims are satisfied is synonymous with ensuring that the 
assurance deficits that are identified for each claim are maintained within acceptable limits25. Thus, an 
effective safety control structure is an organizational structure within which there is an assignment of 
responsibilities to designated owners for tracking, evaluating, and managing each source of assurance 
deficit and for documenting/communicating any effects on the RISC. 
DEFINITION OF ASSURANCE DEFICIT 
An assurance deficit is “any knowledge gap that prohibits perfect (total) confidence” [66]. Assurance 
deficits are caused by variability or lack of knowledge concerning the data or models being used to 
produce the evidence, the parameter inputs to the models, and the interpretation of model outputs. 
Examples of assurance deficits include high statistical uncertainty associated with an insufficient amount 
of data, the possibility of externally imposed major programmatic changes, and incompleteness in the 
identification of hazards. Although “assurance deficit” is more-or-less synonymous with “confidence 
deficit,” there is a slight but significant difference in that “assurance” implies an active process of 
gathering and assessing evidence, whereas “confidence” implies the result attained by providing adequate 
assurance. 
As an example, following is a partial list of potential unplanned events and conditions that, if they should 
emerge, could negatively affect the level of confidence in being able to meet the claims in the RISC: 
• Externally imposed decisions (such as Congressional funding decisions) could result in a need to 
alter the key mission objectives, possibly resulting in a reduction of planned launches and in-
flight events.  
• New information from ongoing programs/projects within NASA could result in changes in the 
perception of reasonableness for previously determined safety thresholds, goals, margins, and 
requirements.  
• New analyses using newer models and data sources could improve the accuracy and 
completeness of the ISA but also cast doubt on previous results. 
• New developments affecting the ratings for the M&S credibility assessment scale (CAS) factors 
for various analyses that have been performed could negatively affect confidence in the ISA.  
• Changes in management personnel could lead to changes in the confidence that safety is being 
managed effectively. 
The SSMP should contain the following to ensure that such changes are adequately addressed: 
• Delineation of how responsibilities for tracking, evaluating, and managing each assurance deficit 
source have been or will be assigned to individuals and teams that have the proper qualifications 
and authority to act 
• Explanation of how the information from their activities will be communicated, documented, and 
used for updating the RISC 
                                                            
25 This topic will be addressed further in Section 6.1.2. 
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The process for managing safety claim assurance deficits should be similar to and commensurate with the 
organization’s process for managing program/project risks. In fact, management of assurance deficits can 
and should be part of the overall risk management process. In this context, the sources for assurance 
deficit identified in the RISC convert to “risk statements” and become part of the organization’s “risk 
list.” The tracking and control of these risks is assigned to “risk owners” who, as discussed in NPR 
8000.4A [4], have the lead for overseeing the implementation of the agreed disposition of the risks that 
are assigned to them. 
The organizational aspects of risk management within NASA are discussed in NPR 8000.4A. The 
relationship between RISC development/evaluation and risk management is illustrated in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1. Relationship between Risk-Informed Safety Case Development and Evaluation and Continuous 
Risk Management 
5.1.5 Configuration Control and Data Management 
Improper configuration control and data management have been among the root causes of several mission 
failures, including the Mars Climate Orbiter mishap [67] and several software-related spacecraft accidents 
[64]. Therefore, sound configuration control and data management practices should be part of the RISC 
and should be addressed in the SSMP. NASA’s preferred practices for configuration control and data 
management are explained in the NASA Configuration Management Standard [68] and in the NASA 
Systems Engineering Handbook [13]. 
Following are some of the characteristics of a good configuration control program (adapted from the 
NASA Systems Engineering Handbook): 
• Enough time is allocated for engineering, SMA, or other Configuration Control Board (CCB) 
members to meet to evaluate changes.  
• Dissent in the record for CCB documentation is allowed for. 
• Redlines and other informal practices to keep track of changes are avoided. 
• There are clear procedures for the integrating contractor to approve all subcontractors/vendors 
changes. 
• There is a designated process for preparing and coordinating change requests. 
• Verification data can be traced to the appropriate hardware/software and specification. 
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• Supporting change procedures adequately involve approval by the originating organization. 
• The contractor has a Configuration Management web site that NASA is able to access to verify 
the latest released changes. 
There should also be a data management plan that covers the following subjects (from the NASA Systems 
Engineering Handbook): 
• Identification/definition of data requirements for all aspects of the product life cycle 
• Control procedures—receipt, modification, review, and approval 
• Guidance on how to access/search for data for users 
• Data exchange formats that promote data reuse and help to ensure that data can be used 
consistently throughout the system, family of systems, or system of systems 
• Data rights and distribution limitations such as export-control Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 
• Storage and maintenance of data, including master lists of where documents and records are 
maintained  
For purposes of the SSMP, the Provider should describe their plans for configuration control and data 
management, demonstrate through past performance how their management and their teams have handled 
configuration control and data management in related programs/projects, and explain how configuration 
control and data management will be handled for proprietary or restricted information and how such 
information will be made available to members of the team who have a need to know it 
5.1.6 Management and Organizational Commitment to Safety 
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover famously stated that the principal characteristics of high-reliability 
organizations are: (1) top management being commitment to safety as an organizational goal, (2) 
implementation of personnel redundancy as well as engineering redundancy, (3) development of a culture 
of reliability, and (4) the valuation of organizational learning [25]. When these principles are 
implemented, they have the effect of countering design characteristics that can produce UU risk such as 
interactive complexity and tight coupling in the design26. On the other hand, not implementing them 
makes it possible for design deficiencies to inordinately affect the risk. 
It is pointed out as well [26] that avoidance of failures requires a nonhierarchical and consultative 
relationship, at least in the planning stages and general operational processes, and that two-way flows of 
information are especially essential in technological systems to maximize the sharing of information 
among all personnel regardless of position in the organizational hierarchy. Bureaucratic barriers to 
cooperation are particularly dysfunctional, given our limited understanding of technological systems and 
our limited ability to control them. However, when a crisis arises in the operations of a technological 
system, the command model – namely, a hierarchical and single-directional mode of communication – 
should supersede the nonhierarchical consultative model in an effort to contain the crisis and limit the 
damage. 
As evidenced by the Mars Climate Orbiter mishap (launched in 1998; lost in 1999), interfaces between 
different elements of the system provided by different suppliers require stringent oversight by the 
managing agency (NASA). In that case, inadequate oversight resulted in a catastrophic failure because 
one organization had written the flight system software to calculate thruster performance using metric 
units, while another was entering course correction and thruster data using Imperial units. 
                                                            
26 This point will be discussed further in Section 5.4.5. 
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Two sources of information are pertinent for providing evidence of management’s dedication to safety 
and effective oversight: (1) documentation in the SSMP and the Program/Project Management Plan, and 
(2) history of the effectiveness of the management team in present and past programs/projects. 
Indications of management and organizational commitment to safety that need to be discussed in the 
SSMP and demonstrated in the RISC are summarized below (excerpted from a list provided by the 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers [69]): 
Demonstration of management commitment 
• Safety Policy Statement is endorsed by Chief Executive of the Company (or if the Providing 
organization resides within NASA, by the Administrator). It is prominently displayed at worksites 
and in company documentation, and is regularly discussed. 
• Senior Management is visibly committed to safety, as evidenced by involvement in the appropriate 
company safety committees; carrying out safety ‘walkabouts’ and site visits; making personal 
statements on safety; holding regular, routine safety performance reviews; active involvement in 
incident reviews and follow-up (incidents include injuries, emergencies and near misses); inclusion 
of safety as a high priority item during management and staff meetings; and appropriate resourcing 
is committed to safety. 
• Senior management compares safety performance on an inter- and intra-company basis. 
• Management participates in setting safety standards and measurable targets, and in establishing 
performance measurement systems and procedures. 
• Management personally practices safety as a top priority and ensuring that their organization does 
not compromise safety in pursuit of other goals. 
• Management and supervision demonstrate a deep belief that safety is part of their job, and behaving 
accordingly. 
Demonstration of organizational motivation and communication 
• There is a clearly defined and implemented communication structure which enables open and frank 
two-way communication. 
• There is clear communication of collective and individual safety performance. 
• There is consultation and communication of safety objectives, tasks, and targets. 
• There is a program for recognizing safety performance. 
• There is a system in place for the reporting of hazards, follow-up by manager, and feedback to the 
initiator. 
• Regular meetings have defined purpose, structure, and records. 
• There are ad hoc meetings for special tasks/reviews. 
• There is a system in place to encourage safety suggestions and ideas. 
• There is an effective safety awareness program which includes promotion, publicity, off-the job 
safety, etc. 
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Demonstration of contractor involvement and commitment 
• Safety is an integral part of the contractor selection procedure. 
• Contracts contain clear provisions requiring the contractor to meet safety conditions and 
specifications consistent with the company’s standards for its own employees. 
• There is an audit of contractor performance and facilities prior to the start-up of work. 
• There is a system for approving contractor working procedures for use on company operations. 
• There is a system for verification of contractors’ training programs, individual competence/ 
qualifications, skill achievements, and where appropriate, team experience. 
• The contractor has to demonstrate safety commitment from their senior management, clearly 
defined safety responsibilities, an active safety program, a system for reporting safety performance 
and investigation of incidents, an effective communication and consultation system, and effective 
control of sub-contractors. 
• Company supervision monitors contractors’ performance. 
5.2 Performing an Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) 
5.2.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Provider’s responsibilities in developing and implementing the SSMP can be summarized as follows: 
 Beginning at Formulation, conduct an ISA of the system that has the following characteristics: 
o Is scenario-based, accounting for credible departures from intended system operation that 
have the potential to lead to adverse safety consequences, accident propagation pathways 
through the system including interactions among subsystems, the potential for dependent 
effects, and the potential for latent faults/failures 
o For critical systems and systems of high value, is scoped to encompass all credible risks 
affecting safety, and uses tools and techniques as necessary to achieve the highest 
practicable level of completeness given the current maturity of the system, recognizing that 
completeness of such risk analyses at the root cause level cannot be guaranteed a priori 
o For noncritical or lower value systems, is scoped to encompass the most important risks 
according to a graded analysis approach  
o Addresses uncertainty and sensitivities 
o Is consistent with relevant verification procedures 
o Adheres to analysis protocols emerging from SSRA 
 From the results of the ISA, designate as SCIs a preliminary set of system features whose 
performance (e.g., capability, reliability, and availability) at levels documented in the ISA assures 
the satisfaction of system-level safety performance requirements. Note: the list of SCIs will be 
updated later to include other items that are found during the RISC development to be important 
to safety. 
 As part of the ISA, assess the ability of each SCI to perform its safety function(s) in the ISA 
accident scenario(s) that rely on that function for the prevention/mitigation of adverse safety 
consequences. For each SCI, this responsibility involves the following objectives: 
o Identify the accident scenario(s) in the ISA that involve the SCI and the function performed 
by the SCI in each accident scenario. 
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o Evaluate the capability of the SCI to carry out its safety function in the context of the 
accident scenario(s) for which that safety function is needed, including uncertainty. 
o Evaluate the reliability of the SCI in performing its safety function in the context of the 
accident scenario(s), including uncertainty. 
o Evaluate the sensitivity of the safety performance of the system, as a whole, to the 
capability, reliability, and availability of the SCI. 
 Designate as risk drivers those SCIs whose failure probabilities are sufficiently high to make 
them significant contributors to the safety performance risk 
 Keep the ISA current through timely incorporation of the following: 
o System design and operational changes and/or refinements 
o Corrections to, additions to, and/or refinements of existing ISA models 
o Safety-related information gained through operational experience with the system, 
including the occurrence of anomalies deemed as precursors to adverse safety 
consequences 
o Safety-related information gained through testing or other data gathering activities 
o Safety-related concerns that have been accepted into the risk management process 
 Document the ISA in a report, to include: 
o The system description, which provides the physical and functional characteristics of the 
system and its subsystem interfaces, and refers to more detailed system and subsystem 
descriptions, including specifications and detailed review documentation, when such 
documentation is available 
o ISA methods and techniques, providing a description of each analysis method and 
technique used, where in the system they are applied, and how these techniques are 
integrated into the ISA. Include a description of assumptions made for each analysis and 
the qualitative or quantitative data used. 
o ISA analysis results. Contents and formats may vary according to the individual 
requirements of the program and methods and techniques used. 
o ISA findings and recommendations 
The following topics pertaining to these responsibilities and areas of consideration are addressed in 
Sections 5.2.2 through 5.2.9: 
 Rationale for performing an ISA 
 Characteristics of an ISA 
 Implementing a graded analysis approach in the formulation of the ISA 
 Integrating subsystem analyses into the ISA 
 Integrating software analyses into the ISA 
 Implementing special considerations for fault management into the ISA 
 Conducting tests to support the ISA 
 Adhering to the Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Credibility Assessment Scale (CAS) in 
conducting the ISA 
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Integration of human interactions with hardware and software is an area that is also discussed in this 
section,27 albeit qualitatively. Furthermore, the importance of various sources of human error that tend to 
increase the probability of UU risks will be discussed later,28 and safety performance margins to account 
for the effects of various human-error-producing factors were discussed earlier.29 However, specific 
means for modeling human errors of commission and omission in an ISA are not developed herein. 
5.2.2 Rationale for Performing an ISA 
Of central importance to the design, development, and operation of a safe system is the early conduct and 
subsequent maintenance of a comprehensive ISA by which the Provider identifies and evaluates safety 
risks and documents the resulting state of knowledge regarding the safety performance of the system. The 
ISA serves as a technical basis for imparting system-specific safety performance information into systems 
engineering and risk management decision making. The scope of system safety involvement in systems 
engineering is necessarily broad, reflecting the reality that practically all systems engineering decisions 
have the potential to affect safety. 
A scenario-based ISA is considered essential to achieving adequate safety, because it is only by 
developing an understanding of how adverse safety consequences can potentially be produced (i.e., what 
the accident scenarios are) that 1) effective measures can be taken to prevent or mitigate them (e.g., by 
managing safety risk drivers), and 2) the measures upon which safe operation depend can be identified 
and maintained at an acceptable level of functional effectiveness over the life of the system. 
A scenario-based understanding of accident potential is considered essential regardless of the quantity of 
operating experience that a system has. For a system with little or no operating experience, ISA can be 
thought of as an elicitation process involving postulated accidents whose cumulative safety risk is then 
managed to acceptable levels. For an operational system, the ISA reflects whatever mishaps or anomalies 
have occurred over its operational lifetime, in addition to those postulated by the ISA analysts. The main 
difference is the degree of completeness of scenario identification. As a system gains operational 
experience in the form of successes as well as failures that are subsequently fixed, there is increasing 
confidence that the system is free from higher probability/frequency unknown accident scenarios. 
5.2.3 Characteristics of an ISA 
An ISA a system-level identification and analysis of scenarios that may lead to undesirable safety 
consequences such as 1) death, injury, or occupational illness; 2) damage to or loss of equipment or 
property, loss of mission; or 3) damage to the environment (e.g., Earth or planetary). The term 
“integrated” in ISA refers to four different aspects: 
 Analysis Methodologies – ISA is methodologically non-prescriptive, allowing for the application 
of different methodologies as appropriate for the level of system definition (which evolves over 
the life cycle), the specifics of the part of the system/mission being addressed (e.g., software, 
launch abort), the safety significance of the issue being analyzed, etc. The ISA integrates safety 
performance information obtained from these separate/complementary methodologies into a 
single, comprehensive, system-level accident scenario set that represents the Provider’s state of 
knowledge regarding the safety of the system. 
 Subsystem Analyses – ISA is a system-level safety analysis that utilizes analyses performed at 
lower levels of the product breakdown structure in the service of a single overarching system-
level analysis. All scenarios that affect the safety of the system are within the scope of ISA, 
regardless of whether or not they propagate across subsystem boundaries. 
                                                            
27 See Section 5.2.5, Figure 5-5. 
28 For example, see Section 5.5.7. 
29 For example,  see Section 4.5.3, Table 4-2. 
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 Safety Performance Measures – ISA integrates the analysis of different safety-related 
performance measures to the greatest extent possible, recognizing the extent to which multiple at-
risk entities (crew, public, assets, etc.) are affected by the same scenarios. 
 Risk Analysis – ISA is integrable with analyses in other performance domains (technical, cost, 
schedule) to support the ASARP principle.  
ISA adheres to two key principles: 
1. ISA is Scenario Based – The purpose of an ISA is to comprehensively identify and analyze what 
can go wrong in the system, in terms of a comprehensive set of accident scenarios that connect 
accident causes to safety consequences of concern. Accident scenarios identify and analyze the 
response of the system to the accident as it progresses, including the potential for success and 
failure of preventive and mitigative features. Depending on the level of rigor of the ISA (as 
discussed in section 5.2.4 below), the set of scenarios may be defined qualitatively in terms of 
the credible sequences of events that can lead to adverse consequences, or also quantitatively in 
terms of the probabilities/frequencies of occurrence of the sequences and the magnitudes of the 
consequences. 
2. ISA is Conducted at the System Level – ISA is by definition a system-level analysis that aims at 
comprehensively identifying all credible safety-related accidents associated with the system in 
the context of its intended operation. This differs from integrated hazard analysis (IHA) as 
traditionally conducted at NASA, which is a coordinated analyses between elements or projects 
that addresses only those hazards or causes that are controlled by another project or element than 
the one who is producing the analysis. Instead, ISA is concerned with the totality of the system 
and its potential accidents, regardless of whether or not they cross subsystem boundaries as they 
progress from cause(s) to consequences. The comprehensive, system-level perspective provided 
by ISA enables: 
 The holistic development of controls: By understanding the accident potential of the system 
as a whole, it becomes possible to optimize the development of control sets. Controls can be 
implemented to provide broad coverage over multiple scenarios, as opposed to implementing 
controls on a scenario-by-scenario or subsystem-by-subsystem basis. This helps to minimize 
the cost and complexity of the control set, and to free up resources (e.g., mass) for use in the 
service of other performance attributes (e.g., payload). 
 Determination of aggregate safety performance: Although not necessarily done (e.g., Priority 
3 projects), quantification of system safety performance (e.g., P(LOC), P(LOM)) requires 
aggregation of the scenario-based contributors to safety risk over the entirety of the system. 
This is particularly true when uncertainties are correlated across subsystems. 
 System-level risk acceptance: Whether the safety performance of the system is quantified or 
not, it is necessary to have a single organizational point of responsibility for system risk 
acceptance. In cases where the ISA is qualitative, this entails the acceptance of individual 
scenarios in terms of the adequacy and acceptability of measures taken to eliminate or control 
the underlying hazards. This acceptance cannot properly be done outside the context of a 
system-level perspective, because without such a perspective there is a risk that separate 
points of responsibility will accept scenarios/controls without a proper appreciation, however 
qualitative, of the scenarios/controls that have been accepted or rejected by others in other 
parts of the system. In cases where there are system-level safety performance requirements, 
such as on P(LOC), system-level risk acceptance is necessary by definition. 
This is not to say that subsystem safety analyses should not be done. Typically, the bulk of the 
engineering expertise required for a credible safety analysis resides in subsystem level organizations, and 
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it is reasonable for these organizations to develop subsystem safety analyses as part of their SE processes. 
However, at the level of the system, these analyses should be taken as technical input to the ISA, rather 
than as collectively comprising the ISA (augmented by IHA). Section 5.2.5 provides guidance on 
integrating subsystem analyses into the ISA. 
SCENARIO ORIENTATION OF ISA 
In realistic engineering situations, scenario-based modeling within ISA is central to building a strong 
understanding of the system and a strong RISC, because it is necessary to understand what scenario 
elements need to be prevented or mitigated, in order to formulate, justify, implement, and (for purposes of 
the RISC) defend the strategies needed to prevent or mitigate those events. Moreover, in typical system 
safety applications, besides identifying scenarios, it is necessary to quantify scenario likelihoods, and to 
address uncertainty. This is true in the context of safety prioritization and safety tradeoff exercises, or as 
part of addressing safety requirements, goals, or thresholds. 
As indicated in Figure 5-2, a scenario begins with an initiating event that perturbs the system away from 
its nominal condition. Subsequent pivotal events that are relevant to the evolution of the scenario may (or 
may not) occur, and may have either a mitigating or exacerbating effect on the accident progression. The 
successful functioning of controls will in general have a mitigating effect, whereas the failure of controls 
to function, the defeating of controls due to overwhelming stresses, or the involvement of hazardous 
material will tend to exacerbate the scenario. The spectrum of possibilities for the evolution of the 
accident is represented by the multiple pathways that can be followed and the multiple end states that can 
be produced. 
Hazard analysis as traditionally practiced by NASA has focused specifically on the worst-case credible 
consequences of identified scenarios, which generally occurs under bounding stresses and/or significant 
control set failure. Although this scope of analysis is valuable, it is insufficient to support the calculation 
of probabilistic safety metrics such as P(LOC), P(LOV), and P(LOM). ISA needs to go beyond the 
examination of worst-case end states also to address systematically less severe end states. Scenario 
development requires systematic analysis of complex interactions, dependencies, and combinatorial 
effects. NASA/SP-2011-3421, Probabilistic Risk assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and 
Practitioners [8], contains additional guidance on scenario development. 
 
Figure 5-2. The Concept of a Scenario 
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The primary task of an ISA is the development and analysis of accident scenarios. These scenarios 
include consideration of accident causes, contributing factors, effectiveness of controls, subsystem 
interactions, physical responses of the system to the environments it encounters, and the means by which 
undesirable consequences may be realized. An ISA is a system-level analysis that integrates potentially 
differing types of safety information and produces results such as the probability of occurrence of each 
accident scenario and the severity of the consequences. The results may be qualitative, quantitative, or 
both, depending on the context and degree of ensurance needed. 
The comprehensiveness of the ISA depends upon the criticality of the program/project, as will be 
discussed in Section 5.2.4. For any program/project that is considered to have high criticality, the ISA is 
designed to be comprehensive with respect to accident scenario types. Potential sources of or contributing 
factors to accidents include component failures, software errors/failures, human errors, unintended  
functional behaviors (including unintended performance/absence/magnitude/timing of a function), 
environmental stresses, intra-system stresses, unintended or improper communication (including 
electronic, optical, magnetic, and/or mechanical communication), absence of an expected communication, 
the possible presence of latent failures, and the possible occurrence of common-cause failures. 
ISA models also consider uncertainties, dynamics, and dependencies. The analysis of uncertainties leads 
to probabilistic models and the propagation of probabilistic information. The consideration of dynamics 
leads to an understanding of changes in boundary conditions, information, and states over time. The 
consideration of dependencies leads to an understanding of the correlations and causal mechanisms that 
cause risks to be coupled.  
ISAs can, and typically will, use a variety of safety analysis methodologies, such as failure modes and 
effects analysis (FMEA), hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis, fault and event tree analysis, 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), bounding analysis, and physics-based simulation, to assess safety 
performance. Each method has its own domains of application such that the methods should generally be 
selected with regard to their intended purpose and applied in a coordinated fashion to ensure that all 
relevant accident types are addressed at an appropriate level of detail. The key characteristic in this regard 
is that the choice of methodologies used depends mainly upon the characteristics of the system or sub-
system being evaluated, including the level of design detail that has been achieved at a particular point in 
the system life cycle; the type of event being analyzed (e.g., component failures, human errors, 
environmental stresses, software errors), as well as the skills and preferences of the analyst. For example, 
FMEA is typically applied to a detailed system design in order to assess the possible effects of individual 
component failures. (It can also be applied at a functional level to systems of less mature design to assess 
the effects of functional failures.) Physics-based simulation, on the other hand, can be used to determine 
the capability of the system to withstand applied loads or to determine whether a particular subsystem can 
function successfully under accident conditions. 
Individual analysis methods are not intended to be conducted as separate, stove-piped, stand-alone system 
analyses. Rather, the set of selected methods should work synergistically in service of the development of 
a single, comprehensive accident scenario set that represents the core output of ISA. To that end, the 
methods should be executed using consistent system data and assumptions, and should be managed in a 
coordinated fashion to appropriately address the scope of hazards and system interactions at issue. Figure 
5-3 notionally illustrates how these different types of analysis methods integrate into a comprehensive 
analysis of accident scenarios.  
The ISA scenario set is quantified to address system-level safety performance measures that pertain to the 
objectives and requirements of the program/project. The ISA integrates the analysis of each performance 
measure to the greatest extent possible, recognizing that many accident scenarios impact multiple 
performance measures, as shown in Figure 5-4. 
 
  
 
73
 
Figure 5-3. Integration of System Safety Analysis Methods in ISA 
 
Figure 5-4. The Potential Consequences of an Accident Scenario May Impact Several Safety Objectives or 
Requirements 
An ISA is a part of Risk Management. Therefore, an ISA is integrated into the analyses of performance in 
other mission execution domains, including technical performance, cost, and schedule. The integration 
across mission execution domains assures that the system configuration and the analysis assumptions are 
treated in a common and consistent manner and that the dependencies among the consequences are 
appropriately correlated (e.g., lower safety risk may be correlated with higher cost).  
ISA should be led by a single, system-level, organizational entity that has ownership of and responsibility 
for the ISA, and that is a customer for supporting subsystem analyses. 
An ISA is tailored to support the RISC at the particular phase in the life cycle at which it is conducted. 
Thus, as the system design evolves, the ISA is likewise evolved and kept current, typically through the 
use of progressively more rigorous analysis techniques that model the system at progressively finer levels 
of detail. The ISA is maintained during system realization so that it can be used to inform decisions 
related to the as-built system, and during system operation in order to reflect design and operational 
modifications and accumulating knowledge/experience (e.g., precursors and anomalies). 
Examples of ISAs, or analyses that illustrate ISA principles, that are applicable during different phases 
during the life cycle include the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), which was developed 
for concept studies; the Simulation Assisted Risk Assessment (SARA) study for Launch Vehicle Design, 
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which was developed for conceptual design; the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Smart Buyer study, 
which was developed for preliminary design; and the PRA for the International Space Station, which was 
developed for the operations and sustainment phase.  
Various ways in which an ISA may support the RISC can be found in Table 7-3 in Section 7.3.2. In 
particular, the column titled “Typical Evidence from Provider” makes various references to analyses that 
are a part of the ISA, especially with respect to the rows designated as Index 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.1.1, 
3.1.2, 3.2.1, and 3.3.1. 
5.2.4 Implementing a Graded Analysis Approach 
While Section 1.1 states that System Safety includes “specific emphasis on the conduct of integrated 
safety analysis (ISA) as a fundamental means by which systems engineering and risk management 
decisions are risk-informed,” a key to the successful performance of an ISA within budgetary and time 
constraints is the use of a graded approach. For example, the expectation of rigor in modeling and 
analysis would be much higher for missions that are critical to NASA than for missions that are not. In 
fact, routine missions for which there is already a storehouse of system failure data may not require more 
than a simple analysis of the failure rate from the data. 
An ISA consists of an integration of various individual models. Within an integrated safety analysis, some 
individual models may require more rigor than others. Generally speaking, the amount of rigor to be 
applied within the individual models and in the integration process depends on three factors: 
 The criticality of the mission and its importance to NASA 
 The importance of the concern or scenario being investigated by the individual model relative to 
the ability to demonstrate that the system meets the minimum level of safety 
 The level of detail that has been achieved in the design being investigated 
 Criticality of the Mission 
The criticality of a mission and its importance to NASA are addressed in several NASA NPRs, including 
(in order of date of latest update): 
 NPR 8705.5A, Technical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedures for Safety and 
Mission Success for NASA Programs and Projects, dated June 7, 2010 [70]. 
 NPR 7120.5E, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements, with 
Changes 1-10 dated August 24, 2012 [34]. 
 NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements, with Change 9 dated February 8, 
2013 [6]. 
Specific requirements pertaining to graded analysis as affected by mission criticality are found in the last 
of these, wherein project priority rankings are defined as follows: 
 Project Priority Ranking 1: Any project that involves human spaceflight, or requires White 
House approval per PD/NSC-25, or is subject to planetary protection requirements, or has high 
strategic importance to the Agency, or has life-cycle cost exceeding $1 billion. Priority 1 projects 
require probabilistic risk assessment (per NPR 8705.5) supported by qualitative system safety 
analysis. 
 Project Priority Ranking 2: Any project that does not have Priority Ranking 1 and has a life-cycle 
cost between $250 million and $1 billion. Priority 2 projects require qualitative system safety 
analysis supplemented by probabilistic risk assessment where appropriate.  
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 Project Priority Ranking 3: Any project that does not have Priority Ranking 1 or 2 and has a life-
cycle cost less than $250 million. Priority 3 projects require qualitative system safety analysis 
only. 
The term “high criticality mission” is taken here to be synonymous with a project that has a project 
priority ranking of 1. Likewise, medium and low criticality missions correspond to project priority 
rankings of 2 and 3, respectively. 
It is important to make two caveats with respect to NPR 8715.3C. First, in the NPR, a Priority 1 ranking 
is also recommended for projects that are conducted within a limited launch window, thereby producing a 
limited time frame for development. A short time frame does increase the importance of acting 
expeditiously, but it does not necessarily imply that a project has high strategic priority (i.e., that it is 
important with respect to the achievement of NASA’s strategic goals), and it does not necessarily mean 
that greater rigor should be exercised in the integrated safety analysis. On the contrary, even if the 
mission is critical in other respects (e.g., human safety and cost), if it has a short time frame the 
recommended approach is to conduct a preliminary simplified analysis that can be demonstrated to be 
bounding, as discussed in the Risk Management Handbook [28]. This enables decisions to be made 
without having to wait for detailed analysis. To compensate for the shortage of rigor, a large safety risk 
margin is applied consistent with the fact that high time pressures lead to a higher contribution from UU 
risks30. Thus, until such time as a more detailed analysis can be performed befitting the criticality of the 
mission, a high criticality mission with a short time frame is treated similar to a low criticality mission 
with respect to analysis rigor, but similar to a high criticality mission with respect to margin. 
Second, some relatively low-cost missions (such as transport of supplies and equipment to the ISS) may 
technically be ranked at Priority 1 according to the project priority rankings in NPR 8715.3C because they 
involve interactions with onboard crew members during or after docking, but not before. In such cases, 
risk scenarios that can affect the safety of the onboard crew would be considered critical from the 
viewpoint of the degree of rigor to be exercised in a graded approach, but those that do not affect the 
safety of the crew would be considered noncritical from that viewpoint. Differences between the 
treatment of high criticality scenarios and low criticality scenarios will be discussed later in this section.  
 
 Integrated Safety Modeling Characteristics for Missions of Different Criticality  
For missions with high criticality and sufficient time window, the integrative qualities of an ISA include: 
 Comprehensiveness in the identification of known hazards and risk scenarios that could be 
significant actors, with particular attention to scenarios that cut across subsystem boundaries 
 Common treatment of elements that cut across different models (e.g., risk scenarios, assumptions, 
inputs, outputs, and uncertainties) 
 Treatment of correlations and dependencies between different risk scenarios, inputs, and outputs 
For medium or low criticality missions, or for missions with high criticality on short timeframes that 
require rapid decisions, the degree of completeness, commonality of treatment, and treatment of 
correlations and dependencies can be relaxed as long as the results obtained can be shown to be 
conservative relative to what would be obtained if a more rigorous integrated analysis were performed. 
With regard to high criticality missions in particular, the biggest challenge for an integrated analysis is to 
ensure that all potentially important emergent concerns or scenarios (i.e., those that cut across subsystem 
boundaries and reveal themselves at a system level) have been identified and are included within the 
integrated models [33]. It is generally recommended that system safety analyses start with models that are 
based on functional representations of the system to ensure that cross-system interactions are accounted 
                                                            
30 This point will be demonstrated further in Section 5.5.7. 
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for. Later, when cross-system interactions are fully understood and the system has reached a sufficient 
level of maturity, subsystem models can be developed and integrated together in a meaningful way. 
In a functional representation, as described in [71-73], each component is modeled as a functional unit 
that operates on certain energy, material, and signal flows. The components perform certain functions on 
these flows to transform them from an input to a desired output state. The logic models capture the 
pathways and timing of these flows. Functional modeling differs from subsystem modeling in that 
accidents emerge when component malfunctions produce unexpected pathways for flows of energy, mass, 
and electrical signals at times when the system is vulnerable to departures from the planned pathways. 
This is different from traditional subsystem models wherein accidents emerge from a propagation of 
failures. 
In addition to facilitating the examination of subsystem interactions, functional models help ensure that 
inputs to and outputs from different subsystems are treated consistently31. 
 Criticality of Individual Safety Risk Scenarios 
An ISA starts with analyses designed to identify safety risk scenarios. The process for identifying risk 
scenarios in general, formulating risk statements, and developing risk scenario diagrams is described in 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the Risk Management Handbook [28]. The risk statement consists of a condition, 
a departure, an asset, and a consequence. An example risk statement from the RM Handbook for a 
particular safety risk scenario is as follows: “Given that [CONDITION] the state of knowledge of Planet 
X’s atmosphere is limited, there is a possibility of [DEPARTURE] unanticipated higher than expected 
stresses during the aerocapture maneuver at Planet X, impacting the structural integrity of [ASSET] the 
spacecraft, thereby resulting in [CONSEQUENCE] radioactive contamination of Planet X.” 
A process for developing a criticality ranking for each risk scenario is described in the RM Handbook 
(Section 4.3). Two attributes are considered in making this ranking on the basis of strategic importance: 
 Safety risk attribute (also known as likelihood-severity attribute): An estimation of the effect of 
the risk scenario on the ability to demonstrate that the probability of loss is less than the 
maximum allowable 
 Uncertainty attribute: A set of qualitative factors that are correlated with uncertainty in the 
evaluation of the probability of loss 
The safety risk attribute is a measure of the contribution of an individual safety risk scenario to the overall 
probability of not meeting the quantitative safety requirement for known risks. If, on the basis of a 
simplified bounding analysis, the inclusion of a particular risk scenario causes the overall loss probability 
from known risks to change from a value clearly below the requirement to a value above it, the safety risk 
attribute is ranked as unacceptable (red) for that scenario. Otherwise, it is ranked as marginal (yellow) or 
acceptable (green). The safety risk attribute can also be applied to collections of risk scenarios. For 
example, if a minimal set of risk scenarios collectively causes the overall loss probability from known 
risks to rise above the requirement, the safety risk attribute for the minimal set is ranked as red.32  
Because the safety risk attribute is evaluated using a simplified bounding analysis, there is a need to 
account for uncertainties as part of a separate scenario criticality attribute. This attribute is also ranked as 
red, yellow or green. The qualitative factors used to develop the ranking include the uniqueness of the risk 
scenario, its cross-cutting character, its complexity, its propagation potential, and its detectability. 
                                                            
31 More guidance on functional modeling as a means for investigating cross-system interactions will be provided in 
Section 5.2.6. 
32 The concept of minimal sets of risk issues that cause a safety requirement to be exceeded in safety criticality 
analysis is similar to the concept of minimal cut sets that cause a system failure to occur in probabilistic risk 
assessment, see [8]. 
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Details of the analysis process to determine an overall red, yellow, or green ranking for the criticality of 
each risk scenario are found in the RM Handbook. 
 Modeling Characteristics for Individual Risk Scenarios of Different Criticality Within 
Missions of Different Criticality  
Although high criticality missions require more rigorous modeling than low criticality missions in 
general, the level of rigor applied to the modeling of individual risk scenarios within the integrated model 
should vary according to the criticality of each scenario, the time frame, and the level of design maturity. 
Table 5-2 and the paragraphs below provide a summary of the type of modeling that should be developed 
for different variants of these factors. 
Table 5-2. Type of Risk Scenario Modeling Used for Different Criticality Conditions 
(a) For Different Levels of Mission Criticality and Risk Scenario Criticality 
 
Mission Criticality 
Low  Med.  High  
Risk 
Scenario 
Criticality  
High  Bounding See Table Below See Table Below 
Med.  Bounding Bounding See Table Below 
Low  None Bounding Bounding 
 
(b) For Different Levels of Time Frame and Design Maturity when the Mission and  
Risk Scenario Criticalities are Significant 
 
Time Frame  
Short  Long  
Design 
Maturity  
High  Bounding with High Margin Probabilistic and High Resolution Deterministic  
Low  Bounding with High Margin Probabilistic and Low Resolution Deterministic  
 
For risk scenarios near the high end of the scale for both medium and high risk scenario criticality, and 
with a long enough time frame to permit rigorous analyses to be performed, probabilistic models along 
with deterministic phenomenological models, such as structural and thermal models, may be needed as 
shown in the Table. When the design is mature, the modeling should be both broad and deep. That is, it 
should account for all important aspects of the phenomenology and also include a level of resolution that 
is consistent with the matured level of design detail. When the design is immature, on the other hand, the 
modeling should be broad but not deep. It should still account for all important aspects of the 
phenomenology but include a reduced level of resolution commensurate with the level of design detail. 
Models that are appropriate for different levels of design maturity are summarized in Section 3.2.1.3 of 
the RM Handbook and in Section 4.3.3.1 of Volume 1 of the SS Handbook. 
Quantitative analysis of uncertainty through probabilistic modeling is a key element of the analysis for 
risk scenarios near the high end of the mission and risk scenario criticality scales with long enough 
timeframe. In this context, the uncertainties being considered pertain to the characterization of risks that 
are known and for which there is a means for constructing meaningful uncertainty distributions. Unknown 
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risks and risks that are underappreciated are also sources of uncertainty, but these sources of uncertainty 
are not amenable to quantification. They are handled separately by applying margins to the loss 
probability from known risks. 
As described in Section 3.2.2.5 of the RM Handbook, both modeling uncertainty and uncertainty in the 
inputs to models should be accounted for when analyzing known risk scenarios that have significant 
mission and risk scenario criticality rankings. The uncertainties in the modeling of the critical risk 
scenarios are propagated through the aggregate risk model, e.g., via a Monte Carlo process, to obtain the 
resultant uncertainty distribution for the loss probability from known risks. 
For risk scenarios that have low criticality rankings within a high criticality mission, it is not necessary to 
perform analyses that are broad or deep. To obtain estimates of the loss probability contributed by these 
risk scenarios, it is usually sufficient to refer to system safety analyses performed for other missions and 
adapt them as needed to account for differences relative to the present mission. Furthermore, uncertainties 
do not have to be accounted when analyzing known risk scenarios with low criticality. It is sufficient to 
use bounding analyses. The same is true of missions with short time frames, although as discussed above, 
it is necessary to include extra margin in such cases to compensate for the increased time pressures in 
general and the lack of time available to perform detailed probabilistic analyses in particular. 
5.2.5 Integrating Subsystem Analyses into the ISA 
The preceding section noted that for high criticality missions, the biggest challenge is to ensure that all 
knowable, potentially important, emergent risk scenarios (i.e., those that cut across subsystem boundaries 
and reveal themselves at the system level) have been identified and are included within the integrated 
models. In an ISA, this means that the analysis must start from a system level model that accounts for 
potential interactions between subsystems and between the hardware, software, and human elements of 
the system. Once a system model has been formulated, it becomes apparent where subsystem level 
models are needed. 
There is a rational process for identifying subsystem level models and analyses that are needed to support 
system level safety assessment. The main steps of that process are as follows: 
1. Identify all of the planned functions of the system in terms of intended movements or flows of 
mass and energy (thermal, electrical, mechanical). 
2. Identify all of the potentially significant unplanned functions of the system, in terms of 
unintended movements or flows of mass and energy. 
3. Identify the subsystems that may be involved with each planned and unplanned function of the 
system, including effects that may be caused by propagation of mass and energy between 
subsystems. 
4. To an extent consistent with the level of design, identify the hardware, software, and human 
elements that are associated with each planned and unplanned function, including consideration 
of the potential propagation of mass and energy across the system. 
5. Construct system level logic models that capture the cross-system interactions between 
subsystems and between hardware, software, and human elements. 
6. From the system level logic models, construct the framework for system level phenomenological 
modeling needed to evaluate consequences at the system level. 
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7. From the system logic and phenomenological modeling framework, construct the framework for 
subsystem level probabilistic and deterministic modeling and analyses that are needed for the 
evaluation of probabilities and consequences within the system level models. 
Steps 1, 2, 3, and 4 are encapsulated in Figure 5-5, which illustrates three examples of how different 
initiating events may lead to cross-system interactions that need to be modeled in an ISA: 
• In Case (a), an external event initiates a possible sequence of events that transcends subsystems. 
For example, an MMOD impact or a strong solar flare might cause damage to hardware in 
multiple subsystems, demanding responses from software to unanticipated environments and, if 
the responses are harmful, demanding the need for ad-hoc human actions. 
• In Case (b), a human error initiates a transcendent event sequence. For example, an uploading of 
incorrect software from the Mission Control Center may lead to unanticipated demands on 
software in other subsystems causing hardware failures across subsystems leading to the need for 
ad-hoc human actions from the crew. 
• In Case (c), a software anomaly initiates a transcendent event sequence. For example, an 
erroneous command that initiates a spurious signal in one subsystem may lead to spurious signals 
in other subsystems causing multiple effects on hardware in various subsystems. 
Directed graphs, as illustrated in Figure 5-5, are a recommended approach to help construct the 
framework for integrated safety analyses. Directed graphs and event sequence diagrams (a form of 
directed graph) also facilitate the derivation of risk models (Step 4 in the process). For example, the 
directed graph for Case (c) is converted to a risk model in Figure 5-6 that involves event trees and fault 
trees. In this example, the spurious signal generated by a software error in Subsystem A can lead to 
several propagating effects that cross subsystems, such as the following: 
• The spurious signal from A may cause a spurious signal in Subsystem B, which causes outright 
failure of hardware in Subsystem B. 
• The spurious signal from A may cause spurious emission of matter from Subsystem A (such as 
liquid or foam) which impacts on Subsystem B and causes structural failures in that subsystem. 
• The spurious signal from A may cause outright failure of hardware in Subsystem A that 
propagates to failure of hardware in Subsystem B. 
And so forth. As noted, many of the events that describe cross-system interactions are expressed as 
functional failures rather than component failures. For example, the generation of spurious signals and 
spurious emissions of matter or energy are functional events that do not require precise descriptions of the 
hardware or software involved33.  
Subsystem level probabilistic and deterministic models and analyses needed to support the system level 
model and analysis (Steps 6 and 7 in the process) are implied in Figures 5-5 and 5-6, and in similar 
figures generated for other initiating events, by the references to subsystems in the figures. For example, 
each circle in Figure 5-5 that refers to a subsystem implies a subsystem level analysis, as does each fault 
tree that is identified by a green box in Figure 5-6. The cross-system interactions are identified by the 
arrows connecting the circles in the directed graph and by the logic in the risk model. 
                                                            
33 Section 5.2.6 will discuss further the subject of functional analysis and its usefulness for depicting cross-system 
interactions. 
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Figure 5-5. Example Directed Graphs of Subsystem-Hardware-Software-Human Interactions to Be Modeled 
in Integrated Safety Analyses  
• Functional Representation:  Arrows Represent Flows of Mass or Energy
• Operational Representation:  Arrows Represent Cause‐Effect Relationships
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Figure 5-6. Transformation of Directed Graph (c) to Event Tree–Fault Tree Representation 
5.2.6 Treating Fault Management in an ISA 
Additional Risks Produced by Fault Management Subsystems 
Fault management provisions introduce new functionalities within a system. There are signals that are 
generated and received to detect faults and isolate them; algorithms that are used to process signals, 
identify causes of faults, predict future states, and determine corrective actions; and additional signals 
generated and received to initiate corrective actions and track progress. These new functions may 
introduce new risks. For example, the signals may not occur when intended; they may occur when not 
intended; they may follow spurious pathways leading to unwanted effects; or the design of the logic in the 
algorithms may be deficient or incorrect for the situations encountered. For accidents leading to abort, 
there are still additional risks. Loss of crew may be caused by the inability of the launch abort system 
(LAS) to withstand the environments produced by a launch vehicle failure (blast wave, high-speed 
fragments, fireball); by the inability of the crew to survive the environment produced by the LAS 
(accelerations, heat, depressurization from punctures); or by failure of the crew to survive touchdown/ 
splashdown. 
Methods for Evaluating the Risks 
For the reasons cited above, fault management subsystems are often best evaluated using functional 
analysis techniques. In analysis approaches exercised by Kurtoglu [71], Tumer [72], and others, each 
component is modeled as a functional unit that operates on certain energy, material, and signal flows. For 
example, a “combustion chamber” component will have input flows for propellant liquids (material), 
command signals (signal), output flows for exhaust gases (material), thermal and mechanical energy 
(energy), and pressure and temperature readings (signal). The components perform certain functions on 
these flows to transform them from an input to a desired output state. The logic models capture the 
pathways and timing of these flows. The flow models are frequently dynamic in nature and are integrated 
with the static risk models that characterize the remainder of the system. 
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The additional risks associated with crew abort require modeling of the phenomenology of the accidents. 
Such modeling is concerned with the magnitude and characteristics of the environments produced, 
including timing and spatial distributions, and their effects on equipment and crew 
Integrated Risk Modeling for Fault Management Systems 
Various analyses performed within or for NASA illustrate different aspects of the risk modeling. 
Mathias et al. [41] describe an integrated method for evaluating the probability of loss of crew given the 
availability of a launch abort system. Their method has the following features: 
• Specific emphasis is placed on the use of physics-based models to characterize the failure 
environments that pose the greatest threat to the crew: blast overpressure, fragmentation, and 
thermal radiation environments. 
• The entire failure development is modeled using combinations of empirical data, engineering 
models, and detailed first principle physical models. 
• Appropriate analytic techniques are selected through consideration of the failure scenario’s 
overall impact on the integrated system design through risk contribution, sensitivity of the results, 
uncertainty in the existing knowledge, and complexity of the physics. 
• Abort success depends on the warning time, severity of the failure environment, launch abort 
system, and robustness of the crew module. 
• A dynamic PRA model is used to model the time dependence of the abort initiation and execution 
process. 
In their method, many simplifying analysis assumptions are used early in the design process when there is 
less detail about the design of the system. Once the primary risk drivers are identified via the PRA, they 
are screened to determine if the results are artificially impacted by the conservatism of the assumptions. If 
this appears to be the case, the analysis inputs are refined through further analysis of the failure 
propagation, failure detection, or by decomposing the initiator bins into subsets more representative of 
actual failures. The process is repeated until the modeling is adequate and the risk representation stems 
from the physics of the failure and abort process. 
Kurtoglu [71], Tumer [72], and Johnson [73] show how a process called functional fault analysis (FFA) 
can provide a systems modeling and integration framework that combines information from functional 
modeling, FMEA, FTA, and failure modes of sub-system components into a single framework. The big 
advantage of the FFA modeling approach is that it facilitates cross-subsystem thinking by expressing 
scenarios in terms of flows that cross subsystem boundaries. For example, the following scenario 
description states how a spurious signal could affect three subsystems, involving both hardware and 
software, and lead to loss of vehicle and loss of mission: 
“A false signal in the landing gear (subsystem 1, hardware) is received by the flight control 
computers (subsystem 2, hardware) and is incorrectly interpreted by the flight control software 
(subsystem 2, software) to imply that the spacecraft has landed, thereby resulting in premature 
termination of the braking engines (subsystem 3, hardware) and crashing of the spacecraft into 
the planet surface (LOV and LOM).” 
Many will recognize that this scenario is thought to have caused the crash of the Mars Polar Lander into 
the Martian surface in 1999. An effective fault management system would be one that is capable of 
recognizing when a signal is spurious and overriding the system’s programmed response to the signal. 
In addition, the FFA modeling approach provides a capability that accounts for timing information as it 
relates to functional failures and their propagation. An illustration of the timing elements that affect the 
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success or failure of a launch abort system is shown in Figure 5-7. Based on the failure mode, the mission 
phase, and other assumptions relevant to the failure mode (such as size of the leak to be modeled), these 
times may be based on more or less sophisticated simulations and analyses. 
 
Figure 5-7. Timing Considerations in a Launch Abort Sequence (Source: [71]) 
In related work, Prassinos, et al. [45], show how the probability of failure of the launch abort system to 
operate can be modeled, assuming a defined architecture, by using historical failure data. Hansen et al. 
[46] provide guidelines on how to estimate distributions for abnormal accelerations produced by an out-
of-control launch vehicle and for the likelihood of false positives causing the LAS to abort in error. 
Graded Analysis Approach 
The analysts’ decisions on which models to use in evaluating the effect of fault management provisions 
on the probability of loss is subject to the same considerations as those described in Section 5.2.4 
concerning the implementation of a graded analysis approach. As discussed in that section, these 
decisions are based on the criticality of the mission, the criticality of each scenario, and the timeframe 
available for analysis. 
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5.2.7 Integrating Software Analyses into the ISA 
 Risks Associated with Software 
Attention to software risks has strongly increased in recent years as reliance on software has increased 
[74-76]. For example, the fraction of incident, surprise, and anomaly reports from the JPL planetary 
missions database (post-Mars-Observer) attributable at least in part to software increased from about 10% 
at the end of 1996 to about 35% at the end of 2006, three-quarters of which were attributable to ground 
software. In addition, according to [76], “about half of the losses suffered by NASA in high visibility 
missions carried out in that time span [the last two decades] have been traced to software faults as a root-
cause or as a critically contributing factor.” On the other hand, there are ongoing arguments within NASA 
circles about whether software failures in themselves were a critical contributor to many of the mission-
ending failures, or whether most of the failures specifically caused by software were more benign. Either 
way, it is agreed that the incidence of software failures resulting in some effect on mission success has 
increased as reliance on software has increased, and so the risk contributed by software failures needs to 
be evaluated. 
The majority of software failures have been related to design or specifications. That is, “the software 
behaved according to its design, but the design rationale was inappropriate for a particular off-nominal 
mission condition that had been encountered, which had not been anticipated or had not been sufficiently 
well understood by the system and software designers.” [76] 
Other factors affecting the importance of software risks are basically the same as those that affect UU 
hardware risks, e.g., time and budget pressures, organizational issues, and design complexity [33]. 
Because software failures usually emanate from faulty design rationale rather than random failures, the 
correction of software-induced problems has tended to occur on a one-by-one basis by attempting to find 
and correct each individual cause. Simply adding redundancy has not generally worked and often 
complicates the problem by making it more difficult to locate the individual causes. 
Integrated Risk Modeling for Software and Hardware  
One integrated approach for risk modeling of software and its interfaces with hardware has been 
developed for NASA and is known as the Context-based Software Risk Model (CSRM) [76, 33]. The 
process is designed for application within the framework of a traditional PRA. It starts from a set of 
Boolean event-tree /fault-tree models that have been developed (or are being developed) for the non-
software portions of a space system. The analyst proceeds to identify the mission-critical software 
functions in the PRA framework and incorporates them into the risk models. 
In the current CSRM approach, the hardware models are component based, but the software models are 
functional. Typical software functional failure events include the following: 
• Redundancy management software error 
• Over-correction in a control function 
• Under-correction in a control function 
• Control set-point set too high 
• Control set-point set too low 
The software-governed events are analyzed in various levels of detail using static and dynamic models. 
The mixing of component-based hardware models with function-based software models is not necessarily 
a desirable aspect of the integrated modeling. Rather it is a convenience based on the choice to utilize 
existing hardware models instead of deriving new ones. While this mixing of the modeling may save 
some time, a more holistic approach would be to utilize the FFA framework discussed in the preceding 
section for both the hardware and software portions of the problem. The FFA approach is the preferred 
approach under most circumstances because it facilitates the treatment of cross-cutting scenarios (i.e., that 
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involve hardware and software contained within various subsystems). Thus, it is more suitable for dealing 
with the emergent nature of safety concerns. 
Data Sources 
Several types of software reliability and failure data have been used successfully with these methods. In 
order of preference, these include: 
• Risk-Informed Test Data: Data generated via tests specifically formulated and prioritized in 
accordance with risk information produced in the course of a software PRA and CSRM 
application 
• System-specific Operational Data: Data collected during software test or operation after the end 
of any planned and systematic fault-correction process for the same system and software modules 
that are of interest 
• System-specific Debugging Data: Data collected during a process of software test and fault-
correction for the same system and software modules that are of interest 
• Surrogate Parametric Data: Surrogate data from other systems and operations that are no longer 
accessible in their original raw state, but have been processed and collapsed into some type of 
parametric correlation model 
• Surrogate Raw Data: Data collected from systems and mission operations judged to be similar to 
the ones being assessed 
Surrogate data should only be used when system specific data are not available, which is generally the 
case during the concept development and early design phases of a program/project. 
Graded Analysis Approach 
The amount of rigor applied to the software portion of the model should be graded according to the 
criticality of the mission, the maturity of the design, and the criticality of the risk scenario being 
evaluated, much the same as for the hardware portion of the models34.  
Margins 
Unknown and underappreciated (UU) risks are as important for software as for hardware, so the need for 
sufficient safety risk reserves applies to the software side as well as the hardware side 
5.2.8 Testing to Support the ISA 
Testing is an essential part of model development for the following reasons: 
 It establishes much of the basis for validating the models (CAS Factor 2 in Section 5.2.9, Table 5-
3). 
 It helps establish the input pedigree (CAS Factor 3). 
 It serves as a basis for uncertainty quantification (e.g., through a likelihood function) (CAS Factor 
4). 
 It can help to identify concerns that were heretofore unknown or underappreciated, thus 
improving results robustness (CAS Factor 5). 
  
                                                            
34 Graded analysis not specific to software was discussed in Section 5.2.4. 
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Testing should be used to provide confidence that the assumptions in the models of the ISA are true and 
that the overall robustness of the ISA is acceptable. To accomplish this, the tests should be designed to 
demonstrate the following:  
 That each assumption or parameter value used in each model is applicable for each environment 
where it is assumed to apply 
 That each model is applicable for each environment where it is used 
 That the integration of models that have been individually verified is applicable for each 
environment where it is used 
 That there is a reasonable margin before failure modes begin to manifest when the environment 
parameters are allowed to exceed the ranges specified in the environmental requirements 
document 
It is advisable to utilize a validated test planning tool that applies “design of experiments” [77], or an 
equivalent process, as a means to ensure that the value of testing is optimized for the least cost. 
5.2.9 Adhering to the Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Credibility Assessment Scale 
(CAS) 
The credibility assessment scale (CAS) factors, as defined in the Modeling and Simulation (M&S) 
Standard [78] and Handbook [79], include the following eight attributes: 
 Model verification (numerical errors small for all important features) 
 Model validation (results agree with real-world data) 
 Input pedigree (input data agree with real-world data) 
 Results uncertainty (nondeterministic and numerical analysis) 
 Results robustness (sensitivity known for most parameters) 
 Use history (model is the de facto standard for the application in question) 
 M&S management (continual process improvement) 
 People qualifications (extensive experience in and use of recommended practices for this 
particular M&S) 
For high criticality risk scenarios within high criticality missions, high scores are sought for each of these 
factors, both for the individual models and for the integrated model. The ranking of the factors is 
performed on a scale of 0 to 4 using Table 1 of Appendix B of NASA-STD-7009 [78]. The table is 
reproduced below as Table 5-3, slightly changed to utilize a scale of 1 to 5, in accordance with the 
ranking scale for assurance deficits to be introduced later35.  
For the individual CAS factors that are underlined in the headings of Table 5-3, the 7009 Standard [78] 
and Handbook [79] further refine the rankings to include separate rankings for two separate sub-factors: 
one for evidence and the other for technical review. The evidence sub-factor considers the quality of the 
evidence, whereas the technical review sub-factor considers the quality of the peer review process. The 
two sub-factor rankings are each multiplied by a weighting factor, which is selected by the responsible 
party designated by program and project management and is subject to approval by program/ project 
management and by the Technical Authority. The weighted sub-factors are summed to yield a single 
ranking for each CAS factor. To evolve an overall ranking for the M&S credibility assessment, the 7009 
Standard [78] and this handbook suggest using the minimum value of the rankings for each CAS factor. 
                                                            
35 A suggested scale for ranking assurance deficits will be presented in Section 7.2.4. 
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So, for example, if “Validation” had an evidence ranking of 4 with a weighting factor of 0.6, and a 
technical review ranking of 3 with a weighting factor of 0.4, the overall ranking for “Validation” would 
be 4 x 0.6 + 3 x 0.4 = 3.6. If “Results Uncertainty” had an overall ranking of 2.7 and none of the other 
CAS factors had a lower ranking, the overall ranking for the M&S credibility would be 2.7. We round this 
value up to 3 for present purposes, to be consistent with the assurance deficit ranking process. 
Table 5-3. Ranking Criteria for Credibility Assessment Scale (CAS) Factors 
 
In practice, there will be a separate M&S ranking for each model that is used to perform calculations for a 
critical risk scenario within a critical mission. For purposes of obtaining a single assurance deficit ranking 
for the base claim that the models used satisfy the M&S Credibility Assessment Scale (CAS) criteria, we 
recommend adopting the minimum of all the M&S CAS rankings for all the models. The justification is 
that all the models that undergo CAS examination apply to critical risk scenarios within critical missions, 
and so all of the CAS rankings apply to essential models. 
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5.3 Tailored, Derived, and Allocated Requirements 
5.3.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Provider’s responsibilities for tailoring, deriving, and allocating requirements are summarized below: 
 Along with any proposed tailoring of safety requirements, include an assessment of the effects of 
the proposed tailoring on the safety performance of the system, using the ISA as a baseline, and a 
qualitative assessment of the potential effects of the proposed tailoring on the prevalence of 
unknown and underappreciated sources of safety risk. 
 Specify requirements and associated verification procedures on each SCI, sufficient to assure its 
performance at levels of capability, reliability, and availability that are documented or implicitly 
assumed in the ISA. Examples of such derived requirements include safety limits, limiting control 
settings, limiting conditions for operation, administrative controls, safety factors, surveillance and 
inspection requirements, maintenance requirements, and quality assurance requirements. 
 Use the ISA to risk-inform the allocation of safety requirements to assure that they are achievable 
at a level of confidence that is consistent with the risk tolerance of the Acquirer relative to 
system-level safety requirements. 
Note that in addition to items that are identified through analysis as being critical to safety, SCIs may 
include support items or items in series whose proper functioning is necessary for the analyzed items to 
function properly. 
The following topics pertaining to these responsibilities and areas of consideration are discussed in 
Sections 5.3.2 through 5.3.5: 
 Tailoring levied requirements 
 Developing allocated and derived requirements 
 Conducting ongoing negotiation with the Acquirer pertaining to tailored, allocated, and derived 
requirements 
 Considering safety performance requirements and levied engineering requirements as an 
integrated package 
5.3.2 Tailoring Levied Requirements 
When the Acquirer levies requirements on the Provider, the Acquirer has already executed a tailoring 
process to eliminate potential requirements that are deemed to be inapplicable, unneeded, or impracticable 
from the Acquirer’s point of views36. Having received those requirements, the Provider will generally 
perform his/her own tailoring process to argue for waivers on levied requirements that the Provider deems 
to be inapplicable, unneeded, or impracticable based on the more detailed specification of the design, 
realization, and operation of the system that the Provider develops. The ultimately agreed-upon set of 
levied requirements results from negotiations between the Acquirer and the Provider, and the Acquirer 
exercises approval authority37. The process of negotiation, adjustment, and approval can occur at any time 
during the program/project, whenever the emergence of new conditions warrants a rebaselining of the 
levied requirements. 
                                                            
36 This role of the Acquirer in tailoring requirements was discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
37 This negotiation was discussed in Section 4.4.3. 
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Since the levied requirements emanate from best practices and lessons learned from past experience, it is 
the responsibility of the Provider in requesting a waiver to substantiate the argument that the best practice 
or lesson learned is inapplicable, unneeded, or impracticable. Consider, for example, the following best 
practices cited in the NASA Goddard GOLD Rules [47]: 
• Gold Rule #1.25: When redundant systems or functions are implemented for risk mitigation, the 
redundant components, or functional command paths, shall be independent, such that the failure 
of one component or command path does not affect the other component or command path. 
Reason for waiving: Both systems or functions might be allowed to have a common component 
to save on weight and cost if failure of the component were extremely unlikely. For example, a 
common tank or manifold in a propulsion system might be desirable because separate tanks or 
manifolds might increase the total number of valves, resulting in a net decrease in safety due to 
the increased probability of valve leakage. 
• Gold Rule #1.30: The Attitude Control System (ACS) shall have stability margins of at least 6db 
for rigid body stability with 30 degrees phase margin, and 12db of gain margin for flexible 
modes. 
Reason for waiving: The same bus is being used with fully measured masses and inertias, along 
with the same algorithm and ACS hardware, flying in the same environment, so that there is 
much less uncertainty in the system dynamics. 
• Gold Rule #4.11: Mechanical environmental testing (sine, random, & acoustic, shock, etc.) of 
flight hardware shall be performed with the test article in the flight like configuration. 
Mechanisms are configured for flight, and the flight or flight-like blankets and harness shall be 
present for test. 
Reason for waiving: Suppose the need to perform both mechanical environmental testing of flight 
hardware in a flight-like configuration and system end-to-end testing using actual flight hardware 
caused the schedule for launch to slip beyond the decision maker’s tolerance because of 
fabrication time or acquisition time for the necessary hardware. The mechanical testing could be 
curtailed or eliminated based on the argument that its purpose is adequately served by the system 
testing. 
• Gold Rule #4.23: A life test shall be conducted, within representative operational environments, 
to at least 2x expected life for all repetitive motion devices with a goal of completing 1x expected 
life by CDR 
Reason for waiving: Life testing for 2x expected life might be impossible for devices that have to 
last for a decade or more (e.g., the ion thrusters for the Dawn mission) 
The NASA waiver process is described in NPR 7120.5E [34], which states:  
• “The request for relief from a requirement includes the rationale, a risk evaluation, and reference 
to all material that provides the justification supporting acceptance.” (NPR Section 3.5) 
• “Provide a rationale consistent with program characteristics such as scope, complexity, visibility, 
cost, safety, and acceptable risk.” (NPR Appendix D) 
NPR 7120.5E also states that for levied requirements that have been retained and not waived, the Provider 
should provide evidence of such retention in the form of references to design drawings, test plans, 
program/project management plans, etc. 
The request for a waiver by the Provider should be backed up by an assessment of the effect of the waiver 
on the ability to meet the overall top-level objectives of maintaining the minimum required level of safety 
and being as safe as reasonably practicable. For practical purposes, this assessment can be based on 
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quantitative bounding estimates or on qualitative arguments. The principal arguments should provide 
confidence that the following statements would remain true if the waiver request were accepted: 
• The resultant value of the loss probability from known risks for each key mission objective would 
remain within the appropriate probabilistic requirement established in Section 4.2. 
• The resultant value of the total loss probability (known risks plus margin) for each key mission 
objective would remain within the appropriate threshold commitment established in Section 4.1.4. 
• The relative increase in the loss probability from known risks for each key mission objective 
would be small enough compared to savings in cost, schedule, and/or improvements in technical 
performance, to justify the waiver or modification from an ASARP point of view. 
• The relative increase in the total loss probability (known risks plus margin) for each key mission 
objective would be small enough compared to savings in cost, schedule, and/or improvements in 
technical performance, to justify the waiver or modification from an ASARP point of view. 
If these statements can be justified, then the Acquirer can be confident that the waiver does not cause an 
inordinate concern about either known or UU risks. 
5.3.3 Developing Allocated and Derived Requirements 
This section concerns lower level requirements that are allocated or derived by the Provider starting from 
higher level requirements that have been negotiated between the Acquirer and the Provider. The 
distinction between allocated and derived requirements was discussed in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 and is 
repeated below: 
• Allocated requirements are quantitative requirements that are apportioned from system or 
subsystem level to lower levels, where the units of measure remain the same as at the higher 
level. For example, the overall maximum allowable probability of LOC during abort may be 
apportioned to the failure probabilities of the abort motor, the jettison motor, the attitude control 
motor, and other subsystems. The maximum failure probabilities at the lower level are allocated 
to stay within the maximum failure probability at the higher level. 
• Derived requirements may be quantitative or qualitative and are developed at a lower level of a 
system to implement a higher level requirement. Derived requirements arise from constraints, 
consideration of issues implied but not explicitly stated in the Acquirer’s requirements, or factors 
introduced by the selected architecture or the design. For example, it may be determined that in 
order for the overall probability of LOC during abort to be less than X, the maximum acceleration 
during abort must be less than Y. The limit on acceleration is a derived requirement. 
As described in the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [13], the requirements at higher and lower 
levels may be of several types or categories38. The process of allocating or deriving lower level 
requirements from higher level requirements can apply to many quantitative deterministic requirements. 
For example, a requirement that the weight of an external tank be less than X may be allocated to lower 
level requirements on the weights of the H2 tank, the LOX tank, the external structure, and the 
instrumentation. Allocation is also customarily applied to probabilistic requirements. From a safety 
viewpoint, the most important types of probabilistic requirements are as follows:  
• Probabilistic safety requirements define maximum allowable probabilities of loss. For example, a 
requirement that P(LOM) be no greater than 1 in 500 is a quantitative safety requirement (since 
loss of mission is considered a safety performance metric according to NASA’s procedural 
requirements). 
                                                            
38 Some of the different types of deterministic engineering requirements were summarized in Section 4.3.  
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• Reliability requirements define minimum required probabilities of success. For example, a 
requirement that the main engine fire successfully at least 999 times out of 1000 is a reliability 
requirement. 
• Probabilistic technical performance requirements define how well the system must execute its 
functions. For example, a requirement that an abort system be effective from ground to LEO for 
at least 80% of the accidents that would otherwise result in LOC is a probabilistic technical 
performance requirement. 
Allocated Requirements 
Volume 1 provided guidance on allocating failure probabilities from higher to lower levels using risk 
assessment models together with cost and schedule models (see Section 4.4.1 in Volume 1). The process 
is iterative and involves the following steps: 
• Initial failure probabilities for subsystems and major components are assigned using historical 
experience. 
• The cost and schedule impact for achieving each allocated failure probability are determined. 
• The lower level failure probabilities, costs, and schedule impacts are entered into the risk and 
cost/schedule models to perform a bottom-up analysis for the safety, cost, and schedule of the 
overall system. 
The allocations are iterated upon to achieve a system that satisfies the probabilistic requirement for safety 
and is ASARP. 
A similar process for reliability allocation has been adopted by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) 
[80]. Their process is depicted in Figure 5-8. 
 
Figure 5-8. FAA Reliability Approach (copied from [80], Fig. 3.2-1) 
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The steps in the FAA reliability allocation approach, as described in [80], are as follows: 
1. Set a vehicle reliability estimate based on a comparison to historical data from previous launches 
of vehicles developed and launched in similar circumstances.  
2. Account for the differences in the mission and system parameters used for this vehicle compared 
to the previous launches, where possible. (For example, comparing the aerodynamic stresses on 
the vehicle or whether components with little test experience are being used.)  
3. Allocate the vehicle reliability estimate among mission phases based on allocation models using 
historical data from launches of similar vehicles.  
4. Allocate the vehicle reliability estimate among subsystems for each mission phase based on 
allocation models and historical data.  
5.  Employ bottom-up subsystem assessments to assess individual contributors to failure, to calculate 
probabilities when allocations are no longer reasonable (because the subsystems become 
interdependent or data are simply not available) or when it becomes impossible to propagate 
failures to a lower level, or to verify that the allocated reliability requirement has been met. 
Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analyses (FMECA), Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD), 
and Parts Count analyses are often used. Verification data can also be used to provide additional 
data support or to disprove the analysis or the allocation.  
6. Use system reliability analyses, such as Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), to assist in verifying overall reliability estimates. The system reliability analyses are 
important. Reliability allocation approaches and bottom-up reliability analysis methods typically 
assume no interaction between components. In addition, they tend to ignore other systems factors, 
such as the environment, human interactions, and software, resulting in optimistic estimates of 
reliability. Therefore, system reliability analyses help ensure that the system safety goals have 
been achieved. Verification data can also be used to provide additional data supporting or 
disproving the analysis. 
 Derived Requirements 
The process for deriving requirements is similar to the process for allocating requirements. However, 
derived requirements may include placing limits on important environmental parameters such as 
accelerations, temperatures, pressures, and fragment characteristics. They may also include placing limits 
on important functional parameters such as rates for mass flows and paths for information flows. Because 
of the fact that constraints on environmental and functional parameters may be included in specification 
of derived requirements, the logic models may need to be broadened to include phenomenological 
relationships. In particular:  
• The risk models used for purposes of developing derived requirements need to capture the 
pertinent phenomenological relationships between component failure rates and/or load limits and 
the environmental and functional parameters mentioned above. 
• These phenomenological relationships should include any significant cross-system effects such as 
the effects of accelerations in one part of the system on other parts of the system. 
• The phenomenological relationships should also include any significant hardware-software-
human interfaces and interactions. 
• The cost and schedule models that are used to ensure that the derived requirements are cost- and 
schedule-effective need to account for how the placement of constraints on the environmental and 
functional parameters mentioned above affect cost and schedule. 
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• Technical performance models should also be used to ensure that technical objectives are met 
when constraints are placed on the environmental and functional parameters. 
The Need for Holistic Risk Modeling in Allocating and Deriving Lower Level Requirements 
Derived requirements may include probabilistic requirements that are placed on cross-subsystem 
functions. For example, in order to achieve an acceptably low probability of LOC, it may be necessary to 
specify a lower level requirement as follows: “The probability of SRB burn-through impinging on the 
mainstage shall be less than X.” To determine an appropriate value for X, the risk model from which the 
lower level requirement is derived must reflect the system as a whole. It must in particular account for the 
likelihood of mainstage impingement given burn-through of the SRB39.  
In addition, when the development of derived requirements introduces constraints on environmental and 
functional parameters, the effects of such constraints tend to have system-wide effects rather than just 
local effects. This reinforces the need for a holistic risk modeling approach that includes all important 
interactions between different subsystems and between the hardware-software-human elements. Figure 5-
9, which is similar to Figures 5-5 and 5-6, illustrates how such interactions may unfold and should be 
accounted for in the use of system-wide risk modeling to derive lower level requirements. 
 
Figure 5-9. Schematic of Subsystem-Hardware-Software-Human Interactions Leading from Implementation 
of a Derived Requirement to Effects on the System 
                                                            
39 The development of holistic risk models that include cross-system interactions was discussed in Sections 5.2.5 
and 5.2.6. 
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Accounting for UU Risks 
Based on the factors that tend to increase UU risks, as indicated in Section 3.1.1 and Table 4-2, it may be 
found that certain allocated or derived requirements may affect the amount of margin that needs to be 
applied to the loss probability from known risks in order to ensure that the total risk, including UU risks, 
is within the desired threshold or goal. The allocated or derived requirements may result in either an 
increase or a decrease in the needed margin. Therefore, the models used to allocate or derive lower level 
requirements need to account for the UU risks as well as known risks40.  
5.3.4 Conducting Ongoing Negotiations with the Acquirer 
Negotiations between the Provider and Acquirer were brought up in Sections 3.1.1 and 4.4.3 in the 
context of rebaselining safety requirements and resetting verification procedures. This section concerns 
negotiations about allocated and derived requirements, both of which are set by the Provider at lower 
levels of the system as a means to satisfy the requirements levied by the Acquirer at higher levels. 
Lower level allocated and derived requirements have to be reviewed by the Acquirer as part of the 
requirement development process because there is a chance that one or more of them might conflict with 
the higher level requirements. For example, a lower level requirement that a particular component be 
certified to 10 g’s might conflict with a higher level requirement that the system as a whole be two-failure 
tolerant up to accelerations of 15 g’s, even though the Provider might not consider the failure of the 
component in question to violate the failure tolerance requirement. If the Provider’s argument for the 
lower level requirement cannot convince the Acquirer that failure tolerance is maintained up to 15 g’s, 
then the lower level requirements may need to be changed. It is far better for the change to occur during 
the requirement development phase than later on after design decisions have already been implemented. 
Even if the Acquirer accepts the Provider’s logic for the allocated or derived requirements, the Provider 
of course still bears the responsibility of demonstrating through the RISC and the evidence developed for 
it that the system meets the Acquirer’s safety requirements and is acceptably safe. 
5.3.5 Considering Safety Performance Requirements and Levied Engineering 
Requirements as an Integrated Package 
As mentioned earlier41, one of the permissible reasons for waiving a levied requirement or adjusting it to 
make it less stringent, is that it does not provide an evident or discernible net increase in safety for the 
present mission. As an example, a requirement that all active parts of a system be two-failure tolerant 
might be waived or adjusted if it can be shown that it is not providing a discernible reduction in the 
probability of loss of crew, vehicle, or mission. To ascertain whether this is the case, it is advisable to 
utilize an integrated risk model in a trade-study fashion wherein, for example, the overall known risk for a 
comprehensively two-failure tolerant system (Option 1) is compared with the overall known risk for a 
system in which two-failure tolerance is applied only in areas where it is believed to be effective (Option 
2). A result showing that Option 2 provides no discernible safety increase over Option 1 (or possibly even 
a net safety decrease) would provide a strong argument in favor of waiving two-failure tolerance in the 
areas that do not contribute to safety. Of course, as part of the argument, it would also have to be 
demonstrated that the possible benefit of retaining Option 1 as a protection against UU risks would not be 
significant. This is an example of the need to consider safety performance requirements and levied 
engineering requirements as an integrated package rather than as individual, unrelated entities. 
                                                            
40 Section 4.1.3 has discussed approaches for estimating and implementing safety performance risk margins to 
ensure that thresholds and goals are met. 
41 See Section 4.3.3. 
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5.4 Supporting the System Design 
5.4.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Provider’s responsibilities in supporting the system design can be summarized as follows: 
 Determine how to implement the following design strategies for safety when making design 
decisions: 
o Elimination of hazards 
o Hazard control (via design for minimum risk, for example42) 
o Failure tolerance (via design redundancy, for example) 
o System safing (via design provisions to accommodate degraded operation or changed 
operational objectives) 
o Emergency operations (via design for abort and/or destruct, for example) 
 Determine how to prioritize safety performance during system design decision making in 
accordance with the ASARP principle, using findings from the ISA. 
 Designate a set of SCIs, as described in Section 5.2.1. 
 Plan for the specified levels of SCI performance (capability, reliability, and availability) to be 
verified through testing, analysis, and application of standard practices such as those reflected in 
consensus engineering standards. 
 Plan for the design of the system to provide for SCI performance monitoring throughout system 
operation and sustainment. 
 Risk-inform test plans and protocols for the purpose of focusing testing on priority system or 
subsystem designs, functions, and concerns most affecting safety. (Value of information (VOI) 
analysis is one method that provides a quantitative basis for decision making regarding 
information-gathering activities such as testing.) 
The following topics pertaining to these responsibilities and areas of consideration are discussed in 
Sections 5.4.2 through 5.4.5: 
 Using RIDM together with historical data to support system design concept decisions 
 Applying ASARP principles in combination with the minimum tolerable level of safety 
performance to support system design improvement decisions 
                                                            
42 The term “design for minimum risk (DFMR)” has a variety of specific meanings within the aerospace industry. 
The FAA System Safety Handbook [81] defines it as follows: “Design to eliminate risks. If the identified risk cannot 
be eliminated, reduce it to an acceptable level through design selection.” This system-level definition is similar to 
the ASARP principle of this Handbook. The definition in the Air Force System Safety Handbook [82] is also 
similar. In contrast, at NASA, DMFR has traditionally been applied at the component level as an alternative to 
failure tolerance when non-safety considerations such as mass, render failure tolerance impracticable. In this context 
DFMR refers to (among other things) the inclusion of specific design features that minimize the probability of 
occurrence of failure modes, such as application of stringent factors of safety or other design margins. This 
Handbook adheres to the NASA conception of DFMR with respect to design features, but does not restrict its 
application only to situations where failure tolerance is impracticable. The appropriateness of DFMR in a specific 
application is a matter to be decided between the Provider and Acquirer. 
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 Designating and analyzing safety critical items and safety risk drivers as part of system design 
support 
 Minimizing system design complexity 
5.4.2 Using RIDM and Historical Data 
This section pertains to cases when the Provider is asked to specify the design concept to be pursued, 
rather than simply implement the design concept that is specified by the Acquirer. The Provider in that 
case should exercise a RIDM approach that is based on the requirements that relate to RIDM in NPR-
8000.4A [4] and the corresponding guidelines and recommendations for implementing them in the RM 
Handbook [28]. The main steps of the process may be stated as follows: 
• Identification of Alternatives – Identify a set of alternative design concepts and the associated 
concepts of operation that have the potential to satisfy all the commitments requested by the 
acquirer with regard to each of the mission execution domains (safety, technical performance, 
cost, and schedule) in a manner that is as safe as reasonably practicable (ASARP). 
• Risk Analysis of Alternatives – Develop a set of performance measures covering all the 
commitments requested by the acquirer and formulate/execute integrated analysis models to 
determine for each design concept the risk of not satisfying the acquirer’s requirements. 
• Risk-Informed Alternative Selection – Negotiate with the acquirer to establish risk tolerances for 
each commitment and provide a case for selecting the alternative that best provides the desired 
solution within these risk tolerances. 
With regard to safety, the main commitment for the Provider is to ensure that the design satisfies the 
requirement for the probability of loss from known risks provided by the Acquirer as described in Section 
4.2 and negotiated between the Acquirer and the Provider as described in Section 4.4.3. It is also 
important to the Acquirer that the UU risks be contained enough to provide confidence that the threshold 
for the probability of loss from all risks is also being satisfied at the time of the initial launch, or in other 
words that the Acquirer’s conception of the margin for UU risks is corroborated by the Provider’s 
attention to the factors that control UU risks43. Thus, there are two probabilistic safety commitments to be 
considered: 
• The known risk (the part of the total risk that is determined from models and analyses) should be 
within the decision maker’s risk tolerance for satisfying the requirement for the probability of 
loss from known sources as specified for each key mission objective. 
• The total risk (from both known and UU sources) at the time of the first flight should be within 
the decision maker’s risk tolerance for satisfying the threshold for the probability of loss from all 
risks, and after a sufficient number of flights have been completed, should be within the decision 
maker’s tolerance for satisfying the goal for the probability of loss from all risks. 
The two commitments together satisfy the need for the selection of the design concept and management 
plan to be informed by analysis of the known risks as well as by historical experience pertaining to UU 
risks. 
The second of the two probabilistic commitments can be examined by multiplying the known risk 
obtained from models and analysis by the appropriate safety performance factor, from Table 4-2 or 
elsewhere, to obtain an estimate for the total risk that can be compared with the threshold. 
                                                            
43 These factors were described in Section 3.1.1 and elsewhere. 
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The following illustration shows how the estimate can rather simply be obtained by multiplying point 
estimates: 
• Suppose that the loss probability from known sources, PKNOWN(Loss) is calculated to be 0.01, that 
the system is to be developed under significant time pressure, with reliability and safety having 
equal priority with cost and schedule, and that the design involves new integration concepts and 
significantly new technology. 
• An estimate of the total risk using a safety performance factor of 5 from Table 4-2 would be 
PTOTAL(Loss) = 0.01 x 5 = 0.05. 
• If the safety requirement for the initial launch is that the loss probability from known sources be 
no greater than PREQT(Loss) = 0.03 and the safety threshold commitment is that the loss 
probability from all sources to be no greater than PTHRESH(Loss) = 0.06, then both are satisfied by 
this design. 
• If, however, the minimum requirement for the loss probability from known sources is 
PREQT(Loss) = 0.01 and the threshold commitment is PTHRESH(Loss) = 0.02, then the requirement 
for the known risk is satisfied but the commitment for the total risk is not satisfied. In that case it 
would be incumbent on the Provider to modify the design and/or management plan, or if 
necessary seek a waiver so that both the requirement and the threshold commitment could be 
satisfied. 
5.4.3 Applying ASARP in Combination with the Minimum Tolerable Level 
 General ASARP Considerations 
According to Volume 1 (Appendix B) of this handbook, being “as safe as reasonably practicable,” or 
ASARP, is “a philosophy that safety should be increased as opportunities arise if the impact on cost, 
schedule, technical performance, or any other domain of interest to NASA is reasonable and acceptable.” 
ASARP therefore entails a judgment from the decision maker about how much sacrifice in areas other 
than safety can be tolerated for a given amount of improvement in safety. In making this judgment, the 
decision maker needs to be presented with quantitative metrics for the increment in safety that results 
from a proposed change to the system, along with the decrement that this entails in other domains (cost, 
schedule, and technical). He/she also needs to know where the measure of each metric lies with respect to 
its associated constraint or requirement, since the decision maker’s tolerability for cost, schedule, or 
technical decrements for the sake of improving safety would be affected by that consideration. Such 
information might be presented as shown conceptually in Figure 5-10, which depicts the loss probability 
versus the total project cost. A similar figure could be prepared for loss probability versus launch date, 
loss probability versus vehicle mass, and loss probability versus any other affected performance metric. 
The safety metric in Figure 5-10 is labeled as the probability of loss from known risks. Its value is 
deemed to be acceptable if it lies within the safety performance requirement for the probability of loss 
from known risks, derived in the manner of Section 4.2. As mentioned several times earlier, it is 
important to look not only at P(Loss) from known risks but also at P(Loss) from all risks, known plus UU.  
Figure 5-11 (left-hand chart) shows similar results where the abscissa depicts the probability of loss from 
all risks at the time of the first flight. Its value meets the minimum tolerable level of safety performance if 
it lies within the safety performance threshold derived as in Section 4.1.4. The total risk in this figure is 
calculated as the known risk times the safety performance factor, which is derived in the manner of 
Section 4.5.3. Finally in this sequence, Figure 5-11 (right-hand chart) shows results depicting the 
probability of loss from all risks when the system has matured after many flights. Its value meets the 
minimum tolerable level if it lies within the safety performance goal as derived in Section 4.1.4. The total 
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risk is equal to the known risk, because UU risks are assumed to have been wrung out for a mature 
system. 
 
Figure 5-10. Schematic of the Effect of a Design Change on the Probability of Loss from Known Risks at the 
Time of the First Flight and on the Project Cost 
 
 
Figure 5-11. Schematic of the Effect of a Design Change on the Probability of Loss from All Risks and on the 
Project Cost 
For all cases shown so far, the principle of ASARP according to the definition in the first paragraph of 
this section is preserved in going from the present system, denoted by a circle, to a changed system, 
denoted by an X. In all cases, safety is improved without causing cost to become unacceptable. If this 
were true as well for the other competing metrics (launch date, vehicle mass, etc.), then the proposed 
change to the system could be said to be within the ASARP principle. 
ASARP in Terms of Joint Confidence Levels and Risk Tolerances 
The NASA Cost Estimating Handbook [39] stipulates that the risks of exceeding cost constraints and 
schedule constraints should be evaluated at a 70% joint confidence level (JCL). This means that the cost 
and schedule performance is considered to be acceptable only if the joint likelihood of the cost exceeding 
the cost constraint and the schedule exceeding the schedule constraint is less than 30%. To state it another 
way, the cost and schedule performance is considered unacceptable if the likelihood of exceeding either 
the cost constraint or the schedule constraint is greater than 30%. The 30% value is in effect the decision 
maker’s risk tolerance for cost overruns and schedule slippages. 
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The term “risk tolerance” is defined in the RM Handbook [28], and is basically the same conceptually for 
cost and schedule as it is for safety risk. Just as cost and schedule performance are considered to be 
acceptable if the joint likelihood of exceeding the cost and schedule constraints is less than the risk 
tolerance (30%), safety performance is considered acceptable only if the following arguments can be 
justified: 
 The likelihood that the loss probability from known risks, PKNOWN(Loss), exceeds the loss 
probability requirement, PREQT(Loss), is less than the decision maker’s risk tolerance for 
exceeding the requirement at all times during the operational timeline. 
 The safety performance factor attributable to the factors discussed in Sections 3.1.1 and 4.5.3 is 
not greater than the value assumed by the Acquirer in deriving the margin between the safety 
performance requirement and the safety performance threshold in Section 4.1.3. 
This interpretation of ASARP is illustrated schematically in Figure 5-12. The RM Handbook provides 
techniques for propagating uncertainty distributions for input variables to determine the uncertainty 
distribution for PKNOWN(Loss), the probability of loss from known risks (referred to in the RM Handbook 
as the aggregate risk). The probability that PKNOWN(Loss) exceeds the requirement is calculated from that 
distribution. 
 
Figure 5-12. Schematic of the Effect of a Design Change on the Probabilities of Exceeding Joint Confidence 
Levels and Risk Tolerances 
ASARP in Terms of Utility Functions 
As mentioned above, the literal interpretation of ASARP given in the first paragraph of this section would 
imply that a proposed change is desirable if safety is improved without causing any other constraint (cost, 
schedule, mass, etc.) to be violated. From practical considerations, however, a change would not be 
implemented if the amount of safety improvement was disproportionately small compared to the amount 
of sacrifice in cost or other metrics of concern, regardless of whether or not the cost and other measures 
remained acceptable. For this reason, there is another criterion given in Volume 1 (Section 2.1) which 
provides a slightly different basis for making an ASARP related judgment. It states: “The system is 
ASARP if an incremental improvement in safety would require a disproportionate deterioration of system 
performance in other areas.” The notion that a “disproportionate” sacrifice should not be made to achieve 
a small increase in safety introduces the idea of value versus impact into the ASARP implementation. 
One way of introducing a value-impact context for ASARP is by using utility functions within a decision 
analysis framework. A utility function is a statement of the decision maker’s preference for different 
values of a parameter or metric, in relation to other parameters or metrics. In its most general form, a 
utility function is a multi-dimensional monotonic function of a number of variables, ܷሺ ଵܺ, ܺଶ, … , ܺேሻ. 
That is, it either increases or decreases monotonically as each Xi is increased with all the other variables 
held constant. An example utility function of two variables is shown in Figure 5-13. In this example, X1 is 
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a safety performance metric (the total probability of loss including both known and UU risks), and X2 is a 
cost metric (the cost expended for reducing the probability of loss). In a higher dimension example, other 
variables in ܷሺ ଵܺ, ܺଶ, … , ܺேሻ might include other cost metrics such as the total cost of the project, other 
safety performance metrics such as the probability of loss from only known risks, schedule metrics such 
the time to complete the project, and technical performance metrics such as the amount of data collected. 
In general, the variables considered in decision making are diverse and not necessarily independent. 
To illustrate further, suppose a decision maker is queried and the following equation is derived to 
represent his/her utility for the two variables cited above (denoted henceforth as P and C instead of X1 and 
X2): 
ܷሺܲ, ܥሻ ൌ െሾ3.0 ൅ 2.0 log ܲሿ ቂ1 െ ஼$ସ଴୑ቃ when C ≤ $20M 
ܷሺܲ, ܥሻ ൌ െሾ3.0 ൅ 2.0 log ܲሿ ቂ3 െ ஼$଼୑ቃ when C  $20M 
Figure 5-14 displays this equation, first in the form of U versus P for various values of C, and then in the 
form of U versus C for various values of P. 
 
Figure 5-13. An Example Two-Dimensional Utility Function (Adapted from [83]) 
  
Figure 5-14. Example Contours of a Two-Dimensional Utility Function Used for Illustration 
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The slopes in a utility function for a performance metric depict the decision maker’s comfort factor with 
respect to changes in the value of the performance metric. In the case of cost in Figure 5-14, for example, 
the decision maker is only mildly averse to cost increases when the cost is less than the constraint placed 
on the project for improvements in safety ($20 million), but very averse to cost increases when the cost 
exceeds the constraint. In the case of total loss probability, the decision maker is more sanguine about 
exceeding the threshold (1 x 10-2) as long as it is not exceeded by more than a factor of about 3. 
To pursue this illustration further, suppose that according to a current assessment, the expected total 
probability of loss for an existing system is 2 x 10-2, which is larger than the threshold value of 1 x 10-2. 
Substituting P = 2 x 10-2 and C = 0 into the first of the two equations above, the utility to the decision 
maker for the existing system is –[3 + 2 log 2x10-2] [1 - 0] = 0.40. If an opportunity arises to improve the 
expected total loss probability from 2 x 10-2 to 1 x 10-2 at a cost of $10 million, the utility to the decision 
maker increases to –[3 + 2 log 1x10-2] [1 - $10M/$40M] = 0.75. Since U has increased, a decision to 
exploit the opportunity at the cost of $10 million would be a positive step toward making the system 
ASARP.  
Suppose, in addition, a different opportunity arises to improve the expected total loss probability from 2 x 
10-2 to 1 x 10-3 at a cost of $22 million. Using the second of the two equations, the utility to the decision 
maker increases to –[3 + 2 log 1x10-3] [3 - $22M/$8M] = 0.75. Thus, either option represents an 
improvement over the status quo, and the choice between them is a wash. 
In general, the variables, Xi, in the utility function are random variables with uncertainty distributions 
which, as shown in Section 4.5, may be rather large. Thus, in formal decision analysis, an “expected 
utility” is calculated by integrating the utility function over the probability distributions of the variables. 
Procedures for doing this may be found in [84]. The value of selecting one alternative action or response 
over another alternative action or response or over no response is based on the change in the expected 
utility calculated for each alternative. Integrating over the input probability distributions is a more 
rigorous process than calculating a utility based on the mean values of the input variables. 
5.4.4 Designating and Analyzing Safety Critical Items and Safety Risk Drivers 
Most people think of a critical items list (CIL) as being derived from the results of a Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA). An FMEA is a bottom-up, inductive analytical method that may be performed 
at either the functional or piece-part level. FMECA extends FMEA by including a criticality analysis, 
which is used to chart the probability of failure modes against the severity of their consequences. An 
FMEA matrix may be sorted by severity level to identify critical items and critical failure modes for 
which controls are desired. 
In the context of system safety, critical items have a broader meaning. As discussed in Section 5.2.5, 
safety is an emergent system-level property, and scenarios that challenge safety frequently involve cross-
system interactions between subsystems and between the hardware, software, and human elements. 
Therefore, critical items for system safety have to evolve from a top-down approach that includes the kind 
of integrated system modeling that was discussed in Section 5.2.5 and illustrated in Figures 54 and 55. 
Safety-critical items (SCIs), then, can include any element or attribute of the system that is critical to 
safety, including hardware, software, interfaces between hardware and software, the human interface, 
operating procedures, and management practices. 
In addition, the SCIs need to satisfy the risk target at their credited levels of performance, and the one-at-
a-time FMEA- or FMECA-based approach does not necessarily achieve that property. The major vehicle 
for SCI identification is therefore the ISA, which is used to identify the hardware, software, human, 
operational, and managerial system features upon which safe system operation depends. As mentioned 
above, such items can be explicit in the ISA (e.g., redundancies, backup systems) or they can be implicit 
(e.g., assumptions regarding component structural integrity). In either case, designating these items as 
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safety-critical protects their safety functions by imposing rigorous and highly visible safety management 
provisions on them. 
Expressed in slightly different terms, if a failure tolerance requirement has been levied, it follows that the 
complement of features needed to satisfy that requirement needs to be included in the set of SCIs. This 
includes items that were explicitly modeled, and items that are functionally in series with those items, 
whether or not they were modeled explicitly. Moreover, the set of SCIs includes embedded assumptions 
about the performance capability of those items. For example, if the failure tolerance requirement is 
satisfied assuming that one subsystem has the needed capability, then that capability, with suitable 
margin, becomes an SCI as well. Finally, the levels of reliability and availability credited to these items to 
address safety requirements become part of the performance baseline for purposes of risk management. 
Note that in some domains, safety classification categories (which subsequently lead to groupings of 
safety critical items) are predefined and are associated with programmatic and quality assurance 
requirements that are meant to provide assurance of notionally high levels of performance and reliability. 
Designation of a particular item in that category then implies that it is subject to all such requirements.  
In general, the designated SCIs should have the following characteristics: 
 High safety function availability (as demonstrated through analysis, testing, or operational 
experience) 
 Safety function verifiability 
 High inspectability 
 High maintainability 
and, in the interest of promoting safety performance, should favor the following preferences: 
 Broad coverage of accident scenarios over narrow coverage 
 Accident prevention over mitigation 
 Passive features over active features 
 Engineered features over human factors  
In practice, conformance to these characteristics and preferences usually has to be traded off against the 
need to satisfy constraints on weight and internal space. For example, a passive feature such as a massive 
heat sink might not be practical from the standpoint of weight and space requirements when compared 
with an active feature like an electrically operated heat exchanger. 
Safety critical items are not the same as safety risk drivers. A safety risk driver is operationally defined in 
the RM Handbook (Section 4) as being a performance parameter, event, or set of performance parameters 
and/or events that, when varied over their range of uncertainty,  cause the safety performance risk to 
change from tolerable to intolerable. The term “critical items” is used to denote elements of the system 
that are critical to the success of the system. These differ from “risk drivers” in the sense that risk drivers 
are defined by the combination of likelihood and consequence, whereas critical items are identified only 
by the consequence that could result if the item did not function properly, independent of the probability 
of that happening. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.4, the “S” in SCI pertains to safety in the context of freedom from harm to 
humans or to the environment, but it may not always be necessary to apply SCIs in the context of safety 
that pertains to freedom from loss of equipment, property, or mission objectives. The decision maker may 
determine that safety in the latter context may be assured by attending to risk drivers rather than SCIs. 
Risk drivers are a subset of SCIs, since in addition to being critical to safety, they have to have a high 
enough failure probability or probability of occurrence to be significant contributors to the safety 
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performance risk. SCIs that are not risk drivers have to be continually monitored to ensure that the basis 
for their not being risk drivers remains intact. 
Examples of risk drivers include: 
• The reliability of a critical hardware or software component 
• Human reliability for a task that is conducted under stressful conditions 
• The environment within which the system operates 
• The environment produced on a part of the system by another part of the system 
• The accuracy or robustness of a model used to determine the risk associated with a type of hazard 
• Experimental error for a particular test 
• The ability of a test to simulate as-flown conditions 
While both safety risk drivers and safety critical items are derived from integrated safety analysis, the 
former are deduced from risk importance calculations whereas the latter are deduced from sensitivity 
analyses. 
Designation of SCIs and risk drivers represents a solution to an optimization problem: how best to 
achieve required system-level safety performance, given the constraints and priorities that operate within 
the given program. Designation of SCIs and risk drivers is not just labeling a collection of components or 
performance parameters for tracking purposes; it is a considered decision to rely upon certain items for 
certain levels of performance, and to invest in those items to make sure that the needed performance is 
attained. It is a system-safety ensurance activity, carried out as part of design within a systems 
engineering approach to development and deployment of a system, which in turn is executed within a risk 
management framework. Designation of SCIs and risk drivers is an instance of RIDM, and the subsequent 
assurance of their performance is an instance of CRM. 
5.4.5 Minimizing Design Complexity 
The concept of complexity is a term used by Perrow [23] to mean “baffling, hidden interactions” not 
anticipated in the original design, that have the potential to “jump” from one subsystem to another. High-
risk technologies are complex in that a single component often serves more than one function. Perrow 
suggests that when a subsystem shares pipes, valves, and feed-lines, and when feedback mechanisms 
automatically control key processes, accidents are to be expected, even inevitable – and hence ‘normal.’ 
Moreover, components in different subsystems are often in close operational proximity. If a component 
fails in one subsystem, the disruption might ‘jump over’ into another subsystem, causing unplanned 
disruptive consequences. For Perrow, technical systems more prone to failure are complex, tightly 
coupled systems that make the chain of events leading to a disaster incomprehensible to the operators. 
Leveson [64], speaking of software and its interactions with hardware, points out that software “allows us 
to build systems with a level of complexity and coupling that is beyond our ability to control, where the 
interactions among the components (often controlled by software) cannot all be planned, understood, 
anticipated, or guarded against.” She notes that the use of redundancy only makes the problem worse—
the added complexity introduced by redundancy has resulted in accidents that otherwise might not have 
occurred. 
Freaner, et al [17], notes a strong correlation between cost and schedule overruns and design complexity. 
These overruns affect safety by adding pressure to stay within budget and schedule. An example of their 
results is shown in Figure 5-15. 
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Figure 5-15. Effect of System Complexity on Program/Project Cost and Schedule 
Skakoon [16] cites a number of guidelines for reducing complexity in mechanical design. Examples 
include: 
• Give priority to purchasing rather than making components. 
• Specify components by standards. 
• Keep the functions of a design independent from one another by not using the same parts for 
different functions. 
• However, while maintaining functional independence, combine multiple functions into single 
units when possible to reduce unit count. 
• Avoid including functions that are not needed to accomplish the goals of the mission. 
• Achieving the simplest system, of course, is not in itself NASA’s ultimate goal. It may conflict 
with higher level Agency goals, such as extensibility (ability to apply the system to other as yet 
undefined missions). Such higher level goals should be specified in the program/project 
requirements to ensure that a proper balance between high level goals and simplicity of design is 
achieved. If not specified as a requirement, however, they should not take precedence over design 
simplicity. 
• The Provider should show how their design achieves all the requirements while avoiding 
unnecessary functionality and using accepted guidelines for minimizing complexity. 
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5.5 Maintaining Adequate Safety Performance throughout the Life Cycle 
5.5.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Provider’s responsibilities in maintaining adequate safety performance throughout the life cycle can 
be summarized as follows: 
 Use the ISA to risk-inform the development of program controls and commitments, which 
include cost, schedule, and human resources. 
 Implement and maintain the safety function(s) of all SCIs at levels of capability, reliability, and 
availability consistent with the ISA. 
 Implement a risk management process in a manner that assures the satisfaction of safety 
performance requirements defined for future milestones in the system life cycle. This 
responsibility includes the following objectives: 
o Assure that the system risk management process is resourced and implemented in a manner 
sufficient to address any safety growth requirements levied by the Acquirer. 
o Assure that the risk of shortfalls relative to safety performance requirements is within the 
Acquirer’s risk tolerance. 
 Prioritize safety during instrumentation and performance monitoring decisions making. 
 Monitor SCI performance and risk drivers as part of risk management. 
 Implement a closed-loop process for identifying test and operational anomalies and assessing 
their safety risk significance. 
An anomaly may be a near-miss or an accident precursor, i.e., an indication of a problem that could recur 
with more severe consequences. Closed-loop anomaly identification and resolution, e.g., via accident 
precursor analysis [29], provides a mechanism for managing discrepancies between the Provider’s 
understanding of the behavior of the system, and the actual behavior of the system. 
Maintenance of the system’s safety performance is a strong function of the performance of the system’s 
SCIs and control of the risk drivers. Maintaining SCI performance at levels consistent with the ISA is 
essential to the continuing safety of the system, as well as to the continuing validity of the RISC. SCI 
performance at a level below that which is asserted in the ISA may imply that acquirer safety 
requirements on the system are no longer being met. Therefore, if monitoring of SCI performance reveals 
a performance concern with a particular item, it may be necessary to rebaseline allocated performance in 
order to compensate for that concern. This is part of the “consequence” portion of the risk accepted by the 
Acquirer in approving the Provider’s deliverable. 
The following topics pertaining to these responsibilities and areas of consideration are discussed in 
Sections 5.5.2 through 5.5.8: 
 Using CRM to manage emerging risks throughout the life cycle 
 Monitoring and managing safety critical items and risk drivers throughout the life cycle 
 Monitoring and correcting for anomalies and precursors throughout the life cycle 
 Identifying and justifying departures from the plan throughout the life cycle 
 Keeping the design within the validated domain throughout the life cycle 
 Maintaining realistic budgets and schedules to adequately support safety throughout the life cycle 
 Risk-informing support activities that are important to safety 
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5.5.2 Using CRM to Manage Emerging Risks 
The Provider should have a plan for exercising a Continuous Risk Management (CRM) approach that is 
based on the requirements that relate to CRM in NPR 8000.4A [4] and the corresponding guidelines and 
recommendations for implementing them in the RM Handbook [28]. Because of the ASARP objective, 
wherein safety improvements are judged against the impacts to technical performance, cost, and schedule, 
CRM is executed across all four mission execution domains and all the results are used within the System 
Safety framework.  
The main steps of the CRM process, encapsulated by the “CRM wheel,” include the following segments 
that are repeatedly exercised during the various phases of the program/project as new information comes 
to light: 
• Identify new risk scenarios and changes to existing risk scenarios as they emerge within each of 
the mission execution domains: safety, technical performance, cost, and schedule. 
• Analyze the new or changed risk scenarios using aggregate risk models to determine how they 
affect the ability to satisfy each of the performance requirements or commitments in each of the 
mission execution domains. 
• Plan responses to these new or changed risk scenarios, selected from among the following 
disposition options: accepting, mitigating, watching, researching, elevating, and closing. 
• Track the status of each risk scenario and the resultant aggregate risks as the planned responses 
are implemented. 
• Control each risk scenario and the resultant aggregate risks by applying contingencies where 
needed and by reentering the Analyze and Plan steps when necessary. 
• Document and Communicate the status of each risk scenario and the resultant aggregate risks. 
In the same sense as described for RIDM in Section 5.4.2, the CRM process considers both the 
PKNOWN(Loss) requirement for known risks and the PTOTAL(Loss) threshold commitment for total risks, 
and tries to assure that both are satisfied within the decision maker’s risk tolerance. The intent of CRM is 
for UU risks to be converted to known risks as expeditiously as possible as time progresses. 
5.5.3 Monitoring and Managing Safety Critical Items and Safety Risk Drivers 
Because of their importance to maintaining safety performance, safety-critical items warrant heightened 
systems engineering, risk management, and safety management attention, in the form of derived 
requirements on their design, manufacture, maintenance, etc., that maximize their functional reliability 
and availability, consistent with the ASARP principle. These derived requirements frequently involve 
more rigorous quality control, maintenance, testing, and inspection procedures44.  
Because of their importance relative to the ability to achieve the probabilistic safety requirements, risk 
drivers warrant heightened tracking attention within the CRM process. In the event that the probabilistic 
risk requirements become jeopardized as a result of new information uncovered during tracking, 
mitigation responses should be implemented. Such responses generally involve the implementation of 
contingencies developed during the Plan step of CRM45.  
                                                            
44 Refer to Section 5.5.8 of this handbook and Section 4.2.4.2 of Volume 1 for more information pertaining to risk-
informed prioritization of quality control, maintenance, testing, and inspection activities. 
45 Refer to Sections 4.5 and 4.6 of the RM Handbook for more information on tracking and controlling risk drivers. 
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5.5.4 Monitoring and Correcting for Anomalies and Precursors 
The Provider should have a plan for ensuring that precursors to the breaching of any safety requirement, 
as well as other anomalies that could degrade the overall safety framework, are: 
• Identified 
• Evaluated with respect to their potential criticality 
• Incorporated into the risk list if deemed important 
• Incorporated when appropriate into the ISA models and analyses to update both PKNOWN and 
PTOTAL 
• Tracked and controlled  
There should be provisions for updating, or rebaselining, the risk-informed decisions if the precursor or 
anomaly results in a change to the identification and/or prioritization of risk drivers, and/or a change in 
the assessment of how well UU factors are being controlled46. Decisions to be considered for updating or 
rebaselining should include: 
• Waivers and adjustments to requirements 
• Derivation of allocated and derived requirements 
• Prioritization of support activities such as QA, testing, training, maintenance, inspections, and 
supply of parts 
5.5.5 Identifying and Justifying Departures from the Plan 
The System Safety Management Plan should document the approach for handling expected and 
unexpected departures from the plan. Such departures could result from external factors, such as: 
• Changes in program/project funding requiring a re-scoping of the technical objectives or leading 
to increased budgetary and schedule pressures 
or from internal factors such as: 
• New risk scenarios requiring implementation of mitigation 
• Changes in existing risk scenarios requiring implementation of a contingency 
The approach for formulating and instituting corrections should take account of all the factors that can 
lead to increased likelihood of UU risks and should try to minimize these factors47. 
5.5.6 Keeping the Design within the Validated Domain 
It has been observed that the risk of catastrophic accidents can increase unexpectedly when designs are 
scaled beyond the knowledge or experience of the designer, even if the amount of departure from existing 
knowledge or experience seems small [24]. The added risk can result either from scaling up existing 
satisfactory designs to achieve operational parameters beyond the original design (known as incremental 
design), or from scaling down existing satisfactory designs usually to save on cost (known as streamlining 
or fine-tuning). As an example of the latter case, Starbuck and Milliken [85] argue that leading to the 
Space Shuttle Challenger accident, twenty-four previous successful flights had created such confidence at 
NASA that they began systematically “fine-tuning” the technology and design of Challenger and its 
rockets until it “broke.” As another example, the switch to a freon-free foam application process for the 
                                                            
46 Refer to Section 5.3 and its subsections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 for guidance on risk-informing these decisions based on 
minimizing both known and UU risks 
47 See Sections 3.1.1 and various sections in Chapter 5 for a discussion of these factors. 
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Shuttle external tank resulted in an unexpected increase in foam spalling during the next flight, which 
could have caused an accident like Columbia to have occurred sooner than it did. 
The following guidelines should apply when making incremental changes in design, fabrication, or 
operation: 
• Make no assumptions about the robustness of the system when extrapolating beyond current 
knowledge and experience, even if the extrapolation appears to be small. 
• Test the actual affected component(s) with changes incorporated in the as-flown environment and 
over all functional modes before putting it into operation. 
• Make sure that all models used for safety analysis have been revalidated for the actual system in 
the as-flown environment. 
The Provider should give evidence that these guidelines are being followed and that sufficient budget and 
time exists to support the recommended testing and analysis 
5.5.7 Maintaining Realistic Budgets and Schedules 
It has been observed many times that catastrophic accidents are much more probable when programs/ 
projects are beset by excessive budget and schedule pressures. For example, pressures to meet schedules 
and budget constraints were cited in various reports on the Challenger and Columbia accidents as a 
principal causative factor. In addition, as mentioned in [27], early launch vehicles based on ballistic 
missile technology suffered a large number of launch failures that can be attributed to the fact that launch 
costs and schedules had a higher priority for these early vehicles than launch quality and reliability. 
As further evidence of the risk produced by inadequate budgets and schedules, time pressures are 
recognized as a fundamental reason for high human error rates in every model that is currently used for 
human reliability analysis (HRA). For example, among the performance shaping factors used in the 
Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method (CREAM) [86], available time is the most critical one. A 
continuously inadequate availability of time is assessed to result in a factor-of-5 increase in the human 
error probability for all four types of cognitive activities considered by CREAM: observation, 
interpretation, planning, and execution. This is especially relevant to present concerns because many of 
the UU risks that have come to fruition in the space program have involved human errors of one kind or 
another. 
To ensure that budgets and schedules are adequate, sufficient reserves must be employed for both. These 
reserves should be derived in a manner that is consistent with knowledge gained from past programs/ 
projects that have experienced budget overruns and schedule slippages. There are a number of NASA 
references dealing with how to develop realistic margins for budget and schedule, among which are the 
following: 
• C. Freaner, et al., “An Assessment of the Inherent Optimism in Early Conceptual Designs and Its 
Effect on Cost and Schedule Growth,” European Aerospace Cost Engineering Working Group, 
May 2008 [17]. See also Chapter 1 of: “Controlling Cost Growth of NASA Earth and Space 
Science Missions,” National Research Council, the National Academies Press, 2010 [18].   
• D. Bearden, “Perspectives on NASA Mission Cost and Schedule Performance Trends”, NASA 
Goddard Space Flight Center System Engineering Symposium, June 2008 [19]. See also: “A 
Complexity-Based Risk Assessment of Low-Cost Planetary Missions: When is Mission Too Fast 
and Too Cheap?” 4th AIAA International Conference on Low-Cost Planetary Missions, 
JHU/APL, May 2000 [20].   
• A. Chmielewski and C. Garner, “How to Calculate Budget Reserve for Your Project,” 
Presentation at the 6th NASA Project Management Challenge, February 24, 2009 [21]. 
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• “NASA’S Challenges to Meeting Cost, Schedule, and Performance Goals,” Rept. IG-12-021, 
Sept. 27, 2012 [14]. 
• NASA Advisory Council Meeting: Report of Audit and Finance Committee, Kennedy Space 
Center, February 5, 2009 [15]. 
In the event that budgets and/or timeframes are decreased by a large amount outside of NASA’s 
jurisdiction, for example as a result of political decisions, then it may well be necessary to de-scope the 
programs/projects that are funded from these budgets so that the budgets and schedules remain 
commensurate with the tasks to be performed. The act of reducing budgets and/or timeframes without 
providing for a commensurate change in scope will almost always result in an increase in the UU risks. 
Unless the initial margins in all four mission execution domains are higher than needed, it is usually not 
possible to stay within the thresholds and constraints for safety, technical performance, cost, and schedule 
by simply making incremental changes to the system or adding controls. 
The Provider should show how the scope of work to be performed is realistic based on the budget and 
schedule available for each task, and that there are realistic reserves in the budgets and schedules to 
accommodate unanticipated conditions or events. 
5.5.8 Risk-Informing Support Activities 
This section of the handbook addresses the use of results from risk analyses to prioritize support activities 
that affect the overall safety of the system. 
There should be a process for applying a risk-informed approach together with use of best practices to 
prioritize the tasks pursued in performing support activities such as the following: 
• Quality assurance and management  
• Qualification testing 
• Training and certification of crew, mission control personnel, and launch control personnel 
• Daily operational support activities during an extended mission (e.g., ISS) 
• Maintenance activities 
• Inspections and audits 
• Sparing provisions (i.e., ordering and stockpiling of spare parts) 
Activities in these areas are prioritized so that actions that are important for reducing safety risk are 
conducted first and most thoroughly. Both known risks and UU risks should be considered in the process 
of prioritizing activities. The risk-informed process for known risks consists of placing highest priorities 
on the activities that are associated with risk drivers, as defined in Section 5.4.4 and determined from 
integrated safety analysis. Ideally, the support activities that affect safety should be prioritized in a 
manner that collectively best reduces the product of likelihood and consequence for each risk driver. 
Minimization of UU risks is also addressed in the overall conduct of the support activities that are 
important to safety. Part of the purpose of these activities is to ensure that the generic factors that 
contribute to UU risks are being controlled. The following rules of conduct, if successfully implemented, 
are known to have a positive effect on reducing UU risks48:  
• Budgets and schedule are realistic and do not lead to unreasonable pressures. 
• Unneeded complexity is being avoided in the design, realization, and operation of the system. 
                                                            
48 These factors were also discussed in Section 5.1.6. 
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• New technology and new applications of existing technology are being adequately tested within 
the larger system before becoming operational. 
• Management is promoting a safety culture in which information about safety risks is discussed 
openly and inclusively between levels of the organization. 
• Management oversight is being maintained over distributed sources and suppliers. 
• Critical parts and services are readily available when needed. 
• There is a process for communicating and correcting the deficiencies uncovered by the 
inspections and audits. 
5.6 Taking Advantage of Emerging Opportunities to Improve Safety Performance 
5.6.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
It was mentioned in Section 2.1.5 that ASARP reflects a mindset that values safety improvement 
regardless of the current level of safety. This entails making a concerted attempt to seize opportunities as 
they emerge for improving safety performance above and beyond the minimum requirements. The 
Provider’s responsibility, therefore, is to seek these emerging opportunities throughout the lifecycle, 
including during system operation and sustainment decision making, and to implement them when 
practicable in order to improve safety in accordance with the ASARP principle. 
The following two topics pertaining to this responsibility are discussed in Section 5.6.2 and 5.6.3: 
 Identifying and assessing safety improvement opportunities 
 Testing safety improvement interactions with the whole system 
5.6.2 Identifying and Assessing Safety Improvement Opportunities 
New opportunities for improving safety may arise from various sources, including the following: 
• Design improvements enabled by new technology. For example, availability of new lightweight 
materials with equal or better strength than existing materials may make it possible to add safety 
features that would not have been possible because of vehicle weight and space limitations. 
• Diagnostic improvements enabled by new technology or by new applications of an existing 
technology. For example, new instrumentation with capability of detecting previously 
undetectable symptoms may make it possible to initiate fault correction and/or abort procedures 
more quickly. 
• Testing improvements enabled by availability of new test equipment. For example, a new facility 
capable of more closely simulating extreme flight environments at larger scales than previously 
may make it possible to conduct testing of integrated systems at as-flown conditions.  
Framework for Managing Safety Improvement Opportunities 
The management of new safety opportunities should be integrated with the management of risks. 
Therefore, taking advantage of new opportunities to improve safety is best handled by expanding the 
framework of the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) plan to become a Continuous Risk and 
Opportunity Management (CROM) plan. The framework for risk and opportunity management should be 
integrated because new opportunities frequently evolve from new risks, and new risks are an expected 
byproduct of new opportunities. 
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The process for managing opportunities is analogous to the process for managing risks in the following 
respects: 
• The activities in the plan for continuous opportunity management are basically the same as for 
continuous risk management: Identify, Analyze, Plan, Track, Control, Document and 
Communicate. 
• The Risk Management team becomes a Risk and Opportunity Management team. 
• Risk Statements become Risk and Opportunity Statements. 
• The planning options are expanded to include: researching the opportunity, implementing the 
opportunity, elevating the opportunity, and closing consideration of the opportunity. 
• All continuous opportunity management activities and reporting procedures are conducted 
together with the continuous risk management activities and reporting procedures. 
Guidance for Managing Safety Improvement Opportunities 
The guidance in the RM Handbook for managing risks is in practically all respects relevant to the 
management of risk and opportunities within this integrated framework. The same guidelines apply to 
calculating how proposed options for implementing opportunities affect the performance measures: 
• The aggregate risks of not meeting performance requirements or commitments are evaluated over 
all the mission execution domains. 
• An integrated safety analysis approach is used. 
• The rigor of the analysis is graded according to the criticality of the mission. 
• The amount of detail for various parts of the analysis is graded according to the importance of 
that part of the analysis for making the decision. 
The Provider should document their Continuous Risk and Opportunity Management plan and should 
provide evidence that the guidelines from the RM Handbook are being followed. 
5.6.3 Testing Interactions with the Whole System 
While the use of heritage technology where possible is a valid means for minimizing the likelihood of UU 
risks (and has proved particularly effective for the development of launch systems, such as Delta which 
was derived from Thor), it should not be assumed that if there is a record of success for a heritage 
technology in one application, that record will carry over for the heritage technology in a new application 
[87]. 
The following guidelines should apply for a new technology after it has reached a high technology 
readiness level (TRL), as well when using a new technology in a new application: 
• Conduct integrated system tests with the full-up configuration in the as-flown environment to 
look for new system interactions. 
• If new system interactions are uncovered, perform integrated risk analyses to assess the risk 
impact of these interactions and develop controls to minimize this impact if needed. 
• Make sure that all models used for safety analysis have been revalidated for the full-up system in 
the as-flown environment. 
The Provider should give evidence that these guidelines are being followed and that sufficient budget and 
time exists to support the recommended testing and analysis.  
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5.7 Example for Chapter 5  ASARP Principles Applied to a Proposed Space 
Shuttle Escape Pod 
 Statement of the Problem 
In this example, the year is 1978 and it is proposed that a 7-person escape pod be added to the Space 
Shuttle design to protect the astronauts against unknown and underappreciated (UU) risks (see Figure 5-
16). The escape pod is to be designed to safely return the crew at any time during launch, assent, orbit, or 
reentry, The detailed design of the Shuttle has already been developed, and the proposed escape pod 
would necessitate a modification of the design. However, no prototype hardware has been developed, and 
so there would not be a need for retrofitting the proposed escape pod into an existing system 
 
Figure 5-16. Schematic of Proposed Space Shuttle Escape Pod 
For this example, we assume a detailed PRA has been performed on the existing design (obviously this is 
a departure from the actual situation in 1978). We further assume that the detailed PRA is on a level that 
is consistent with the Integrated Shuttle PRA that was completed after the Columbia accident in 2003.
Therefore, we assume that the possibility of accidents similar to the Challenger and Columbia accidents 
was recognized in the 1978 PRA but the magnitudes of these risks were underappreciated. 
Furthermore, we assume an analysis of prior launch vehicle failure frequencies was available, and that it 
was therefore known that UU risks can be large contributors to the total risk. From that information and 
the published literature at that time, the influence of organizational and programmatic factors on the 
potential magnitude of the UU risks was also known, at least qualitatively. 
For this example, the safety benefit of including the escape pod is to be weighed against the additional 
cost of implementing it and the reduction in payload weight that would have to be accepted in order to 
accommodate the weight of the escape pod. 
 Background Information Used in the Execution of this Example 
NASA had been evaluating Shuttle escape methods even before the fatal breakup of Columbia. After the 
Columbia accident, it was estimated that the retrofit of a 7-person escape pod capable of surviving both 
the Challenger and the Columbia accidents would cost $1 billion to $5 billion in 2003 dollars ($1.3 to $8 
billion in 2011 dollars) and would take 6.0 to 8.5 years to complete (Houston Chronicle 2004). In 
comparison, the total cost of the Space Shuttle program in 2011 dollars from conception to retirement has 
been $196 billion. It was originally estimated that the total cost in 2011 dollars including 135 flights 
would be about $50 billion (Wikipedia). The escape pod retrofit was considered plausible when NASA 
envisioned extending the life of the Shuttle fleet until 2020, but the idea was dropped when it was decided 
to retire the Shuttle fleet by 2010. 
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Based on estimates for an escape capsule for the Apollo Command Module, the weight of an escape pod 
is estimated to be about 1650 lb per crew member, or about 11,600 lb for 7 Shuttle crew members 
(Encyclopedia Astronautica). In comparison, the maximum total payload weight in the final Shuttle 
design was about 55,000 lb (Wikipedia). 
The integrated Shuttle PRA was not completed until prior to the 120th chronological flight. Results from 
the integrated Shuttle PRA applied retroactively to earlier flights indicated that the total probability of 
LOC prior to the fifth flight (the first flight without seat ejection capability) was about 0.1, and the 
probability of LOC prior to the fifth flight that would have been predicted by the integrated Shuttle PRA 
based on information that was known at the time was about 0.02 (see Figure 4-3 presented earlier). The 
difference is attributable to underappreciated risks that later manifested themselves in the Challenger and 
Columbia accidents. 
The observation that underappreciated risks were about 5 times as large as appreciated risks is consistent 
with the programmatic, organizational, and design aspects of the mission: namely, moderately high 
schedule and cost pressures, top-down decision making process, and complicated design interfaces (see 
Section 4.5.3 and Table 4-2). 
 Results of a Hypothetical Safety Performance Evaluation 
Suppose that the stated threshold for the first flight is for the total probability of LOC to be less than 0.01 
(consistent with current safety threshold guidelines for LEO missions to the ISS). Assume that 80% of the 
requirement is to be reserved as a safety performance risk margin to accommodate possible unknown and 
underappreciated risks (consistent with a safety performance factor of 5). This fraction is consistent with 
the programmatic factors (schedule and cost pressures) and the design interface complexities being 
similar to those for the Shuttle program, but the top-down decision making process having been replaced 
by a more participatory one. The associated requirement for the maximum value of P(LOC) from known 
risks, therefore, is (0.2)(0.01) = 0.002. 
Suppose that the PRA without the escape pod included indicates that the predicted probability of LOC 
accounting for known risks is 0.016 (slightly better than the result for the actual shuttle which was 0.024, 
see Table 4-1) The predicted value of P(LOC) without the escape pod is thus 8 times the required 
maximum value of 0.002. Suppose we assume that the addition of an escape pod will reduce the predicted 
risk by 90%,. to a value of 0.1 x 0.016 = 0.0016 (This 90% reduction is consistent with assumptions that 
have been made in other analyses for the effectiveness of abort systems, but should be calculated more 
rigorously for the present application using integrated safety analysis models.) The predicted value of 
P(LOC) with the escape pod is thus 0.8 times the required maximum value, and therefore the addition of 
the escape pod satisfies the requirement for P(LOC). 
In addition, the Provider claims that there have been improvements in the safety management culture 
since the time of the Columbia accident, owing to the adoption of a more participatory safety process and 
better oversight of subcontractor activities. For this reason, the Provider claims that the ratio of total loss 
probability to known loss probability can be reduced from a factor of 5 to a factor of 3, consistent with 
Table 4-2. Furthermore, the Provider claims that this improvement in the safety performance factor 
(denoted in subsequent figures as SPF) applies both to the present design and to the design with the 
escape pod added, because the modification is being incorporated very early during the design process 
and there is plenty of time available for testing and validating the capability of the escape pod. Thus, the 
total loss probability including UU risks is claimed to be around 0.016 x 3 = 0.048 without the escape 
pod, and 0.0016 x 3 = 0.0048 with the escape pod. The value of P(LOC) with the escape pod including 
both known and UU risks is 0.48 times the threshold value of 0.01, and therefore the addition of the 
escape pod satisfies the threshold for P(LOC). 
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 Results of a Hypothetical Cost Evaluation 
Suppose that the acceptable total program cost is $200 billion (consistent with the total actualized cost of 
the Shuttle Program). Suppose also that 67% of the total program cost is to be reserved as a cost margin to 
accommodate possible unknown and underappreciated risks. (This is consistent with the fact that for the 
Shuttle program, about 75% of the total cost was underappreciated at the beginning of the program, but 
some of that would be reduced by virtue of the reduced risk of catastrophic accidents afforded by a more 
participatory decision making process.) The associated requirement for the calculated, or predicted, total 
cost is that it be less than (0.33)($200 billion) = $66 billion. 
Suppose that a detailed cost analysis has been performed and that the predicted total cost accounting for 
known cost risks is $50 billion (consistent with the initial total cost estimate for the Shuttle), The 
predicted total cost without the escape pod is therefore $50B / $66B or about 0.76 times the margin-
adjusted requirement. 
Suppose that the addition of an escape pod will add a cost of $3 billion (less than the estimate for 
retrofitting an escape pod system because the escape pod is included in the original design). The predicted 
total cost with the escape pod is therefore $53 billion, which is 0.80 times the margin-adjusted 
requirement. Therefore, the addition of the escape pod does not cause the total cost requirement to be 
exceeded. 
Figure 5-17 shows the loss probability from known risks versus the total program cost, and the loss 
probability from all risks versus total program cost, both without and with the escape pod. 
Figure 5-17. Effect of Adding an Escape Pod on Loss Probability and Program Cost 
Results of a Hypothetical Payload Weight Evaluation 
Suppose it is required by specification that the transport system carry a payload weighing at least 50,000 
lb (this number is hypothetical). Suppose that 10% of the payload weight requirement is reserved as a 
margin to accommodate possible mass growth and contingencies. The associated minimum requirement 
for the calculated, or predicted, payload weight is (1.1)(50,000 lb) = 55,000 lb. Suppose that the predicted 
maximum payload weight is 60,000 lb (consistent with the final Shuttle design). The predicted total 
maximum payload weight without the escape pod is thus 1.091 times the margin-adjusted requirement. 
Suppose that the addition of an escape pod will add 16,000 lb (slightly less than the estimate based on the 
Apollo CM ejection capsule), all of which must be subtracted from the available payload weight. The 
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predicted maximum payload weight with the escape pod is 60,000 – 16,000 = 44,000 lb, which is 88% of 
the minimum requirement. Therefore, the addition of the escape pod causes the requirement for payload 
weight to be violated. 
Figure 5-18 shows the loss probability from known risks versus the total payload weight, and the loss 
probability from all risks versus total payload weight, both without and with the escape pod
 
 
Figure 5-18. Effect of Adding an Escape Pod on Loss Probability and Payload Weight 
 Analysis 
Although the addition of the escape pod reduces the loss probability from an unacceptable to an 
acceptable value, it also reduces the maximum payload weight from an acceptable to an unacceptable 
value. The decision maker in the Acquirer’s organization has to determine whether a forfeiture in 
maximum payload weight to a value that is 12% lower than the 50,000 lb specification is “practicable,” 
and if so, whether the forfeiture is more than made up for by the factor of 10 reduction in the loss 
probability afforded by an escape pod. If not, then the Acquirer will have to find other ways to reduce the 
loss probability. 
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6. Developing the Risk-Informed Safety Case (RISC): The 
Provider’s Role 
A safety case is commonly defined as “a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that 
provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is, or will be, adequately safe for a 
given application in a given environment” [88]. A Risk-Informed Safety Case (RISC) is a specialization of 
the standard safety case, in that it is intended specifically to be part of a deliberative decision making 
process that is informed by an assessment of the multi-attribute risk to a system (safety, technical, cost, 
and schedule) and tries to achieve a balance between performance in each of these other areas. 
Furthermore, a RISC attempts to demonstrate not only that the system is adequately safe, but also that 
plausible, knowable scenarios that could lead to a risk of system failure have been identified, rigorously 
analyzed, and conscientiously responded to. 
In the context of NASA systems engineering, a RISC refers to the totality of safety-related documentation 
submitted to a given technical review in the project life cycle. As such, the documentation requirements 
of the RISC are consistent with the entrance criteria for the relevant review, as itemized in NPR 7123.1B, 
NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements [3]. Similarly, the criteria for evaluating the 
adequacy of the RISC are consistent with the corresponding technical review success criteria in the NPR. 
The RISC addresses each of the operational safety objectives of the system, and includes a roadmap for 
achieving safety objectives that are applicable to later phases of the system life cycle. The primary focus 
of the RISC is on hazards that have a significant impact on safety, and while being as comprehensive as 
possible, should avoid focusing on hazards that have little impact on the safety of the system. 
This chapter provides guidance and examples that expand upon the overview for developing and 
documenting the RISC presented in Section 3.3. The following subjects from that overview are discussed 
sequentially in Sections 6.1 through 6.5: 
 Developing and documenting the RISC 
 Assigning responsibilities and integrating the parts 
 Exercising a graded approach 
 Maintaining and updating the RISC and addressing future life-cycle phases 
 Addressing weaknesses, limitations, and significant unresolved safety related issues  
6.1 Overall Approach to RISC Development and Documentation 
6.1.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Provider’s responsibilities in developing and documenting the RISC can be summarized as follows: 
 Develop a Risk-Informed Safety Case to clearly argue for the safety of a system to be acquired by 
NASA. The RISC should explain why there is high confidence that the system is adequately safe 
and the risks are adequately controlled; provide substantial evidence to support this confidence; 
and explain actions taken and commitments needed to ensure the further continuance of this high 
confidence over the life cycle of the system. 
 Develop a Risk-Informed Safety Case report. In general, the report should contain the following 
information: 1) an executive summary; 2) a description of the program, project, and system; 3) 
documentation of system safety objectives, requirements, policies, regulations, and standards; 4) 
the safety argument for the system with supporting evidence; 5) a roadmap for ongoing system 
safety activities; 6) a description of the change and configuration management procedures for the 
RISC; 7) a description of the audit and review process employed; and 8) a discussion of plans to 
resolve significant unresolved issues. 
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 In the case that a system is already in operation, is built but not yet in operation, or is in some 
stage of development/production without an earlier RISC having been submitted, prepare a RISC 
report representing the current state of knowledge of the system under development or operation, 
and update the RISC report for relevant subsequent system reviews.  
The RISC report is the means through which the Risk-Informed Safety Case is communicated across 
Program/Project and between Provider and Acquirer, and provides the material by which the Acquirer 
may evaluate the RISC. For systems in operation, or at some stage in the development or production 
process, the RISC should reflect the current state of the system. However, regardless of the state of 
development/operation of the existing system, a complete and sufficiently comprehensive RISC should be 
developed particularly for systems of high value to NASA. An understanding of why earlier decisions 
were made and how effective they were is important for assessing lessons learned. 
The following topics pertaining to development and documentation of a RISC are discussed in Section 
6.1.2 through 6.1.6: 
 Principles for the overall approach to RISC development 
 Process for deriving safety claims for the RISC starting from objectives and requirements 
 Process for developing evidence for the RISC 
 Claims tree structures for the RISC (including optional use of goal structuring notation) 
 Documentation of the RISC 
6.1.2 Principles for the Overall Approach 
According to Volume 1, the approach to demonstrating that a system is safe starts with developing a 
safety claims tree. The top claim in the tree is that the system is adequately safe, and the process for 
demonstrating confidence in that claim is based on devising a hierarchy of lower level sub-claims that 
support the top claim. The tree is developed down to a level where there is sufficient evidence to support 
the sub-claim at that level. Inference arguments are then provided to support the assertion that satisfaction 
of the sub-claims at the lowest level leads to satisfaction of the claim at the top level (i.e., that the system 
is adequately safe). 
Processes for rigorously developing claims trees and constructing arguments based on evidence and 
inference are described by Hawkins [66] and by Denney [89, 90], among others. This volume of the 
handbook borrows from that work but presents it in a simplified form. We start with the observation that 
there are two types of claims in the claims tree, which we call “intermediate claims” and “base claims” 
(consistent with the terms “intermediate events” and “base events” in fault tree notation): 
DEFINITION OF INTERMEDIATE AND BASE CLAIMS 
 An intermediate claim is a claim that is further decomposed into lower level sub-claims that feed into 
it. It is demonstrated to be true as asserted to a high degree of confidence by demonstrating that all of 
the sub-claims feeding into it are true as asserted to a high degree of confidence. 
 A base claim is a claim that is not decomposed to lower levels. It is demonstrated to be true as 
asserted to a high degree of confidence by providing evidence and by showing that all deficits in the 
evidence that erode confidence in the base claim are sufficiently minimal. 
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Similarly, there are two types of evidence for each base claim, which we call “direct evidence” and 
“supporting evidence”: 
DEFINITION OF DIRECT AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 
 Direct evidence consists of information that is mostly quantitative and that supports the base claim by 
showing that the risk of not meeting it is acceptably low. Examples of direct evidence include failure 
rates from test data or operational experience, analyses of system response to various environments, 
results of probabilistic risk assessments, analysis of precursors and anomalies, and adherence to best 
practices.  
 Supporting evidence consists of information that is mostly qualitative, provides confidence in the 
direct evidence, or demonstrates a general responsiveness to safety concerns. Examples of supporting 
evidence include personnel qualifications, verification and validation of analysis tools, applicability 
of experiments, quality of documentation, quality of external reviews, effectiveness of 
communication protocols, and safety culture of the organization. 
 
The strength of the evidence is judged in terms of “assurance deficits” [66], which were defined in 
Section 5.1.4. In the approach advocated here, assurance deficits are scored by rating the degree to which 
the assurance deficit sources affect the confidence of achieving the base claim that the evidence pertains 
to. An example of a possible ranking scale might be as follows: 
 Deficit Rank = 1 implies very low assurance deficit, corresponding to confidence of around 95% 
to 100% that the base claim is justified by the evidence. 
 Deficit Rank = 2 implies low assurance deficit, corresponding to confidence of around 85% to 
95% that the base claim is justified by the evidence. 
 Deficit Rank = 3 implies moderate assurance deficit, corresponding to confidence of around 65% 
to 85% that the base claim is justified by the evidence. 
 Deficit Rank = 4 implies high assurance deficit, corresponding to confidence of around 35% to 
65% that the base claim is justified by the evidence. 
 Deficit Rank = 5 implies very high assurance deficit, corresponding to confidence of around 0% 
to 35% that the base claim is justified by the evidence. 
The percentile values suggested here are notional. For any particular program or project, the range of 
confidence percentiles corresponding to each rank would be selected by the Acquirer’s decision maker on 
the basis of the criticality of the mission.49 
The term “confidence” in the above list is interpreted to be equivalent to “degree of belief.” Because the 
ranking of degrees of belief requires broad knowledge of the system and of the evidence presented to 
support each base claim, it should be a task that is assigned to highly qualified subject matter experts.  
The ideas expressed in this section are illustrated in Figure 6-1, which depicts a conceptual claims tree 
consisting of intermediate claims and base claims, direct and supporting evidence that feeds into the base 
claims, and assurance deficits in the demonstration of the claim that emanate from deficits in the 
evidence50.  
 
                                                            
49 Mission criticalities are discussed in Section 5.2.4. 
50 We have not yet discussed how the ranking of assurance deficits at the base claim level can be propagated up 
through the tree to infer the resultant degree of confidence that has been demonstrated for the top claim. Processes 
for accomplishing this will be taken up in Section 7.2.5. 
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Figure 6-1. Claims Tree Conceptual Diagram 
6.1.3 Deriving Safety Claims from Objectives and Requirements 
Section 2.1.3 discussed how the top safety objective is to achieve an adequately safe system, and how 
there are two fundamental principles beneath the top objective:  
 Achieve a system that meets or exceeds the minimum tolerable level of safety. 
 Achieve a system that is as safe as reasonably practicable (ASARP). 
These two principles are further decomposed into specific safety objectives, carried down to a level where 
they can be clearly addressed by systems engineering processes. This decomposition results in a set of 
operational safety objectives presented in the form of a generic operational objectives tree in Figure 3-2. 
As discussed in the preceding section, the first tasks for the Provider include developing an operational 
objectives tree that is specific to the mission under consideration and a corresponding mission-specific 
claims tree that can be supported by evidence. As discussed in Volume 1 of this handbook, the safety 
claims are developed from the hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. 
Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety 
objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is adequately safe. 
Because the claims tree is devolved down to the level of base claims that can be validated by evidence, 
the claims tree will generally be much lengthier than the objectives tree. Each base claim, however, 
should be traceable to one of the objectives in the operational objectives tree. Because the objectives tree, 
like the claims tree, is constructed in a top-down manner, a base claim that can be traced to an objective at 
the lowest level of the objectives tree is traceable to higher level objectives through the branching 
structure. 
Level 2 Claims
Top Level Claim
Level 1 Claims
Interm.
Interm.
Base Interm. Base Base Base
Interm.
Base Interm. BaseLevel 3 Claims
Base BaseLevel 4 Claims
DirectLevel 2 Evidence Support Direct Support Direct Support Direct Support
Direct SupportLevel 3 Evidence Direct Support
Direct Support Direct SupportLevel 4 Evidence
Assurance Deficit 
Sources & Rank
Assurance Deficit 
Sources & Rank
Assurance Deficit 
Sources & Rank
Assurance Deficit 
Sources & Rank
Assurance Deficit 
Sources & Rank
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Sources & Rank
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Two illustrations of how base level claims may be traceable to the operational objectives are provided in 
Tables 6-1 and 6-2. The Provider should produce similar mappings that depict the mission-specific 
objectives and the mission-specific base claims. 
Table 6-1. Illustration of the Relationship between Base Claims and Operational Objectives for Claims 
Pertaining to the	Acquirer’s Roles for Setting Probabilistic Requirements 
Operational 
Objective 
Base Claim(s)
Establish safety 
performance 
margins. 
A set of key mission objectives (KMOs) has been established that aptly represents all the key 
mission phases and evolutions where separate safety cases are needed. 
Results from relevant previous missions have been analyzed and the differences between the 
predicted (known) and actual (total) loss probabilities are understood. 
For each KMO, a margin has been established for the calculated probability of loss for a new 
system consistent with the understanding of UU risks from relevant previous missions. 
For each KMO, a safety threshold has been developed for the total loss probability that 
represents an achievable expectation for a new system. 
For each KMO, a safety goal has been developed for the total loss probability that represents an 
achievable expectation for a mature system. 
Establish 
minimum 
tolerable levels 
of safety for 
known risks. 
 
The requirement for the known loss probability is consistent with the threshold, margin, and 
goal, and decreases with multiple flights according to a realistic burn‐down rate.  
The known loss probability requirement is accompanied by verification procedures according to 
which the Provider may argue compliance, and according to which the Acquirer may deem the 
requirement to have been satisfied. 
Provisions have been specified by which the known loss probability requirement and its 
accompanying verification procedures may be rebaselined in the event that they become 
unachievable due to the evolution of conditions and risks. 
 
  
  
 
122
Table 6-2. Illustration of the Relationship between Base Claims and Operational Objectives for Claims 
Pertaining to the Provider’s Roles for Managing Unknown and Underappreciated (UU) Hazards 
Operational 
Objective 
Base Claim(s)
Incorporate 
safety‐related 
best practices 
into system 
design. 
All relevant best practices for combating UU risks learned from previous missions have been 
identified and documented. 
The relevant best practices and lessons learned either have been incorporated into the present 
system or are demonstrated to be not practicable. 
Budgets and schedules are adequate for the tasks to be performed and include realistic reserves.
Roles and responsibilities for resolving safety concerns are clearly defined in accordance with the 
program/project and RM plans, provide effective interaction, and resolve problems as they arise. 
Design complexity is minimized without violating safety.
Any changes from previous validated designs, fabrication methods, and operational procedures 
remain within the domain for which the performance of the system is known.  
Provisions are made (and documented within the Plan) for testing any new technology or new 
application of an existing technology within the context of its interactions with the whole 
system. 
Minimize the 
Introduction of 
hazards during 
system 
realization & 
operation. 
Means are in place for identifying and evaluating any departures from the program/project and 
RM plans that could increase UU risks and for instituting corrections when needed. 
Be responsive 
to new safety‐
relevant 
information. 
Management is focused toward continuous safety improvement and inclusiveness in the 
resolution of risks. 
6.1.4 Developing Evidence 
As mentioned earlier (Section 6.1.2), direct evidence consists of information that is mostly quantitative 
and that supports the base claim by showing that the risk of not meeting it is acceptably low. Supporting 
evidence consists of information that is mostly qualitative, provides confidence in the direct evidence, or 
demonstrates a general responsiveness to safety concerns. Table 6-3 provides an illustration of the types 
of direct and supporting evidence that generally are expected to accompany various types of base claims. 
The Provider should show a similar mapping of the direct and supporting evidence used for each base 
claim in the RISC.   
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Table 6-3. Illustration of the Types of Evidence that Pertain to Various Potential Base Claims 
Item  Example Base 
Claim 
Example Direct Evidence Example Supporting Evidence
1  Results from 
relevant previous 
missions have been 
analyzed and the 
differences 
between the 
predicted (known) 
and actual (total) 
loss probabilities 
are understood. 
Observed mission failure rates and/or 
anomaly rates for comparable systems 
(Anomaly rates, while not directly leading to a 
catastrophic loss, provide important insights 
into the relative fraction of occurrences that 
are attributable to known and fully 
appreciated risks as opposed to unknown or 
underappreciated risks. It has been shown 
that in the past, this fraction tends to be 
similar for anomalies as for actual 
catastrophic failures.) 
The quality of the records kept for 
past failures and anomalies, and 
the experience of the analysts 
relative to understanding the 
systems involved in previous 
missions and the causes of the 
anomalies and failures 
2  For each KMO, a 
margin has been 
established for the 
calculated 
probability of loss 
for a new system 
consistent with the 
understanding of 
UU risks from 
relevant previous 
missions. 
Correlations of historical occurrences of 
failures and/or anomalies with qualitative 
factors that tend to produce UU risks. 
Identification, analysis, and ranking of such 
factors 
The rigor exercised in identifying 
the governing factors, the quality 
of the data used to develop the 
correlations, the standard errors of 
the correlations, the degree to 
which the correlations have been 
verified and validated for relevant 
applications, and the experience 
and commitment of the analysts 
3  For each key 
mission objective, a 
safety threshold has 
been developed for 
the total loss 
probability that 
represents an 
achievable 
expectation for a 
new system. 
1. Documentation of the selected safety 
threshold for the initial loss probability and 
the rationale for selecting that value  
2. The models and results from a variety of 
PRAs to show that the threshold is 
achievable. Could include PRAs for previous 
systems and missions with additions and 
modifications to account for differences 
between the previous and present systems 
and missions 
3. Mission failure and/or anomaly rates for 
comparable new systems if there is a 
sufficient amount of applicable data 
4. The results of analyses of effectiveness of 
the launch abort system (in the case of 
crewed flights): Includes analyses of accident 
initiators in the launch vehicle including those 
that might be caused by the presence of the 
LAS and its interactions with the launch 
vehicle; Includes modeling and simulation of 
the environments produced by each accident 
scenario and their effects on the LAS and its 
passengers.  
2. The quality of the 
documentation of the previous 
PRAs, their applicability to the 
present mission;.the analysts’ 
understanding of the previous 
systems and missions and how 
they differ from the present 
system/mission 
3. The amount and quality of 
failure and anomaly data from 
relevant previous missions that 
employed new systems;.the 
analysts’ understanding of the 
previous systems and missions. 
4. The quality of the models used 
to support the abort analysis (as 
measured by credibility 
assessment factors) and the 
qualifications of the analysts 
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Table 6-3. Illustration of the Types of Evidence that Pertain to Various Potential Base Claims (Cont.) 
Item  Example Base 
Claim 
Example Direct Evidence Example Supporting Evidence
4 Processes to 
ensure that 
requests for 
waivers or 
modifications of 
safety 
requirements are 
risk‐informed. 
Waiver/modification approach documented 
in SSMP; documented rationale based on 
correlation of safety requirements with risk 
drivers 
Demonstrated understanding of 
safety requirements and their 
relation to risk drivers; 
appreciation for potential UU 
risks; knowledge of historical 
precedence and best practices 
5 Models used to 
calculate the 
probability of loss 
from known risks 
are appropriately 
graded according 
to the importance 
of the mission, the 
criticality of each 
risk scenario, and 
the maturity of 
the design. 
The mission criticality ranking and 
associated rationale for that ranking; the list 
of safety risk scenarios and evidence that it 
is a comprehensive list; the criticality 
ranking for each risk scenario and 
associated rationale for each ranking; the 
assumptions and approximations contained 
in the bounding models and evidence that 
these assumptions and approximations are 
realistic as well as bounding; the basis for 
establishing a margin for the loss probability 
when using bounding estimates to 
accommodate a short time window; and the 
assumptions and degree of resolution 
utilized in the more rigorous models 
together with evidence that the 
assumptions and resolution are appropriate 
for the criticality of the mission, the 
criticality of the risk scenario, and the 
maturity of the design 
The qualifications and experience 
of the analysts regarding the 
bounding, deterministic, and 
probabilistic models and the use 
of graded analysis approaches; 
the use of experts in specifying 
the assumptions, approximations, 
and degrees of resolution to be 
used in the models; the processes 
used to verify that the models are 
sufficiently accurate considering 
the criticality level for which they 
are being applied; and the 
processes used to validate the 
models against real data and 
against other models that are 
accepted in the community and 
can be used as benchmarking 
models. 
6 Models used for 
high criticality risk 
scenarios within 
high criticality 
missions satisfy 
the Modeling & 
Simulation 
Credibility 
Assessment Scale 
(CAS) criteria and 
are backed by ISA‐
informed tests. 
Depends on the factor being ranked, but in 
general includes comparisons of M&S 
results to an acceptable referent, 
comparison of input data with measured 
data, quantitative uncertainty estimates, 
repeatability of the M&S results, and 
sensitivity of the M&S results to input and 
model parameters for the real‐world 
system. 
Use of reliable error estimation 
methods, community acceptance 
of the model as a de facto 
standard, and availability of 
personnel with advanced 
engineering or science degrees or 
extensive work experience in 
M&S in general, and with 
extensive experience in the 
development and use of the M&S 
being reviewed in particular 
7 Reasonable 
estimates of the 
uncertainty 
distribution and 
their correlation 
coefficients have 
been obtained. 
Statistical analysis, applicability/ 
completeness of testing and modeling 
Robustness of expert elicitation.
Qualifications of participants; 
documentation; use of qualified 
independent reviewers 
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Table 6-3. Illustration of the Types of Evidence that Pertain to Various Potential Base Claims (Cont.) 
Item  Example Base Claim  Example Direct Evidence Example Supporting 
Evidence 
8  Plans are in place for 
identifying/evaluating the potential 
risk significance of precursors and 
anomalies, and for instituting 
appropriate contingencies and 
controls when needed. 
Plans documented in SSMP for 
precursor analysis, anomaly and 
problem reporting, and 
implementation of corrective 
actions  
Quality and completeness of 
record keeping of precursors 
and anomalies; staffing plan; 
experience of analysts 
9  Budgets and schedules are adequate 
for the tasks to be performed and 
include realistic reserves. 
Monte Carlo analysis of cost and 
schedule; budgets and 
deliverable dates consistent with 
analysis results; inclusion of 
realistic reserves based on 
historical experience 
Quality of analytical models;
qualifications of analysts 
10  Management is focused toward 
continuous safety improvement and 
inclusiveness in the resolution of 
risks.  
Program/project management 
plan 
Past performance of 
management in present and 
previous programs 
11  Any changes from previous validated 
designs are small enough to remain 
within the domain for which the 
performance of the system is known.  
Integrated safety analysis and 
testing of the final system over all 
mission parameter values 
Quality of analytical models 
and tests; qualifications of 
analysts 
12  Provisions are made for testing any 
new technology or application of an 
existing technology within the context 
of its interactions with the whole 
system. 
Plans for integrated testing of the 
final system over all mission 
parameter values 
Evidence of sufficient budget 
and time to support such 
testing 
6.1.5 Optional Use of Goal Structuring Notation in Developing Claims Trees 
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) has become an accepted format, and in some circles a standard format, 
for presenting safety cases in a rigorous and organized manner [66, 91, 92]. It was introduced to make 
safety arguments easier to develop and easier to evaluate through providing a clear graphical structure 
(see Figure 6-2). Toward this end, the structure includes the following elements: 
 Goals at various levels. Note that the term “goal” in traditional GSN notation is taken to be 
equivalent to the term “claim” in this handbook, as it is in many applications that use GSN. We 
prefer “claim” to “goal” because the latter has a particular connotation within NASA referring to 
a maximum allowable probability of loss. 
 Strategy, which refers to the process of decomposing a higher level claim to a set of lower level 
claims in such a way that the probable truth of the lower level claims is sufficient to establish the 
probable truth of the upper level claim. Verification that the decomposition is appropriate and 
sufficient is accomplished by inference arguments. 
 Context, which provides a list of the present conditions and sources of information that pertain to 
a particular goal or strategy 
 Assumptions, which are the hypotheses that must hold for the safety case to be valid 
 Evidence, which has the same meaning as used earlier in this handbook 
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Figure 6-2. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
The use of GSN helps prevent the user from getting into common traps that pertain to the preparation of a 
safety case, such as [93]: 
 Circular reasoning, which occurs when an argument is structured so that it reasserts its claim as a 
premise or defines a key term in a way that makes its claim trivially true 
 Diversionary arguments, which contain excessive amounts of irrelevant material that could 
distract a reader from a weakly supported claim 
 Fallacious appeals, which invoke irrelevant authorities, concepts, or comparisons as evidence 
 Mathematical fallacies, which describe common pitfalls in probabilistic and statistical inferences 
 Unsupported assertions, which are claims stated without evidence 
 Anecdotal arguments, which show that their claims hold in some circumstances but not 
necessarily in general 
 Omission of key evidence, which occurs when an otherwise complete argument omits evidence 
that is necessary to establish its validity 
 Linguistic fallacies, which concern the use of misleading language that might lead the reader to 
an unwarranted conclusion. These fallacies may appear in any informal argument. 
In addition, GSN helps to better document safety arguments by introducing common forms, and may 
assist in better management and maintenance of the safety case. 
On the other hand, GSN has certain potential drawbacks. Among them is the fact that construction of 
large safety arguments using GSN could be complex, difficult to manage, and require specialized 
software (e.g., AdvoCATE [90] or commercial software). It is for this reason that the present handbook 
does not presume the use of GSN in developing a safety case. In developing their own safety cases, users 
should decide whether GSN adds enough benefit for their application to justify the added complexity or 
whether a more simplified approach is sufficient. 
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6.1.6 Documenting the RISC 
This subsection provides guidelines for each of the eight sections of the RISC report enumerated in 
Section 6.1.1. 
 RISC Executive Summary 
The executive summary should specify the context of the RISC, the review for which the RISC was 
prepared, key assumptions about the system, and key results and conclusions, including mention of 
significant unresolved issues.  
 Program, Project, and System Descriptions 
This section should give sufficient detail about the program and project to unambiguously set the context 
in which the RISC has been developed. Generally, this section should give summary information pointing 
readers to specifics of the program/project/system via references.  
 Documentation of System Safety Objectives, Requirements, Policies, Regulations, and 
Standards 
A subsection on safety objectives should discuss the safety performance objectives, safety thresholds, 
margins and goals, and assumptions about the projected rate of safety risk reductions (burn-down) over 
the life cycle of the project/program. 
A subsection on system requirements should detail the system requirements appropriate to the review 
phase for which the RISC has been developed. Typically, this will be summary information with 
references to system and subsystem requirements documentation. 
A subsection on policy, regulations, and standards should detail lower level requirements, policies, 
regulations, standards, NPRs, etc., which the program/project and system must satisfy. Examples include 
non-NASA policies, regulations and requirements to which the system must adhere (OSHA, DOD, DOE, 
etc.), and relevant NASA standards, NPRs, etc. 
Where appropriate, accordance with and deviations from the objectives and guidelines in Chapter 4 and 
Section 5.3 of this handbook should be noted and explained. 
 The Safety Argument for the System with Supporting Evidence 
A variety of approaches may be taken in presenting the safety argument for the system. Typically, 
summaries of the safety argument claims, and supporting evidence are provided in this section of the 
RISC report, with the detailed safety argument structure and evidence provided in appendices and 
references. Where appropriate, accordance with and deviations from the Provider’s responsibilities and 
objectives in Chapter 6 of this handbook should be noted and explained. 
 Roadmap for Ongoing System Safety Activities 
This section should present a plan for the various safety-related activities that will be taken in the future 
(after the current life-cycle review). The intention of the roadmap is to instill confidence in the Acquirer 
that an acceptable plan for ensuring the continued safety of the system is in place. As such, the plan 
should include activities that are currently in process and will continue past the current life-cycle review, 
as well as activities planned to start in the future. The plan should include a schedule showing when 
activities will begin and end, and dependencies between activities. Where appropriate, accordance with 
and deviations from the Provider’s responsibilities and objectives in Chapter 5 of this handbook should be 
noted and explained. 
  
  
  
 
128
 Description of the Change and Configuration Management Procedures for the RISC 
This section should describe in detail the change and configuration management processes, procedures, 
and system(s) employed to ensure that changes to the RISC are adequately tracked and controlled. The 
description should include an explanation for why the configuration and change control process is 
considered to be adequate, including a description of the process employed to incorporate changes and 
updates to the RISC.  
 Description of the Audit and Review Process Employed  
This section of the RISC Report should describe the internal RISC audit and review process. In particular, 
the Provider should document the following when conducting an audit: 
 When audits were conducted 
 The results of the audits 
 Audit team members and their qualifications, and  
 Any significant concerns raised in the audit  
Similar detail should be provided about the internal RISC review process employed by the Provider.  
 Discussion of Plans to Resolve Significant Unresolved Issues 
Especially in the early phases of spaceflight system development, it is normal to have unresolved issues at 
review points. This section of the RISC is intended to give the Provider the opportunity to report on 
significant unresolved safety-related issues and discuss plans to resolve them. The plan for resolution 
should be as detailed as possible to allow the reviewers of the RISC to understand the issues and gain 
confidence that they have a high likelihood of being resolved.  
6.2 Assigning Responsibilities for RISC Development and Integrating the Parts 
6.2.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Provider’s responsibilities in assigning responsibilities for RISC development and integrating the 
parts can be summarized as follows: 
 Identify and assign appropriately qualified personnel to be responsible for the development, 
integration, management, and maintenance of the RISC. Personnel should be chosen with the 
necessary experience, education, or training to effectively develop and update the RISC; to 
manage the integration of lower-level RISCs (e.g., those from subcontractors or other 
organizations) and supporting documentation from other subsystems (if required); and to manage 
the change and configuration control of the RISC Report. 
 Take responsibility for the accuracy of all RISCs developed by subcontractors or sub-
organizations that are integrated into the RISC developed by the Provider. As the organization 
providing the system to NASA, it is the responsibility of the Provider to take full ownership of all 
evidence submitted by subcontractors and sub-organizations that argue for the safety of a part of 
the integrated system. 
The use of qualified personnel is necessary to gain acceptance for the RISC and assure knowledgeable 
people that the system is adequately safe. This is particularly true because formulation of the safety case 
requires more care and rigor from the Provider than does fulfillment of a set of prescriptive process 
requirements. 
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This section of the handbook addresses the following topics pertaining to these responsibilities: 
 Assigning qualified personnel for RISC development, integration, management and maintenance 
 Integrating subsystem RISCs into a system level RISC 
6.2.2 Assigning Appropriately Qualified Personnel  
It would be expected that persons developing a risk-informed safety case for NASA programs/projects 
would have a degree in an engineering or science discipline along with significant experience in one or 
more of the following areas: aerospace engineering, system safety engineering, aerospace system safety 
certification, aerospace system operation, probability and statistics, risk analysis, failure analysis, and 
mishap investigation. 
The individual should understand: 
• The structure of modern standards and aerospace safety cases including deterministic and 
probabilistic safety assessment and engineering substantiation 
• ASARP and its application throughout the safety case life cycle 
• The engineering design and operation of the system being assessed and the mission for which it is 
used 
• How the safety case can be implemented and how it integrates with the design and operation of 
the system being assessed 
• Safety case standards and methodologies 
• The need for and use of specialized analyses where needed 
In addition, the Provider should use the following guidelines in the selection and training of personnel: 
 
• Maintain an established and effective procedure for defining individual employee qualifications 
and for ensuring that selections are made against these criteria. 
• Use a structured approach to identify all employee training needs. 
• Ensure that training needs are satisfied before employees start executing the task. 
• Maintain a system for following-up on newly placed personnel to verify their effectiveness and 
include a review of the need for changes to the employee qualification criteria and/or personnel 
training. 
• Maintain a system for identifying personal training needs following changes to the system design 
and/or operational mode, safety standards, and procedures; ensure that training is implemented in 
a timely manner. 
• Maintain a system regularly validating the competence of the training instructors. 
• Apply the training standards to both company employees and contractors. 
• Make use in the training programs of lessons learned and experience developed from previous 
projects and incidents. 
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6.2.3 Integrating Subsystem RISCs 
Just as there is a need for subsystem analyses that feed into an integrated system analysis51, there is a need 
for subsystem level RISCs that feed into a system level RISC. The system level RISC is prepared by the 
organization that is referred to in this report as the Provider. The subsystem level RISCs are prepared by 
the organization responsible for each subsystem. If subsystem development is allocated to subcontractors, 
each subcontractor should prepare a RISC that pertains to their assigned subsystem. 
There are two general considerations for subcontractors preparing RISCs: 
1. The subsystem RISC should address all subsystem level concerns that are identified in the system 
level RISC. 
2. The RISCs at subsystem level should all be consistent with one another and with the system level 
RISC in terms of the claims that are made and the evidence that is used to substantiate the claims. 
Regarding the first item, it has been pointed out earlier that many concerns identified in the system level 
RISC will cross over subsystem boundaries. For example, a claim in the system level RISC that the 
probability of loss of the system from known risks is within the probabilistic requirement, would likely 
require a risk assessment that would have to account not only for the failure of individual subsystems but 
also for cross-system scenarios. The approach advocated in Section 5.2.5 for identifying subsystem 
analyses that feed into an ISA would therefore apply to the formulation and substantiation of claims at 
subsystem level that feed into a system level RISC. 
Regarding the second item, the claims at system level contain many elements that would also have to be 
addressed at subsystem level. For example, claims like the following would have to be included and 
substantiated at both levels: 
• The agreed-to verification procedures have been executed, or if not, the reasons for any 
departures from the procedures have been adequately explained, justified, and agreed to by the 
Acquirer. 
• Models used to calculate the probability of loss from known risks are appropriately graded 
according to the importance of the mission, the criticality of each risk scenario, and the maturity 
of the design. 
• Models used for high criticality risk scenarios within high criticality missions satisfy the 
Modeling & Simulation Credibility Assessment Scale (CAS) criteria and are backed by ISA-
informed tests. 
• Fault management models and software models are adequately integrated with other ISA models.
• Configuration control and data management reflect NASA standards and guidelines and are 
maintained in all relevant areas, particularly where there are multiple suppliers and distributed 
resources. 
• Relevant best practices and lessons learned either have been incorporated or are demonstrated to 
be not practicable. 
• Budgets and schedules are adequate for the tasks to be performed and include realistic reserves. 
• Management is focused toward continuous safety improvement and inclusiveness in the
resolution of risks. 
• Roles and responsibilities for resolving safety concerns are clearly defined in accordance with the 
                                                            
51 The relationship between subsystem analyses and integrated system analysis was discussed in Section 5.2.5. 
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program/project and RM plans, provide effective interaction, and resolve problems as they arise. 
• Design complexity is minimized without violating safety. 
• Any changes from previous validated designs, fabrication methods, and operational procedures 
remain within the domain for which the performance of the system is known. 
• A set of safety critical items (e.g., hardware features, software features, human actions, 
management practices, and administrative controls) has been identified whose performance at 
levels documented in the Integrated Safety Analysis assures the satisfaction of the system-level 
known loss probability requirement. 
For these claims and others like them, it is incumbent on the Provider to ensure that consistency and 
relevance are maintained across the system RISC and all subsystem RISCs. 
6.3 Exercising a Graded Approach in RISC Development 
6.3.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Provider’s responsibility in exercising a graded approach in RISC development can be summarized 
as follows: 
 Develop the RISC to an appropriate level of detail to ensure that the safety of the system is fully 
and coherently documented, and in such a way as to allow for an independent review and 
evaluation of the RISC. 
Small programs/projects do not require the same amount of analysis and documentation as ones that are 
larger or more complex. Correspondingly, the RISC should be developed to a level of detail that is 
sufficient to communicate the safety argument effectively. In all cases, for reasons of scrutability and to 
maximize the utility of finite resources, the RISC should focus on safety risk drivers, but should also 
provide rationale for why the other sources of safety risk not focused on are not considered to be 
significant. 
6.3.2 Exercising a Graded Approach 
The graded approach to be applied in a RISC pertains to two aspects of the RISC: the completeness of the 
claims tree and the completeness of the evidence. The criteria for determining how much rigor to apply in 
each of these two areas are similar to those discussed in Section 5.2.4, which addressed graded analysis 
for an ISA. Choices about the completeness of the claims tree depend on the criticality of the mission, 
analogous to choices about the scope of an ISA. Choices about the amount of effort to be applied in 
developing evidence for a claim in the claims tree depend on the mission criticality and on the criticality 
of the claim, just as the level of effort to be applied in analyzing a risk scenario in an ISA depends upon 
the mission criticality and the importance of the scenario. 
In Section 5.2.4, mission criticality was taken to be equivalent to the project priority rankings as defined 
in the latest version of NPR 8715.3C [6]. The scheme for rating mission criticality can be used in this 
context as well. Namely: 
 A mission has high criticality if it requires White House approval per PD/NSC-25, or is subject 
to planetary protection requirements, or has high strategic importance to the Agency, or has life-
cycle cost exceeding $1 billion. 
 A mission has medium criticality if it does not have high criticality and has a life-cycle cost 
between $250 million and $1 billion.  
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 A mission has low criticality if it does not have high or medium criticality and has a life-cycle 
cost less than $250 million. 
The desired completeness of the claims tree parallels the criteria in the NPR and in Section 5.2.4 for the 
scope of the ISA: 
 A mission with high criticality should entail full scope development of the claims tree according 
to the techniques described in Section 6.1 and subsections. 
 A mission with medium criticality should entail claim development only in specific areas that are 
deemed to warrant it, together with a set of arguments to justify that the system as a whole is 
safe. 
 A mission with low criticality should be accompanied by a set of arguments to justify the 
assertion that the system is safe but does not require formal development of a claims tree. 
Risk scenario criticality, in Section 5.2.4, was measured in terms of rough estimates of the likelihood of 
the scenario becoming a reality, the corresponding severity of the outcome, and a qualitative estimate of 
the uncertainty. In the present context, the notion of risk scenario criticality is replaced by evidence 
criticality, which has the following rating scheme: 
 The evidence criticality is “high” if the claim to which it applies is deemed to be important 
relative to the goal of achieving a safe system and the amount of assurance deficit for that claim 
using existing evidence is considered high52. 
 The evidence criticality is “moderate” if the claim to which it applies is important relative to the 
goal of achieving a safe system and the amount of assurance deficit for that claim using existing 
evidence is considered moderate but not critical. 
 The evidence criticality is “low” if the amount of assurance deficit for that claim using existing 
evidence is considered low, regardless of the relative importance of the claim. 
Table 6-4 provides a summary of the criteria for evidence completeness as a function of these two 
criticality factors.  
Table 6-4. Amount of Additional Evidence Needed to Satisfy the Criteria for Evidence Completeness for 
Different Levels of Mission Criticality and Evidence Criticality 
 
Mission Criticality 
Low  Medium  High  
Evidence 
Criticality  
High  No additional evidence required 
As much as needed to 
reduce the assurance 
deficit to moderate 
(Rank 3 or less) 
As much as needed to 
reduce the assurance 
deficit to low (Rank 1) 
Moderate  No additional evidence required 
No additional 
evidence required 
As much as needed to 
reduce the assurance 
deficit to low (Rank 1) 
Low  No additional evidence required 
No additional 
evidence required 
No additional 
evidence needed 
 
                                                            
52 Sections 6.1.2, 7.2.3, and 7.2.4 provide more information on the identification and ranking of assurance deficits. 
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6.4 Maintaining and Updating the RISC and Addressing Future Life-Cycle Phases 
6.4.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Provider’s responsibilities in maintaining and updating the RISC and addressing future life-cycle 
phases can be summarized as follows: 
 For new systems, develop a RISC for the System Definition Review (SDR) and update it, as 
necessary, to reflect changes in the design or operation of the system53. At a minimum, the RISC 
should address all relevant milestone review entrance criteria specified in NPR 7123.1B [3]. 
Updates would typically be expected at the designated reviews in the NASA Systems 
Engineering Life Cycle (see Figure 6-3). 
 
Figure 6-3. The NASA Systems Engineering Life-Cycle Phases 
 For already existing systems to be acquired by NASA (for example, commercially supplied 
launch services), update the RISC as required by the program/project. (An initial RISC should 
already have been developed.) 
 At scheduled life-cycle RISC reviews, delineate the burndown-to-date of safety risks associated 
with fulfillment of the levels of safety performance. As defined in Section 2.1.1, risk burndown 
refers to the expectation that as a program/project evolves over time, and as risk concerns are 
retired and the state of knowledge about the performance measures improves, uncertainty should 
decrease, with an attendant lowering of risk. The burndown of safety risks provides important 
evidence of the effectiveness of the Provider’s RM process, as well as the support of RM by the 
Provider’s management organization. 
 
                                                            
53 See Section 6.1.1 for a brief discussion of RISC requirements for existing systems.  
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 In each RISC submittal, address safety-related objectives, plans, concerns, and scenarios for all 
future program/project life-cycle phases at an appropriate level of detail. It is understood that the 
level of detail presented in treating the safety-related objectives, concerns, and scenarios for 
future phases of the system will necessarily be of lesser detail than the current RISC for a given 
review phase, and that the level of detail may, in fact, be minimal for late life-cycle phases of a 
RISC submitted early in a Project/Program. For example, a RISC submitted at SDR would 
normally have only high-level discussion about system safety for the closeout phase of the 
program/project. This information would become more detailed in RISCs submitted later in the 
life cycle. 
 Update the RISC when certain events occur. Circumstances that would warrant updating of the 
RISC include the following: 
o Significant unplanned updates to the system (e.g., unplanned block upgrade of avionics, 
propulsion, thermal protection system (TPS), upload of new or revised software, etc.) 
o Significant changes to the operation of the system not captured in the existing operative 
RISC 
o Failure of a critical subsystem that does not lead to catastrophic failure of the vehicle (e.g., 
failure of one component in a subsystem with redundancy) 
o A change of mission requirements 
o A change in the environment, the understanding of the environment, or the assumptions 
made about the environment that affects assertions made in the RISC 
o Design or operational changes resulting from return-to-flight decisions during hiatus 
following a catastrophic failure of the system 
This section of the handbook addresses the following topics pertaining to the maintenance and updating 
of the RISC and the addressing of future life-cycle phases: 
 Maintaining and updating the RISC 
 Addressing future life-cycle phases 
6.4.2 Maintaining and Updating the RISC 
The normal processes of analysis, testing, and operation can lead to new information that affects the 
evaluation of the loss probability or the degree to which deterministic requirements are being met. For 
example, a new risk scenario may be uncovered, or the understanding of an existing risk scenario may 
need to be reassessed. Whenever this occurs, it is necessary to reevaluate whether the system still satisfies 
the probabilistic and deterministic requirements. 
If a requirement is not satisfied for any key mission objective, then the first step is to try to regain 
compliance by applying controls that do not violate the criteria for minimizing UU risks, i.e., do not 
significantly increase the design complexity, reduce the effectiveness of defense-in-depth, or increase the 
pressures on time or budget. If this cannot be accomplished by introducing practicable controls, the 
alternative is to seek an adjustment (or rebaselining) of the requirement. In either case, the RISC should 
be updated accordingly. For launch vehicles and human-rated systems this may require re-certification of 
the system. The existing RISC will then need to be updated to reflect changes in the system design or 
operation. 
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6.4.3 Addressing Future Life-cycle Phases  
The concept of adequate safety requires that safety be addressed throughout all phases of the system life 
cycle. Correspondingly, the RISC must also address the full system life cycle, regardless of the particular 
point in the life cycle at which the RISC is developed. This manifests in the RISC as two distinct types of 
safety claims: 
 Claims related to the safety objectives of the current or previous phases argue that the objectives 
have been met. 
 Claims related to the safety objectives of future phases argue that a ‘roadmap’ has been 
established for the satisfaction of objectives yet to be met, i.e., that necessary plans, preparations, 
and commitments are in place to meet safety objectives at the appropriate time. 
The form of the RISC arguments for accomplished objectives vs. upcoming objectives is shown in Figure 
6-4 for the point in time at which design has completed and realization is about to commence. As the 
system proceeds in the life cycle and RISCs are developed for successive milestones, arguments 
demonstrating an ability and commitment to meeting objectives are replaced by arguments demonstrating 
accomplishment of objectives. 
 
Figure 6-4. Coverage of the System Life Cycle in the RISC 
The operational safety objectives tree presented in Section 3.1 (Figure 3-2) specifically highlights the 
responsibility of the Provider to address future life-cycle phases by separately referring to objectives that 
need to be addressed during design, others that need to be addressed during product realization, and still 
others to be addressed during operation and sustainment. To be consistent with this life-cycle perspective, 
the claims in the claims tree must cover these three phases at a minimum (as well as any other phases that 
require consideration, such as decommissioning). Frequently, the claims are worded without reference to 
life-cycle phase, but the understanding is that the evidence to be provided must substantiate each claim 
for each phase of the life cycle to which it is applicable. For example, a claim such as Item 4 in Table 6-3, 
“Processes to ensure that requests for waivers or modifications of safety requirements are risk-informed,” 
must be presumed to apply anytime when waivers or modifications may be requested, whether during 
design, realization, or operation. The Provider should show that the premise of the claim is being 
addressed in the present phase by citing real evidence to that effect, and should also show how the claim 
will be addressed during future phases by referring to an appropriately documented section of the System 
Safety Management Plan (SSMP). 
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6.5 Addressing Weaknesses and Unresolved Safety Issues 
6.5.1 The Provider’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Provider’s responsibilities in addressing weaknesses and unresolved safety issues can be summarized 
as follows: 
 Clearly address weaknesses and limitations in the RISC. This should include an assessment of the 
degree to which such weaknesses and limitations affect the overall assurance that the safety 
claims have been satisfied and the system is adequately safe. 
 Discuss in the RISC the plan to address significant unresolved safety related issues and provide a 
schedule for achieving resolution of all such issues. 
6.5.2 Addressing Weaknesses and Issues 
For the Acquirer to have a full understanding of, and confidence in the RISC, it is critical that weaknesses 
and limitations in the RISC, such as shortcomings in the evidence, be identified and addressed. This 
process imparts confidence to the Acquirer that the RISC has been carefully prepared, that it is complete, 
and that the Provider and Acquirer understand its weaknesses and limitations. 
In the development of new space flight systems that push the technological state-of-the-art, it is common 
to encounter problems in the design of the system during the development phase that may have impacts 
on the safety of the system. Identifying significant unresolved issues, and presenting a plan to address 
such issues, helps to focus attention on areas of the project that may require additional resources or that 
may cause schedule slips. Addressing unresolved safety-related issues helps with transparency in the 
Program/Project, increases Acquirer confidence in the system and the Provider, and increases the 
likelihood that the system will meet its safety thresholds and be ASARP. 
The responsibility for identifying weaknesses and unresolved safety issues, assessing their effects on the 
claim that the system is adequately safe, and devising how to resolve those issues, lies principally with the 
Acquirer during the RISC evaluation step. However, the Provider is also expected to make their own 
assessment of these issues and correct them to their best ability prior to submitting the RISC to the 
Acquirer. The approach recommended for the Provider is basically the same as the approach 
recommended for the Acquirer. Refer to Sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4 for guidance on assurance deficits, 
which also applies to this section of the handbook. 
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6.6 Example for Chapter 6 – RISC Fragment for New Technology on a Robotic 
System (Electric Ion Thruster) 
As discussed by Brophy, et al., [94, 95], electric ion thrusters for use on deep-space science missions (see 
Figure 6-5) have challenging life qualification issues because they are expected to have operational 
lifetimes of tens of thousands of hours, operate over a broad range of input powers, and are subject to 
complex wearout failure modes. The customary approach of performing a single life test for the required 
number of hours plus margin provides insufficient information to characterize the failure risk. 
 
Figure 6-5. Schematic of an Electric Ion Thruster Subsystem and Photo of a Test Model 
There are several questions to be addressed when gathering evidence to substantiate a claim that the 
thrusters will perform their mission without premature failure: 
• Has the testing time and/or operational time been sufficiently long to establish that there are not 
unexpected wearout failure modes that could occur toward the end of life? 
• Have there been a sufficient number of life tests to establish that there is not a wearout failure 
mode with random failure time that has not yet been observed? 
• Have the environments for life testing and/or operation been identical to the environments that will 
be seen during actual operation (e.g., zero-gravity, vacuum, radiation, orientation)? 
• Has the item been life-tested at conditions beyond the design basis environments to establish its 
robustness in the event of abnormal/unexpected environments? 
• Have all functions that the item will have to perform during the mission been tested? 
• Have all the above factors been tested in the full-up system configuration to account for interactive 
modes of wearout failure? 
• Are there analytical models that successfully fill the gaps left by shortcomings in the testing and 
operational experience? 
6.6.1 Safety Claims Tree 
Figure 6-6, on the following two pages, shows an example claims tree for a proposed new electric ion 
thruster subsystem, in which the top claim to be demonstrated is that the as-designed spacecraft propulsion 
system is adequately protected against wearout failure. 
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Figure 6-6. Claims Tree Pertaining to Wearout Failures for a New Technology Ion Electric Thruster (1 of 2) 
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Figure 6-6 (Cont.). Claims Tree Pertaining to Wearout Failures for a New Technology Ion Electric Thruster (2 of 2) 
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6.6.2 Sources of Evidence 
The safety claims tree has a total of 17 base claims. Table 6-5, below, presents the sources of evidence that 
are cited by the Provider to support these base claims. In addition to testing and operational results, the 
direct evidence includes the results of failure analyses, design inspections, historical reviews, and a 
literature review. Supporting evidence includes the quality of the tools used to perform the failure analysis 
and the qualifications of the analysts and expert consultants used  
6.6.3 Hypothetical Suppositions, Assumptions, and Contexts 
For purposes of this example, it is assumed that the following set of suppositions, assumptions, and 
contexts applies to the mission to be executed and the evidence that was obtained. These suppositions, etc.,
are stated purely for purposes of developing the example, are hypothetical, and are not intended to 
represent the actual reality for an existing mission or system. 
• The mission lifetime is 10 years. 
• There have been 65 full-up tests on the ion thrusters to be used, with test times between 2 years 
and 5 years, and there were no failures during these tests and no evidence of material 
degradation. 
• Gridded ion thrusters of various kinds have been tested in microgravity, in vacuum, and in high 
radiation environments, but not all three at the same time; therefore, there is some question about 
their life expectancy in the combination of environments. 
• Prior spaceflight history implies that the probability of experiencing an environment during a 
mission that would subject the ion thrusters to stressors beyond their design margins is on the 
order of 10%. 
• There has been testing for every functional mode of the thrusters to be experienced during the 
mission. 
• The only identified significant system interaction is a potential for impingement of eroded 
material from the ion thruster subsystem on other subsystems. 
• The only identified significant hardware-software interaction is the possibility unusual cycling of 
the ion thrusters due to malfunction of the control logic. 
• The statistical analysis performed in association with Base Claim 10 in Table 6-5 was a maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) analysis which was conducted using the data from the 65 real-system 
tests as input, to examine the implications of the limited test time. A Weibull failure distribution 
was assumed with a high shape parameter so that the resulting estimate could be considered 
bounding. Binomial statistics were used to examine the possible influence of randomness in the 
test results. A confidence level of 95% was assumed for this analysis to be conservative. 
Results from the expert judgment elicitation conducted in association with Base Claim 11 in Table 
6-5 were used to estimate the probability that there may be unknown critical wearout failure 
modes from each of the following causes: (1) environments that have not been simulated during 
testing (e.g., the combination of microgravity, vacuum, and high radiation); (2) unanticipated 
abnormal environments (e.g., solar flares); (3) unintended functional modes for the ion thrusters, 
and (4) unknown or underappreciated system interactions (e.g., interactions between the electrical 
and chemical thrusters). Inputs to the elicitation included the results of testing on similar systems 
in a variety of environments, the historical record of occurrences of unanticipated environments 
and heretofore unknown interactions, and the amount of margin in the thruster design. 
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Table 6-5. Evidence for Selected Base Claims Pertaining to Wearout Failures for the Ion Thruster Subsystem
Item   Base Claim  Evidence 
1  The effort to identify potential 
wearout failure modes has been as 
comprehensive as reasonably 
practicable. 
1. DIRECT: Inspection following Extended Life Testing (ELT): 30,000 
hour ELT of NSTAR thruster 
2. DIRECT: Body of Evidence for similar thrusters: Ion thruster 
technology’s long history of life testing and operational experience
3. DIRECT: Literature Review: Extensive published technical material 
for ion thrusters existing or currently under development 
4. SUPPORTING: Competency of personnel: Identification activities 
performed by personnel with extensive background in theory and 
practice of Ion engines 
2  Arcing through low‐voltage isolator 
eliminated by design 
1. DIRECT: Design inspection confirms no use of low‐voltage 
isolators. 
3  Cause of clogging can only occur 
during extended periods at low 
operating temperature levels 
1. DIRECT: Literature search
4  During first 2500 days throttle 
levels will always be high enough to 
keep operating temperature level 
above clogging level. 
1. DIRECT: Analysis of thrusting levels during mission profile
2. SUPPORTING: Favorable NASA‐STD‐7009 review of analysis 
5  During low‐power end of throttle 
range, keeper current will be high 
enough to ensure operating 
temperature above clogging level. 
1. DIRECT: Design inspection confirms keeper current settings will be 
high. 
6  Electron back‐streaming due to 
accelerator grid erosion < 0.01 
probability 
1. DIRECT: Analysis of test results: No failures observed 
2. DIRECT: Deterministic physics of failure modeling and Monte‐
Carlo simulation for back‐streaming due to accelerator grid 
erosion: Failure within mission lifetime < 0.01 probability 
3. SUPPORTING: Deterministic models verified to be correct and 
validated for ground test environments based on M&S Credibility 
Assessment Scale criteria in NASA‐STD‐7009 
4. SUPPORTING: Probabilistic models consistent with best PRA 
practices in NPR 8705.5 
7  Potential synergisms between 
individual failure modes are ruled 
out or bounded. 
1. DIRECT: Literature review shows no interactions between 
different failure modes. 
2. DIRECT: Expert judgment elicitation indicates very low likelihood 
of significant potential synergisms. 
3. SUPPORTING: The experts are highly qualified. 
8  The common cause failure rate is 
known or reasonably bounded for 
each failure mode. 
1. DIRECT: Robust quality assurance and control program to protect 
against  
9  Design features for failure 
tolerance and diverse functional 
redundancy provide sufficiently 
robust protection against 
synergisms and common cause 
failures. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. DIRECT: The design includes two extra ion thrusters beyond the 
minimum needed. 
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Table 6-5. Evidence for Selected Base Claims Pertaining to Wearout Failures for the Ion Thruster Subsystem 
(Cont.) 
Item   Base Claim  Evidence 
10  The independent and common 
cause failure rates and cited design 
features are sufficient to keep the 
known risk of wearout within the 
minimum requirement. 
1. DIRECT: Statistical analyses of censored failure data from ion 
thruster testing indicates 80% confidence that wearout failure will 
not occur before mission is completed. 
2. SUPPORTING: Statistical models are verified and validated for 
many hardware applications (but not specifically for ion thrusters).
3. DIRECT: Expert judgment elicitation indicates low likelihood 
(<10%) of exceeding minimum requirement. 
4. SUPPORTING: The experts are highly qualified. 
11  Reasonable target margins on 
environmental and design 
parameters and/or reasonable 
target levels of independent 
redundancy have been determined 
consistent with the number, 
relevance, and duration of wearout 
testing performed and with 
historical experience for 
unexpected wearout failures. 
1. DIRECT:Margin added to the keeper current level to account for 
potentially underappreciating the failure rate due to clogging of 
the neutralizer orifice 
2. DIRECT: Margins to account for UU failure modes are consistent 
with UU failure rates that have occurred for other systems. 
3. DIRECT: Level of redundancy for ion thrusters is consistent with 
level of redundancy used for other new technology subsystems in 
spaceflight applications. 
4. DIRECT: Expert judgment elicitation on the likelihood of 
unintended environments, functional modes, and system 
interactions indicates low probabilities (< 10%) 
5. SUPPORTING: The experts are highly qualified. 
12  The actual margins and levels of 
independent redundancy are not 
less than the established targets. 
1. DIRECT: Inspection of the design and operational plan indicates 
targets will be met. 
 
13  Safety has been prioritized during 
decision making. 
1. DIRECT:Management structure, roles and responsibilities, safety 
policies, inclusiveness in decision making all indicate that safety 
has a high priority. 
14  New safety related information is 
adequately addressed. 
1. DIRECT: Risk management processes and database contents, 
status of unresolved safety issues, precursor analysis program, 
problem reporting and corrective action, and information sharing 
processes all indicate that new safety related information is being 
adequately addressed. 
15  There is a plan to systematically 
continue prioritizing safety during 
decision making and continue 
addressing new safety related 
information. 
1. DIRECT: The System Safety Management Plan and Risk 
Management Plan indicate that safety will continue to be 
prioritized and new safety information will be addressed. 
16  NASA’s anthology of best practices 
and lessons learned have been 
tailored to retain those that apply 
to the present system. 
1. DIRECT: Corroborated by the status of the System Safety 
Requirement Analysis (SSRA) and adherence to best practices and 
lessons learned from the Goddard GOLD Rules, NASA Space Flight 
Program and Project Management Handbook, NASA Preferred 
Practices for Design and Test of Robust Systems (JPL), NASA 
Lessons Learned System, etc. 
17  The design, realization, and 
operation of the system comply 
with the tailored list. 
1. DIRECT: Inspections and audits concur that best practices and 
lessons learned are being adhered to. 
Section 7.4 will continue with this example in providing results of the analysis and interpreting those 
results in terms of confidence in the safety case. 
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6.6.4 A Note on Margins 
Safety margins in the context of the present example have a different connotation from safety performance 
margins as discussed in Section 4.1.3 and demonstrated in Section 4.5. For the present example, margins 
have been used in a more traditional sense. That is, the safety claim relating to margins in Figure 6-6 refers 
to factors of safety on environmental parameters (e.g., stress, temperature) and design parameters (e.g., 
material thickness, configuration), rather than on safety performance parameters such as the probability of 
loss of vehicle or mission. The higher level intermediate claim is that the design margins and design 
redundancy are sufficient to keep the risk of wearout from UU failure modes small compared to the risk 
from known failure modes.  
The philosophy applied here is that when the source of risk is entirely phenomenological (i.e., associated 
with the understanding of the physics), it is not fruitful to attempt to develop margins directly for the safety 
performance risk based on experience. As opposed to program/project risks, where the principal sources of 
UU risk tend to be associated with organizational, management, and programmatic factors, the magnitude 
of phenomenological risks from unknown and underappreciated sources is basically unpredictable (e.g., 
[94]). For phenomenological risks, therefore, it is more fruitful to develop margins on environmental 
and/or design parameters and to make those margins large enough to gain confidence that the risk of 
wearout failure from UU risks is contained. 
An example pertaining to the principle of margins for phenomenological risks is the risk of satellite control 
processors (SCPs) failing due to shorting as a result of the growth of tin whiskers. In the early 2000s, such 
failures were happening as early as four years after launch for satellites that were designed to last for 15 
years [e.g., see NASA web site nepp.nasa.gov/WHISKER/failures/index.htm]. The principal cause was 
that the solder in the electronic circuitry was made of tin coated by a thin polymer film, and the relaxation 
of the tin solder from thermal stresses produced by cyclical exposure to the sun caused whiskers to grow.
The whiskers eventually become long enough to short the energized bus terminal posts to the grounded 
relay case. 
The tin whiskers phenomenon was known long ago, but what was not known was that the growth 
mechanism was aggravated by conditions characteristic of space that were not manifest in ground testing 
and operation on Earth (i.e., microgravity and vacuum). It is appropriate to ask how greater design margins 
might have helped for such a problem that was known but underappreciated. It can be postulated that 
greater margins would have been successful if applied to accomplish any of the following objectives: 
 Lower thermal variations inside the spacecraft 
 Greater thickness of conformal coating (polymer film) 
 Greater independent redundancy (additional fully contained SCPs) available in a standby 
mode 
For the ion thruster system, it may be postulated that greater margins should reduce the risk from UU 
scenarios if applied to accomplish the following: 
 Operating temperature kept within a narrower range (low temperatures can increase orifice 
clogging whereas high temperatures can challenge material capabilities)  
 Stronger grid design (addresses electron backscatter caused by grid erosion) 
 Independent redundancy: the inclusion of standby ion thrusters that are physically separate 
and functionally independent from the active thrusters to allow for continued operation in 
case the active thrusters degrade or fail as a result of wearout 
The first two of these are intended to protect against known risks that are underappreciated, whereas the 
last provides protection against both underappreciated and unknown risks. 
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7. Evaluating the RISC: The Acquirer’s Role 
Once the Provider has delivered the RISC to the Acquirer, it will typically be evaluated on behalf of the 
Acquirer by an Evaluator, which is an agent of the Acquirer who is tasked to evaluate the RISC and 
generate findings on its technical adequacy (i.e., validity and completeness). The Evaluator’s findings, 
along with the RISC, are furnished to the Acquirer’s decision-making entity, which will use them as a 
safety-specific technical basis to allow or disallow the system to move forward in its life cycle. 
In general, an Acquirer has a safety risk acceptance decision to make at each KDP in a system 
development life cycle, and the RISC is a key input to that decision process. The Acquirer is responsible 
for the decision, and decides how much and what kind of review, or how much independent analysis, will 
be needed in order to create a technical basis for an acceptance decision. The Evaluator may need to 
review the RISC in very significant depth to warrant confidence in it. 
The norms for safety risk acceptance itself are beyond the purview of this handbook. The balance of the 
discussion in this chapter, therefore, is focused on technical evaluation of the RISC, which entails 
reviewing the claims made in the RISC in order to: 
 Understand the technical basis (i.e., arguments and evidence) behind the claim of adequate safety. 
 Evaluate the technical basis of the claim to determine its validity. 
 Judge the adequacy of the claim (validity and completeness). 
In questioning the technical basis of the RISC and judging its adequacy, the Evaluator will analyze the 
RISC from a critical viewpoint. If all key arguments in the RISC are understood by the Evaluator and are 
logically compelling, such that all evaluation findings required of the Evaluator are manifestly supported, 
then there will be no need for clarification or supplementary argument during RISC evaluation. However, 
due to the complexity of space systems, gaps or differences in understanding are possible on either side. 
Since the Acquirer is ultimately accepting or not accepting the risk of not meeting safety objectives, the 
Acquirer determines the outcome of a gap or difference in understanding. 
If gaps or differences in understanding warrant, or if the key arguments in the RISC are not logically 
compelling, the Acquirer may ask for information in addition to that submitted by the Provider, e.g., 
through a formal Request for Additional Information (RAI) process. RAIs are the mechanism through 
which the Acquirer is able to seek clarification of a particular concern during the RISC evaluation 
process. This additional information from the Provider will typically be integrated into the RISC by the 
Provider during the review process, and the final RISC and associated evaluation findings prepared by the 
Acquirer will reflect these Evaluator/ Provider interactions. The assumptions underlying the RISC and the 
effectiveness of the processes implemented in accordance with the RISC will be reviewed throughout 
every phase of the project. 
This chapter addresses the processes the Evaluator may use when establishing and communicating 
expectations concerning a forthcoming RISC, and when evaluating a submitted RISC. It provides 
guidance and examples that expand upon the overview for developing RISC-specific evaluation processes 
and findings presented in Section 3.4. The following subjects pertaining to that overview are discussed 
sequentially in Sections 7.1 through 7.3: 
 Interfacing with the Provider 
 Reviewing, evaluating, and scoring the RISC 
 Documenting the findings of the RISC evaluation 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the evaluation processes described herein may be tailored by the 
Acquirer in accordance with the principle of implementing a graded approach to risk management.  
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7.1 Interfacing with the Provider 
7.1.1 The Acquirer’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The Acquirer’s pursuits in interacting with the Provider to facilitate evaluation of the RISC can be 
summarized as follows: 
 Before submittal of the RISC, request a System Safety Requirements Analysis (SSRA) and a 
finalized System Safety Management Plan (SSMP) from the Provider. 
 Inform the Provider of the expected level of detail required in the development of the RISC and 
of any expectations with regard to structure and presentation of the RISC prior to its 
development, negotiating with the Provider as appropriate to most effectively satisfy the 
Acquirer’s information needs within the context of the SSMP. 
 Set periodic review meetings with the Provider during development of the RISC to gauge 
progress, receive/communicate updates, and determine if issues have arisen or been resolved. 
 When necessary, initiate a Request for Additional Information (RAI), relating each RAI to a 
perceived weakness in the support for one or more safety claims in the RISC. 
The SSRA serves to clarify what detailed requirements the Provider expects to address in the ensuing 
development of the system, and argues that the satisfaction of these requirements will provide evidence of 
satisfaction of the top-level requirements. Evaluation of the SSRA gives the Acquirer an early opportunity 
to ensure that the Provider is adequately addressing the safety performance requirements and is 
implementing a risk-informed process in development of the system (for example, through the use of 
tailored requirements).  
When the scope of requirements to be addressed has been clarified through the SSRA process, the SSMP 
can be finalized, again through iteration between the Acquirer and the Provider. This plan ties specific 
processes to specific requirements. The iteration between Acquirer and Provider concerns the finalization 
of processes for implementing requirements. The commitments documented in the SSMP relative to the 
decision for which the RISC is developed provide context for evaluating the RISC. 
During the evaluation of the RISC, the Acquirer may request additional information to clarify or further 
substantiate elements in the RISC, e.g., via RAIs. Note that if the Provider does not satisfy the Acquirer 
on a given issue, the Evaluator may not be able to find the technical basis of the RISC to be adequate. 
Consequently, the Acquirer’s assessment of the safety risk of the system may exceed the Acquirer’s risk 
tolerance. 
7.1.2 Guidance on Interfacing with the Provider to Facilitate Evaluation of the RISC 
Guidelines on the processes of interfacing with the Provider with respect to the RISC were presented in 
Section 3.6 and in Tables 3-1 and 3-2. More detailed guidance on this subject has not been developed, 
since the interactive process by its nature must be flexible enough to accommodate new or unexpected 
findings. 
7.2 Reviewing, Evaluating, and Scoring the RISC 
7.2.1 The Acquirer’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The responsibilities of the Evaluator in reviewing, evaluating, and scoring the RISC can be summarized 
as follows: 
 Review the RISC submittal by the Provider to determine that all necessary material has been 
provided. 
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 Conduct a Qualitative Scope/Methods Review of the RISC submittal. 
 Conduct a quantitative evaluation of the RISC submittal. Within a graded approach, the 
quantitative evaluation focuses on areas of highest impact to the safety of the system and those 
with high uncertainties. Nevertheless, the evaluation is intended to support a safety risk 
acceptance decision, and the coverage of the evaluation should therefore be sufficiently 
comprehensive to support that decision. 
 As part of the quantitative evaluation of the RISC, conduct sensitivity studies for key parts of the 
RISC submittal (e.g., sensitivity to key assumptions and models). 
 Rate the RISC as Acceptable or Unacceptable based on the evaluation findings. 
The process of evaluating the RISC falls into three phases: 1) acceptance review of the submitted RISC; 
2) a qualitative scope/methods review (surveying); and 3) a quantitative evaluation, including judiciously 
selected peer review calculations and sensitivity studies to spot-check the credibility of the Provider’s 
results. Once an evaluation has been completed, the results of the RISC evaluation are communicated by 
the Evaluator to the Decision Maker in the form of a RISC Evaluation Report. 
Acceptance review is a step undertaken to make sure that the information needed for substantive review is 
present in the submittal, and is intended to save resources (including time). During the acceptance review 
the submittal will be compared with expectations created earlier in the development process. 
A qualitative scope/methods review (surveying) refers to a process of comparing RISC elements to 
standard methods and to other analyses. Examples include comparing methods and results of hazard 
analyses, methods and qualitative results of probabilistic risk analyses, and comparing assessed risk 
contributions between launch vehicles. In this step, the evaluators derive their own perspective on the 
results. Evaluators should also assess the Providers’ qualifications including experience with the 
operation of the system. 
The quantitative evaluation process consists of independent checking of selected technical results by the 
Acquirer, in order to confirm the Provider’s results and to establish operationally that the Acquirer 
understands, in detail, what methods, data, assumptions, and models were used to obtain the results. 
Evaluation may range from “peer review” (high-level checking of selected results) up through replication 
of key results in the RISC. For example, the Evaluator may develop simplified analytic models to confirm 
the Provider’s results. 
Figure 71 shows the flow of the evaluation process. The following topics pertaining to the review, 
evaluation, and scoring of the RISC are discussed in Section 7.2.2 through 7.2.6: 
 Composition of the evaluation team 
 Sources of assurance deficit caused by incomplete or inaccurate evidence  
 Ranking of the severity of the assurance deficits and their importance relative to the safety of the 
system based on the judgments of subject matter experts 
 Experts’ qualitative ranking of the overall confidence that the system is adequately safe 
 Using Value-of-Information (VOI) methods to analyze options for reducing uncertainty 
7.2.2 Composition and Independence of the Evaluation Team 
The Acquirer’s Evaluation Team should consist of a corps of experts that includes not only subject matter 
experts but also experts with broad experience and knowledge of the system as a whole and the risks that 
challenge the system. They should be independent from the Provider and from the Acquirer’s decision 
making authority. Independence from the Provider is needed to avoid the possibility of conflicts of 
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interest. Independence from the Acquirer’s decision making authority is desirable to ensure that the 
process is devoid as much as possible from political influences. 
 
Figure 7-1. Phased Evaluation of the RISC 
7.2.3 Sources of Assurance Deficit 
As mentioned earlier, the strength of the evidence that supports a base claim is judged in terms of 
“assurance deficits,” which were defined in Section 5.1.4 as “any knowledge gap that prohibits perfect 
(total) confidence” [66]. Assurance deficits relate to the sum of the evidence that is used to support a 
particular base claim. As suggested in Section 6.1.2, they can be ranked on a scale of 1 to 5 in terms of the 
confidence that the base claim is justified by the evidence. 
Table 7-1, an extended version of Table 6-3, identifies some of the potential sources of assurance deficit 
that could apply to some of the base claims and associated evidence that were presented in the earlier 
table. This list is intended to be representative and is not intended to be an exhaustive list.  
  
Acceptance 
Review
Qualitative (Scope 
/ Methods)   
Review
Quantitative 
Evaluation 
(Auditing)
Submittal is Suitable for Subsequent Review 
Phases: Submittal is Complete, Comports with 
Analysis Protocols,  is Generally consistent with 
expectations, including ASARP and Roadmap. 
Technical Processes Are Appropriate to Claims; 
Technical Processes Appropriately followed; 
Disciplines Adequately Covered; Evidentiary 
Strength Adequate   to Claims, including ASARP 
and Roadmap. Roadmap coverage is adequate.
Quantitative Results are confirmed, based on 
audit checks by acquirer, sensitivity studies by 
acquirer. ASARP calculations spot‐validated. 
Roadmap details (flight rules) spot‐validated. 
Evaluator has an adequate sense of 
uncertainties affecting risk acceptance. 
RISC 
Submittal
Staged Evaluation 
Process
Recommendation 
to Decision‐Maker
RAIs If 
Necessary
RAIs If 
Necessary
RAIs If 
Necessary
Findings to 
Decision Maker
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Table 7-1. Illustration of Assurance Deficit Sources that Pertain to Evidence for Various Potential Base 
Claims 
Row 
No. 
Example Base Claim  Example Direct and Supporting Evidence  Example Sources of Assurance 
Deficit 
2  For each KMO, a 
margin has been 
established for the 
calculated probability 
of loss for a new 
system consistent 
with the 
understanding of UU 
risks from relevant 
previous missions. 
DIRECT: Correlations of historical 
occurrences of failures and/or anomalies 
with qualitative factors that tend to 
produce UU risks. Identification, analysis, 
and ranking of such factors 
SUPPORTING: The rigor exercised in 
identifying the governing factors, quality 
of the data used to develop the 
correlations, standard errors of the 
correlations, degree to which the 
correlations have been verified and 
validated, experience and commitment 
of the analysts 
Completeness of identification of 
the qualitative factors that tend to 
produce UU scenarios. Robustness 
of the correlation of historical 
failures/anomalies with the above 
qualitative factors; robustness of 
the analysis and of the ranking of 
the qualitative factors for the 
present program/project 
4 Processes to ensure 
that requests for 
waivers or 
modifications of 
safety requirements 
are risk‐informed.  
DIRECT: Waiver/modification approach 
documented in SSMP; documented 
rationale based on correlation of safety 
requirements with risk drivers 
SUPPORTING: Demonstrated 
understanding of safety requirements 
and their relation to risk drivers; 
appreciation for potential UU risks; 
knowledge of historical precedence and 
best practices 
Incomplete or inaccurate 
understanding of the risk drivers; 
inadequate appreciation for UU 
risks; lack of knowledge of 
historical precedence and best 
practices 
 
6 Models used for 
high criticality risk 
scenarios within 
high criticality 
missions satisfy the 
Modeling & 
Simulation 
Credibility 
Assessment Scale 
(CAS) criteria and 
are backed by ISA‐
informed tests. 
DIRECT: Comparisons of M&S results to 
an acceptable referent; comparison of 
input data with measured data; 
quantitative uncertainty estimates; 
repeatability of the M&S results; 
sensitivity of the M&S results to input 
and model parameters for the real‐
world system 
SUPPORTING: Use of reliable error 
estimation methods; community 
acceptance of the model as a de facto 
standard; availability of personnel with 
advanced engineering or science 
degrees or extensive work experience 
Unfavorable comparisons of M&S 
results to an acceptable referent; 
unavailability of a suitable 
referent; unfavorable comparison 
of input data with measured data; 
lack of quantitative uncertainty 
estimates;. non‐repeatability of 
the M&S results; lack of 
knowledge of the sensitivity of 
the M&S results to input and 
model parameters; lack of 
community acceptance of the 
model as a de facto standard; lack 
of a test plan that is realistically 
informed by the ISA models and 
results; unsuitable test facility or 
equipment; lack of personnel 
with needed educational and 
experience background 
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Table 7-1. Illustration of Assurance Deficit Sources that Pertain to Evidence for Various Potential Base 
Claims (Cont.) 
Row 
No. 
Example Base Claim 
(from Table 12‐3) 
Example Direct and Supporting Evidence 
(Synopsized from Table 12‐3) 
Example Sources of Assurance 
Deficit 
7 Reasonable estimates 
of the uncertainty 
distribution and their 
correlation 
coefficients have 
been obtained. 
DIRECT: Statistical analysis;
applicability/completeness of testing and 
modeling 
SUPPORTING: Robustness of expert 
elicitation; qualifications of participants; 
documentation; use of qualified 
independent reviewers 
Uncertainty associated with the 
analysts’ and experts’ 
understanding of the risk 
scenarios; uncertainty associated 
with differences between the 
experts on the uncertainty 
distributions for the significant 
known uncertainty sources and the 
correlations between them 
8  Plans are in place for 
identifying/ 
evaluating the 
potential risk 
significance of 
precursors and 
anomalies, and for 
instituting 
appropriate 
contingencies and 
controls when 
needed. 
DIRECT: Plans documented in SSMP for 
precursor analysis, anomaly and problem 
reporting, and implementation of 
corrective actions 
SUPPORTING: Quality and completeness 
of record‐keeping of precursors and 
anomalies; staffing plan; experience of 
analysts 
Uncertainty about the 
qualifications of the participants, 
the availability of resources, and 
the commitment of management 
 
9  Budgets and 
schedules are 
adequate for the 
tasks to be 
performed and 
include realistic 
reserves. 
DIRECT: Monte Carlo analysis of cost and 
schedule; budgets and deliverable dates 
consistent with analysis results; inclusion 
of realistic reserves based on historical 
experience 
SUPPORTING: Quality of analytical 
models; qualifications of analysts 
Incomplete, biased, or inaccurate 
evaluation of costs and schedule; 
inadequate reserves; likelihood 
and severity of future budget cuts 
11  Any changes from 
previous validated 
designs are small 
enough to remain 
within the domain for 
which the 
performance of the 
system is known. 
DIRECT: Integrated safety analysis and 
testing of the final system over all 
mission parameter values 
SUPPORTING: Quality of analytical 
models and tests; qualifications of 
analysts 
Insufficient testing or flight 
experience to demonstrate that 
the changes do not introduce new 
UU risks 
 
12  Provisions are made 
for testing any new 
technology or 
application of an 
existing technology 
within the context of 
its interactions with 
the whole system. 
DIRECT: Plans for integrated testing of 
the final system over all mission 
parameter values 
SUPPORTING: Evidence of sufficient 
budget and time to support such testing 
Uncertainty about the likelihood 
and severity of budget cuts that 
could compromise the quality and 
scope of the testing 
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7.2.4 The Process of Ranking Assurance Deficits and Base Claim Importance 
In Section 6.1.2, it was mentioned that assurance deficits can be scored by ranking the degree to which 
the assurance deficit sources affect the confidence of achieving the base claim that the evidence pertains 
to. In the illustration cited, Rank 1 was taken to imply a 95 to 100 percent level of confidence that the 
base claim is justified by the evidence, Rank 2 an 85 to 95 percent confidence, Rank 3 a 65 to 85 percent 
confidence, Rank 4 a 35 to 65 percent confidence, and Rank 5 a zero to 35 percent confidence. These 
high-end-weighted percentile values would likely apply for a mission with high criticality, whereas a 
more uniform distribution of percentile values (80 to 100 percent, 60 to 80 percent, etc.) would be more 
applicable for a lower criticality mission. The range of confidence percentiles corresponding to each rank 
is selected by the Acquirer. 
Because of the qualitative nature of much of the evidence, assurance deficit rankings are unavoidably 
subjective. They should be based on the combined breadth and depth of knowledge and experience 
brought by the Acquirer’s Evaluation Team. The Evaluation Team may access outside sources of 
information as appropriate to make these judgments.  
The criticality of evidence is influenced by two factors: (1) the amount of assurance deficit in the 
evidence relative to acceptance of the base claim, and (2) the importance of the base claim relative to 
acceptance of the top claim (that the system is adequately safe). 
The second of these two factors is also an item to be ranked by experts. A typical ranking scheme might 
be expressed as follow:  
 Importance Rank = 1 implies that the base claim has a very small effect on the top claim, such 
that if the base claim were not satisfied, the effect on the confidence of the top claim would be 
less than 5%. 
 Importance Rank = 2 implies that the base claim has a moderately small effect on the top claim, 
such that if the base claim were not satisfied, the effect on the confidence of the top claim would 
be around 5% to 15%. 
 Importance Rank = 3 implies that the base claim has a mediocre effect on the top claim, such that 
if the base claim were not satisfied, the effect on the confidence of the top claim would be around 
15% to 35%. 
 Importance Rank = 4 implies that the base claim has a moderately large effect on the top claim, 
such that if the base claim were not satisfied, the effect on the confidence of the top claim would 
be around 35% to 65%. 
 Importance Rank = 5 implies that the base claim has a very large effect on the top claim, such that 
if the base claim were not satisfied, the effect on the confidence of the top claim would be greater 
than 65%. 
Again, the percentile range corresponding to each rank is selected by the Acquirer. As was the case for 
the deficit ranks, the experts’ judgments on importance ranks are subjective but based on extensive 
knowledge and experience. 
The experts are aided in their assessment of base claim importance by the claims tree, which shows the 
logic by which the base claims feed into higher level claims that ultimately feed into the top claim. Part of 
the assessment involves deliberations on whether or not the claims tree accurately and completely 
captures the top-down decomposition from the top claim down to the base claims. In addition to 
providing deficit and importance rankings, therefore, the experts’ assessment should inform the Acquirer 
about the soundness of the logic in the claims tree and whether or not it is sufficiently inclusive to assess 
the confidence that the system is adequately safe. 
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7.2.5 Experts’ Estimates of Overall Confidence 
As mentioned above in Section 7.2.1, one of the responsibilities of the Acquirer (or an Evaluator 
appointed by the Acquirer) is to rate the RISC as Acceptable or Unacceptable. If a scoring scheme is used 
to accomplish this objective, the Acquirer should give the Provider direction regarding the approach prior 
to initiation of the RISC. 
There are various means for scoring a safety case by propagating assurance deficits and importance 
measures through the claims tree, but all of them are open to the criticism that there are subtle interplays 
between the various claims that are mission-specific. Thus, there is no simple method of aggregation that 
can apply to all cases. However, it is instructive to discuss a variety of simple methods that can be used as 
rough indicators for various situations but with the caveat that their limitations be understood and 
appreciated. The next several paragraphs will look at the following four simple methods of 
approximation: (1) multiplying independent confidence levels together, (2) taking the weighted average 
of the confidence levels, (3) using the minimum of the confidence levels, and (4) multiplying weighted 
confidence levels together (weighted averaging of the logarithms). An overall recommendation will 
follow the exposition on these simplified methods. 
Multiplying Independent Confidence Levels Together 
Multiplying base-claim confidence levels together to aggregate them to a higher level is mathematically 
correct only when the base claims themselves are statistically independent. Given the large number of 
base claims that will typically exist in a RISC for a system of even moderate degree of complexity, it is 
virtually impossible to conjecture that all the base claims will be independent. For example, consider the 
following two base claims: (1) The system is appropriately modeled in the ISA, and (2) The ISA 
adequately addresses safety critical items. While both claims are appropriate in a RISC, they are not 
independent because the truth of Claim (1) is dependent on the truth of Claim (2). Put another way, both 
depend to some extent on the same evidence. The same is true for the following two base claims: (3) an 
effective quality control process is in place, and (4) an effective configuration control and change 
management process is in place. Claims (3) and (4) are not independent because both quality control and 
configuration control, while they may be under separate organizations at a lower level, are under the same 
management at the top level and both depend on the organizational management culture. 
On the other hand, it is possible to estimate the confidence at the base-claim level by dividing the 
evidence that supports each base claim into independent attributes and multiplying the confidence in each 
attribute together. For example, the following three attributes for the evidence supporting a base claim can 
be considered to be independent: 
1. The “credibility” of the evidence, denoted by symbol c. This is the level of assurance that the 
models and data used are accurate and comprehensive for the context in which they are being 
used. 
2. The “applicability” of the evidence, denoted by symbol a. This is the degree to which the 
evidence is applicable to the system and mission being evaluated. 
3. The “strength” of the result, denoted by symbol s. This is the level to which the probability of loss 
is claimed to be controlled on the basis of the evidence. (For example, if the evidence 
demonstrates that a failure rate is less than 10-3, the strength of the evidence is s = 10-3.) 
Since the attributes are independent, it is possible to estimate the confidence in the base claim using the 
following equation: 
C(B) = C(c) C(a) P(s) 
where C(B) is the confidence in the base claim, C(c) is the confidence that the modeling and/or data are 
credible and comprehensive, C(a) is the confidence that the modeling and/or data are applicable, and P(s) 
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is the probability that the probability of the base claim not being true is less than s, assuming the 
modeling and/or data are credible, comprehensive, and applicable. 
It should be mentioned that multiplying confidence levels together assumes that a statement about the 
confidence level is equivalent to a statement of probability. The probabilistic interpretation of confidence 
(implied, for example, in Bayes’ theorem) has for a long time been a subject of considerable debate. 
Taking the Weighted Average of the Confidence Levels 
When there are many base claims and it is clear that they are not mutually independent, it is not 
uncommon for people to assume that the confidence in the top claim can be estimated by taking a 
weighted average of the confidence levels for the base claims. The following equation expresses this 
process: 
C(T) =  Wi C(Bi) 
where C(T) is the confidence in the top claim, and Wi is a weighting factor that in some sense represents 
the relative importance of Base Claim i in demonstrating the truth of the top claim. With insightful 
selection of the weighting factors, this process can be argued to be potentially applicable as an 
approximation only when no single base claim is essential to justify the top claim. Since the result 
(assuming that none of the weights is zero) is always higher than the minimum value of C(Bi) and lower 
than the maximum value of C(Bi), the weighted average does not allow for the possibility that any of the 
base claims could be a weak link which, if it were not true, would make the top claim not true. 
Using the Minimum of the Confidence Levels 
It is also not uncommon for people to estimate the confidence in the top claim by using the minimum 
value of the confidence levels for the base claims, as follow: 
C(T) = min [ C(Bi) ] 
This process can be applicable for trees where all of the base claims are potential weak links, such that a 
failure of any one of them to be true results in the top claim being untrue. It is commonly believed that 
taking the minimum base-claim confidence value provides a lower-bound estimate on the confidence of 
the top claim. However, this is not necessarily true. Taking the minimum implies that if the base claim 
with the lowest confidence level is untrue, it makes no difference whether any of the other base claims is 
also untrue. This may clearly be an optimistic assumption in many cases (e.g., cases for which two or 
more of the base claims are independent). 
Multiplying Weighted Confidence Levels Together (Weighted Averaging of the Logarithms)  
Still another approach is to estimate the confidence in the top claim by using a weighted average of the 
logarithms of the confidence levels for the base claims. The operative equation in this case is as follows: 
log [C(T)] =  Wi log [C(Bi)] 
Upon taking the anti-log of both sides, the result is as follows: 
C(T) =  [C(Bi)]Wi 
where the symbol  denotes the product. This form has the advantage that when all of the weights are 
equal to 1.0, the result is mathematically correct form for the case where all the base claims are 
independent. Thus, the weights Wi are a measure of the degree of independence between base claims. The 
difficulty with this approach is in knowing a priori how to select values for Wi that accurately represent 
the degree of independence of the base claim relative to the other base claims. 
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Recommendation 
In general, it is not fruitful to try to use a formulaic method for aggregating confidence levels from the 
base claims (where the evidence is) to the top claim (where the decision resides). Rather, the scoring of 
the RISC should be left to the experts and should be based on rational arguments that account for the 
uniqueness of and complex relationships within the mission. As mentioned in the preceding subsection, 
the corps of experts should include not only subject matter experts but also experts with broad experience 
and knowledge of the system as a whole and the risks that challenge the system. 
Where justified, the experts should provide not only a two-tier ranking as suggested in Section 7.2.1 
(acceptable and unacceptable), but also each expert should provide a numerical estimate of his/her 
confidence that the top claim has been demonstrated to be true (i.e., that the system is adequately safe). 
This estimate can be both subjective and rough. For example, one expert may conclude that he is 80% 
confident that the top claim has been proven true, while another may claim that she is 90% confident. 
Although the estimate is subjective, it should be backed by the expert’s rankings of assurance deficit and 
base claim importance, and it should be accompanied by a set of arguments about how his/her confidence 
of the truth of the top claim is shaped by these rankings. 
The action of providing a numerical estimate of confidence at the top claim level provides the following 
benefits:  
 Top level confidence values calculated for one system can be compared to top level confidence 
values calculated for another system to compare which system is more robust from a safety 
viewpoint. 
 The differences between the experts’ confidence values provides the decision maker (in this case 
the Acquirer) with more information about the uncertainties associated with the safety case and 
how to interpret it. 
 Inferences can be drawn from the experts’ rationale about which base claims are driving the 
overall confidence, thereby providing a basis for selecting critical safety items. 
A common challenge in expert judgment elicitation is what to do if the experts markedly differ from one 
another in their confidence assessment. A common approach when the elicitation results differ is to use 
the average of the results provided by all the experts participating in the elicitation (the so-called 
consensus approach or “delphi method”). However, the discipline of expert judgment elicitation provides 
for other possibilities, one of which is to drop the most pessimistic and optimistic responses (the outliers) 
before taking the average. There is a considerable litany of information on expert judgment elicitation that 
address questions like this [96]. 
If the experts’ individual scores are widely divergent and a consensus cannot be reached, the team should 
attempt to agree on what remedies could be instituted so that the whole team would have high confidence 
that the system is safe. This information should be conveyed from the Acquirer to the Provider so that the 
Provider understands what needs to be done to obtain a favorable consensus from the members of the 
Evaluation Team. Such a consensus would help to convince the Acquirer’s decision making authorities 
that the system successfully meets the safety requirements within the decision maker’s risk tolerance. 
7.2.6 Using Value-of-Information Methods to Analyze Options for Reducing 
Uncertainty 
In essence, a decision maker’s (DM) risk tolerance is an expression of the amount of uncertainty that the 
DM is willing to tolerate in regard to whether a safety performance requirement will be satisfied by the 
time the system becomes operational. For example, if a DM states at a particular point in time that he/she 
has a 10% risk tolerance for P(LOC) being greater than X, that means that he/she wants to be 90% 
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confident that P(LOC) will be less than or equal to X by the time of the first flight. In other words, he/she 
wants P(LOC) to be  X with less than 10% uncertainty. 
For practical purposes, DMs have three choices when told that the risk of not meeting a safety 
performance requirement exceeds their risk tolerance: 
1. They may accept the risk, which means that they increase their risk tolerance. 
2. They may mitigate the risk, which means that they accept the costs of mitigation. 
3. They may seek to reduce the uncertainty by seeking more information, which means that they 
accept the costs of obtaining the required information. 
The decision between these three choices is governed by several factors: (1) the amount of conviction 
behind the DM’s risk tolerance (or technically speaking, his/her “utility” for deviation from the stated risk 
tolerance); (2) the expected cost of mitigating the risk, (3) the likelihood that the mitigation will be 
successful; (4) the expected cost of obtaining the new information; and (5) the likelihood that the new 
information will be sufficient to reduce the uncertainty by the amount needed. Determining the trade-off 
between these factors is an optimization problem that requires tradeoffs between a combination of 
objective and subjective factors. 
Methodologically, such tradeoffs are classified as Value-of-Information (VOI) analysis. Summaries of 
VOI methodology and implementation principles are available in [97-99]. 
7.3 Documenting the Findings of the RISC Evaluation 
7.3.1 The Acquirer’s Responsibilities and Areas to Address 
The responsibilities of the Evaluator in documenting the RISC evaluation findings can be summarized as 
follows: 
 Develop and report a set of summary evaluation findings to the Decision Maker. The summary 
evaluation findings act as the primary results from the RISC evaluation process. 
 Develop and report a set of detailed evaluation findings to the Decision Maker. The detailed 
evaluation findings act as the foundational findings from the RISC evaluation. 
 At the conclusion of the RISC evaluation process, present the results of the RISC evaluation to 
the Decision Maker, in the form of a RISC Evaluation Report. 
The following topics pertaining to the RISC evaluation findings and their documentation are discussed in 
Section 7.3.2 and 7.3.3: 
 Contents of the summary and detailed RISC evaluation findings 
 Contents of the RISC Evaluation Report  
7.3.2 Contents of the Summary and Detailed RISC Evaluation Findings 
Table 7-2 and Table 7-3 provide guidance for summary evaluation findings and detailed evaluation 
findings, respectively. Because of the diverse range of programs/projects and possible RISC structures, it 
is not possible to give an exhaustive accounting of findings that will apply in all situations, but Tables 7-2 
and 7-3 provide a recommended, generic set for Acquirers to use as a starting point. 
The Summary Evaluation Findings are an overview of the more detailed evaluation process findings, 
present a simplified view of the evaluation of the RISC, and enable the Decision Maker to quickly 
comprehend the results of the RISC evaluation, especially areas of the RISC that have been found to be 
inadequate. As with other recommendations in this handbook, this set is subject to tailoring or revision in 
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a specific application; but the expectation is that the Provider should understand in advance the findings 
that will be used during the RISC evaluation process. 
7.3.3 Contents of the RISC Evaluation Report 
As with the RISC Report submitted by the Provider (see Section 6.1.6), the RISC Evaluation Report 
should contain a standard set of information to be submitted by the Evaluator to the Acquirer’s decision 
makers. The RISC Evaluation Report should include at least the following sections: 
 Executive Summary 
 Composition of the Evaluation Team 
 Description of the process employed to evaluate the Provider’s RISC  
 Description of the methodologies used to score and rate the RISC 
 RISC Evaluation Findings 
 Documentation of weaknesses, limitations, and any open issues relating to the Provider’s RISC 
The following paragraphs provide guidelines for the type of information to be included in these sections.  
 Executive Summary 
The executive summary of the RISC Evaluation Report should specify the context in which the 
RISC evaluation is performed, the review for which the report was prepared, key assumptions about the 
evaluation, and key conclusions including any open or outstanding issues. 
 Composition of the Evaluation Team 
This section should list the members of the Evaluation Team and any non-team personnel consulted, their 
roles in the evaluation process, and their qualifications.  
 Description of the Processes Employed to Evaluate the Provider’s RISC 
In this section the various processes employed to evaluate the Provider’s RISC should be discussed, 
including the following: 
 The acceptance review process for the Provider’s RISC to determine that all necessary material 
was provided 
 A description of the process used to qualitatively scope and review the methods use in the RISC  
 A description of the process used to undertake quantitative evaluations of the RISC and 
sensitivity studies, i.e., which areas of the RISC were selected for quantitative review/audit and 
why 
 The process for initiating RAIs 
 Overall RISC evaluation scoring process, e.g., number of reviewers assessing each finding, etc. 
 Description of the Methodologies Used to Score and Rate the RISC 
This section should give a description of the methodologies used by the Evaluation Team to score and 
rate the RISC, including: 
 The methodology used to score the RISC Summary Evaluation Findings and RISC Detailed 
Evaluation Findings, as mentioned in the first paragraph of this section 
 The methodology to determine the overall rating of the evaluated RISC (Acceptable or 
Unacceptable)  
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 RISC Evaluation Findings 
This section details the findings of the Evaluation Team. While this handbook mandates no specific 
format, it is recommended that the evaluation findings be presented in a tabular format; similar to the 
format presented in Tables 7-2 and 7-3. The evaluation findings should include identification of and 
rankings for the key sources of assurance deficit54.  
 Documentation of Weaknesses, Limitations, and any Open Issues Relating to the RISC 
Examples of weaknesses, limitations, and/or open issues to be discussed in this section include weak sub-
claims, sub-arguments, or evidence; unresolved issues from a previous evaluations, etc. Where 
appropriate, weaknesses, limitations, and open issues should be consistent with the assurance deficits 
identified and discussed in the RISC evaluation findings. 
                                                            
54 Key sources of assurance deficit were defined in Section 6.1.2 and discussed in Sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4. 
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Table 7-2. Guidelines for Summary Evaluation Findings 
	 	 	
	 Index	 Primary	Findings	 Secondary	Findings		 Acceptable	 Unacceptable	
	 	
0		
	
The	Risk‐Informed	
Safety	Case	is	
adequate.	
	
N/A	 	
The	RISC	provides	a	clear	case	that	the	
system	is	safe	and	is	supported	by	
sufficient,	verifiable	evidence	to	support	
this	claim.	
	
The	RISC	does	not	provide	a	clear	case	
that	the	system	is	safe	and/or	is	not	
supported	by	sufficient,	verifiable	
evidence	to	support	this	claim.	
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1.0		
	
Provider	is	Capable	of	
Designing/Building/	
Operating	System.	
	
	
N/A	
	
The	Provider	has	clearly	demonstrated	
that	they	have	the	expertise,	infrastructure	
(capital,	hardware,	supply	chain,	etc.),	and	
plans	in	place	to	successfully	
design/build/operate	system.	
	
The	Provider	has	not	demonstrated	that	
they	have	the	expertise,	infrastructure	
(capital,	hardware,	supply	chain,	etc.),	
and	plans	in	place	to	successfully	
design/build/operate	system.	
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2.0		
	
System	meets	Safety	
Performance	
Requirements.	
	
2.1	System	as	designed,	built,	or	operated,	
meets	levied	safety	performance	requirements.	
	
	
2.2	The	Provider	has	an	adequate	plan	to	
ensure	the	system	will	continue	to	meet	levied	
safety	performance	requirements.	
	
	
The	ISA	clearly	demonstrates	that	the	
system	meets	levied	safety	performance	
requirements.	
	
The	Provider’s	System	Safety	Management	
Plan	(SSMP)	clearly	demonstrates	that	the	
system	is	on	track	to	meet	levied	safety	
performance	requirements.	
	
	
The	ISA	does	not	show	that	levied	safety	
performance	requirements	are	met.	
	
	
The	SSMP	does	not	demonstrate	that	
the	system	will	continue	to	meet	levied	
safety	performance	requirements.	
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3.0	
	
Provider	Risk‐Informs	
Decisions.	
	
	
3.1	The	Provider	prioritizes	safety	during	
design/realization/operation	decision	making.	
	
	
	
	
3.2.	The	Provider	risk‐informs	safety	
requirement	allocation	decisions.	
	
	
	
	
3.3.	The	Provider	is	responsive	to	new	safety‐
relevant	information	during	system	
realization/operation/sustainment.	
	
	
The	Provider	shows	that	risk	management	
decisions	are	subject	to	clear	and	
consistent	heuristics/criteria	that	
prioritize	safety	within	cost,	schedule,	and	
technical	constraints.	
	
The	Provider	shows	that	safety	
performance	requirements	are	allocated	
into	subsystems	in	a	balanced	manner	
supported	by	appropriate	risk	analyses.	
	
	
The	Provider	shows	that	mechanisms	are	
in	place	to	identify	safety	relevant	
information	internal	and	external	to	the	
system	into	the	RM	process.	
	
		
	
The	Provider	lacks	clear	and	consistent	
decision	guidance	that	prioritizes	
safety.	
	
	
	
The	Provider	has	not	shown	that	safety	
performance	requirements	are	
allocated	into	subsystems	in	a	balanced	
manner	supported	by	appropriate	risk	
analyses.	
	
The	Provider	has	not	shown	that	
mechanisms	are	in	place	to	identify	
safety	relevant	information	internal	and	
external	to	the	system	into	the	RM	
process	
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Table 7-2. Guidelines for Summary Evaluation Findings (Cont.)	
	
4.0	
	
The	Provider	has	
Adequately	Addressed	
Unknown	and	
Underappreciated	
Risks.	
	
4.1	The	Provider	has	incorporated	safety‐
related	best	practices	and	lessons	learned	into	
system	design/realization/operation.	
	
	
4.2.	The	Provider	minimizes	the	introduction	of	
hazards	during	system	realization	and	
operation.	
	
	
The	Provider’s	SSRA	clearly	shows	the	
application	of	safety‐related	best	practices	
and	lessons	learned	that	are	relevant	to	
the	specific	system.	
	
The	Provider	clearly	demonstrates	the	
application	of	QA,	configuration	
management,	and	other	safety	
management	best	practices	during	system	
realization	and	operation.	
		
	
The	Provider	has	not	shown	the	
application	of	safety‐related	best	
practices	and	lessons	learned	that	are	
relevant	to	the	specific	system.	
	
The	Provider	has	not	shown	the	
application	of	QA,	configuration	
management,	and	other	safety	
management	best	practices	during	
system	realization	and	operation.	
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5.0	
	
The	Provider	Complies	
with	Safety‐Related	
Engineering	and	
Process	Requirements.	
	
5.1	System	as	designed,	built,	or	operated,	
meets	levied	safety‐related	engineering	and	
process	requirements.	
	
	
5.2	The	Provider	has	an	adequate	plan	to	
ensure	the	system	will	continue	to	meet	levied	
safety‐related	engineering	and	process	
requirements.	
	
	
The	requirements	verification	process	
clearly	demonstrates	that	the	system	
meets	levied	safety‐related	engineering	
and	process	requirements.	
	
The	Provider’s	SSMP	clearly	demonstrates	
that	the	system	will	continue	to	meet	
levied	safety‐related	engineering	and	
process	requirements.	
	
	
The	requirements	verification	process	
does	not	show	that	the	system	meets	
levied	safety‐related	engineering	and	
process	requirements.	
	
The	Provider’s	SSMP	does	not	show	that	
the	system	will	continue	to	meet	levied	
safety‐related	engineering	and	process	
requirements.	
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Table 7-3. Guidelines for Detailed Evaluation Findings 
	
1.0	The	Provider	is	institutionally	capable	of	providing	the	desired	system/service	(cross‐cutting	claim)	
	
	
Index	 Findings	 Related	Evaluation	Objectives	 Typical	Evidence	from	Provider	 Common	Assurance	Deficits	
	
1.1	
	
Provider	has	sufficiently	
qualified	personnel	conducting	
safety‐related	activities.	
	
Verify	that	Provider‐conducted	system	safety	activities	are	
performed	by	qualified	personnel.	
	
	
	
Personnel	resumes,	training	
programs,	etc.	
	
Inadequately	qualified	or	trained	
personnel,	lack	of	employer	
provided	training	
	
1.2	
	
Provider	is	able	to	sustain	
design/realization/operational	
support	for	the	required	
duration.	
	
	
Verify	that	the	Provider	organization	has	the	capability	to	provide	
appropriate	support	for	the	duration	of	the	acquisition.	
	
History	of	organization,	past	
performance	on	similar	scale	
projects,	training	programs,	etc.	
	
Lack	of	success	on	similar	types	
of	programs/projects,	little	
operating	history,	no	past	
experience	with	
program/projects	of	similar	scale	
		
	
2.0	The	System	Meets	Safety	Performance	Requirements	
	
	
2.1	The	system	as	designed,	built,	or	operated,	meets	all	safety	performance	requirements	
	
Index	 Findings	 Related	Evaluation	Objectives	 Typical	Evidence	from	Provider	 Common	Assurance	Deficits	
	
2.1.1		
	
The	Provider	demonstrates	
that	the	system	as	designed,	
built,	or	operated,	meets	
safety	performance	
requirements.	
	
	
1.	Verify	that	analysis	methods	are	appropriate	to:		
‐	The	specifics	of	the	system	
‐	The	point	in	the	life	cycle	at	which	the	analysis	is	being	conducted	
(i.e.,	maturity	of	the	system	design,	realization,	or	operation)	
‐	The	project	category	(refer	to	NPR	7120.5)	
‐	The	risk	classification	
	
2.	Verify	that	the	identified	scenarios	meet	expectations	of	
comprehensiveness,	considering:	
‐	System	design	(e.g.,	internal	hazards,	external	hazards,	system	
complexity)	
‐	Mishap	history	of	similar	systems	
‐	Operational	loads	on	the	system	
‐	Possible	subsystem	interactions	
‐	Extent	of	application	of	deterministic	standards	(which	
potentially	remove	issues	from	analytic	consideration	by	virtue	of	
overwhelming	margin)	
	
	
	
	
	
All	analysis	methods	used	in	the	ISA	
(e.g.,	hazard	analysis,	FMEA,	HAZOP,	
PRA,	statistical	analyses	of	
comparative	systems	or	subsystems,	
physics‐based	modeling,	analysis	of	
test	results,	etc.)	
	
Scenarios	identified	from	and	
analyzed	in	the	ISA	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Analysis	method	used	is	
inappropriate	for	the	specifics	of	
the	systems	or	the	point	in	the	
life	cycle	at	which	the	analysis	is	
being	made.	
	
	
Scenarios	are	not	sufficiently	
comprehensive.		
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3.	Verify	that	models	are	consistent	with	the	requirements	of	NASA‐
STD‐7009	Standard	for	Models	and	Simulation,	and	that	their	
credibility	is	acceptable.	
	
4.	Verify	that	numerical	values	and	uncertainties	are	reasonable	(i.e.,	
check	for	indefensibly	low	numbers,	missing	common	cause	
dependencies,	unsubstantiated	crediting	of	functionality,	narrow	
uncertainty	ranges,	etc.).	
 
 
 
5.	Verifying	that	modeled	safety	performance	measures	are	not	
unduly	sensitive	to	analysis	assumptions	(i.e.,	by	performing	targeted	
sensitivity	analyses).	
	
6.	Verify	that	safety‐critical	items	have	been	properly	identified,	i.e.,	
at	a	minimum,	that	the	explicit	and	implicit	safety	functions	
documented	in	the	ISA	are	designated	as	safety‐critical.	
	
	
	
7.	Verify	compliance	with	all	requirements	derived	from	the	safety	
performance	requirements	(e.g.,	safety‐related	engineering	
requirements	imposed	on	safety‐critical	items).	
	
8.	Verify	compliance	with	all	safety	performance	requirements	
according	to	established	verification	protocols	(analysis	protocols,	
confidence	levels,	etc.).	
	
	
The	analytic	models,	and/or	
documentation	of	the	models,	data	
and	methodologies	used	
	
ISA	analysis	results	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
ISA	analysis	results	
	
	
	
ISA	analysis	results,	safety‐critical	
items	lists	
	
	
	
	
Requirements	database,	
requirements	verification	matrix	
	
	
ISA	analysis	results	
	
Models	are	not	sufficiently	
documented	or	do	not	comply	
with	NASA‐STD‐7009.	
	
Analyses	over‐credit	new	
technology,	lack	bounding	
analysis	to	“sanity”	check	results,	
use	data	from	significantly	
different	systems,	or	use	
inappropriate	mathematical,	
numerical,	or	statistical	methods.	
	
Sensitivity	of	safety	performance	
results	to	credible	regions	of	the	
parameter	space	
	
Items	relied	on	for	safety	but	not	
explicitly	credited	in	the	ISA	(e.g.,	
due	to	assumed	high	reliability)	
are	not	identified	as	safety‐
critical.	
	
Unverified	requirements,	
inadequate	adherence	to	
verification	procedures	
	
Analysis	result	does	not	meet	
safety	performance	requirement,	
or	does	not	adequately	address	
the	verification	protocol	
associated	with	it.	
	
	
2.2	The	Provider	has	an	adequate	plan	to	ensure	that	the	system	will	continue	to	meet	levied	safety	performance	requirements	during	realization	and/or	operation	
	
Index	 Findings	 Related	Evaluation	Objectives	 Typical	Evidence	from	Provider	 Common	Assurance	Deficits	
	
2.2.1	
	
System	safety	performance	
will	be	adequately	maintained.	
	
	
1.	Verify	that	safety‐critical	item	capability,	reliability,	and	
availability	are	maintained	at	levels	consistent	with	their	assessed	
performance	in	the	ISA.	
	
	
	
	
	
Appropriate	safety‐related	
engineering	requirements	
	
Appropriate	safety‐related	process	
requirements	(surveillance,	testing,	
maintenance,	etc.)	
	
	
	
	
Plans	and	processes	do	not	
adequately	demonstrate	that	
system	safety	performance	will	
be	adequately	maintained;	lack	
of	adherence	to	standards;	
inadequate	surveillance	activities	
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2.2.2	
	
The	ISA	will	be	adequately	
maintained.	
	
1.	Verify	that	a	process	is	in	place	to	update	the	ISA	in	light	of	
operating	and	test	experience	(e.g.,	anomaly	resolution/precursor	
analysis).	
	
	
	
2.	Verify	that	the	ISA	is	updated	as	appropriate	to	reflect	risk	
scenarios	identified	by	the	CRM	process.	
	
3.	Verify	that	the	ISA	is	updated	to	reflect	system	design	and	
operation	changes.	
	
4.	Verify	that	the	ISA	is	updated	to	address	any	identified	potential	
inadequacies	in	the	ISA.	
	
	
ISA	Development	Plan	and	
Roadmap;	appropriate	safety‐
related	process	requirements	(e.g.,	
Accident	Precursor	Analysis	process	
requirements)	
	
Updated	ISA;	RM	process	
requirements	
	
Updated	ISA;	configuration	
management	process	requirements	
	
Updated	ISA	
	
Poorly	documented	process	for	
updating	ISA,	or	ISA	is	not	
updated	
	
	
	
“	”	
	
	
“	“	
	
	
“	“	
	
	
2.2.3	
	
System	safety	performance	
will	be	improved	consistent	
with	safety	growth	
requirements	(i.e.,	from	
threshold	to	goal).	
	
	
1.	Verify	that	an	adequate	program	of	continuous	safety	
improvement	is	being	implemented	at	a	level	of	effort/commitment	
consistent	with	safety	growth	requirements,	e.g.,	safety	
performance	projections	are	consistent	with	safety	growth	
requirements.	
	
	
Safety	improvement	process	
requirements	
	
Inadequate	staffing/funding;	
inadequate	linkage	of	safety	
improvement	activities	to	safety	
goals	
	
3.0	The	Provider	Risk‐Informs	Decisions	
	
	
3.1	The	Provider	prioritizes	safety	during	design/realization/operation	decision	making	
	
Index	 Findings	 Related	Evaluation	Objectives	 Typical	Evidence	from	Provider	 Common	Assurance	Deficits	
	
3.1.1	
	
An	effective	RIDM	process	has	
been	(and	continues	to	be)	used	
to	identify	and	analyze	credible	
decision	alternatives.	
	
	
1.	Verify	that	decision	alternatives	include	a	comprehensive	set	of	
safety‐promoting	options,	e.g.:	
‐	Margin	
‐	Simplicity	
‐	Testing	
‐	Technology	maturation	
‐	Use	of	proven	technology	
‐	Automation	over	human‐in‐the‐loop	
‐	Inhibits	
‐	Fault	management	(redundancy,	defense	in	depth,	contingency,	
etc.)	
	
2.	Verify	the	adequacy	of	the	ISA	to	characterize	the	safety	
performance	of	each	alternative	for	decision	making	purposes.	
	
	
	
	
	
ISA,	RISRs,	RMP,	SSMP;	RM	process	
requirements	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
“	”	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Consideration/analysis	of	only	a	
narrow	set	of	alternatives		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Inconsistency	in	assumptions	
and/or	analysis	methods	across	
the	alternatives	space;	graded	
approach	to	analysis	not	used	to	
focus	on	concerns	that	are	
determinative	
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3.	Verify	that	the	ISA	is	being	used	to	characterize	the	safety	
performance	of	each	decision	alternative,	across	all	safety	
performance	measures.	
	
	
4.	Verify	that	relevant	safety	performance	information	is	
communicated	to	decision	makers	in	a	timely	and	effective	manner.	
	
	
“	“	
	
	
	
	
“	“	
	
ISA	not	used	for	early	direction‐
setting	decisions;	ISA	is	not	
integrated	into	day‐to‐day	
systems	engineering.	
	
Lack	of	standardized	and	
understood	communication	aids;	
system	safety	information	lags	
behind	systems	engineering	
decisions.	
	
	
3.1.2	
	
Decisions		made	are	in	the	
interests	of	safety	performance,	
within	technical,	cost,	and	
schedule	constraints.	
	
1.	Verify	that	decision	rationales	are	documented	to	a	level	
appropriate	to	the	significance	of	the	decision.	
	
	
2.	Verify	that	safety	adequately	drives	decision	making,	as	
documented	in	the	decision	rationales.	
	
	
ISA,	RISRs,	RMP,	SSMP;	RM	process	
requirements	
	
	
“	“	
	
Inadequate	documentation	of	
rationale;	decisions	driven	by	
management	pressure	
	
“	“	
	
3.2	The	Provider	risk‐informs	safety	requirement	allocation	decisions	
	
Index	 Findings	 Related	Evaluation	Objectives	 Typical	Evidence	from	Provider	 Common	Assurance	Deficits	
	
3.2.1	
	
The	Provider	risk‐informs	
safety	requirement	allocation	
decisions.	
	
1.	Verify	that	a	process	is	in	place	that	assures	that	the	ability	of	
subordinate	organizations	to	meet	allocated	safety	requirements	is	
consistent	with	the	safety	performance	risk	tolerances	of	the	
allocating	organization.	
	
	
ISA,	RMP,	SSMP;	RM	process	
requirements	
	
ISA	not	used	to	allocate	safety	
requirements;	lack	of	margin	
over	and	above	ISA	results	to	
account	for	UU	hazards	
	
3.3	The	Provider	is	responsive	to	new	safety‐relevant	information	during	system	realization/operation/sustainment	
	
Index	 Findings	 Related	Evaluation	Objectives	 Typical	Evidence	from	Provider	 Common	Assurance	Deficits	
	
3.3.1	
	
The	Provider	actively	seeks	
safety‐relevant	information	
from	the	system.	
	
	
1.	Verify	that	a	test	program	actively	seeks	to	improve	safety	(e.g.,	
testing	is	risk‐informed).	
	
	
	
2.	Verify	that	the	system	is	instrumented/monitored/inspected	
adequately	to	reveal	safety‐relevant	information.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Test	plans	and	process	
documentation	
	
	
	
Design	specs,	ISA	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Poorly	documented	test	plans,	or	
test	program	does	not	
adequately	seek	to	improve	
safety.	
	
ISA	not	used	to	risk‐inform	
instrumentation/monitoring	
decisions;	opportunities	to	
instrument/monitor	against	UU	
hazards	are	not	taken.	
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3.	Verify	that	a	process	is	in	place	that	responds	effectively	to	safety‐
relevant	test	and	operation	information,	e.g.,	anomaly	
resolution/precursor	analysis.	
	
	
4.	Verify	that	an	effective	CRM	process	is	in	place	(per	NPR	8000.4A	
and	the	NASA	RM	Handbook).	
	
	
Safety	analysis;	appropriate	safety‐
related	process	requirements	(e.g.,	
Accident	Precursor	Analysis	
process	requirements	
	
RMP,	RM	process	requirements.	
	
	
	
Process	is	beholden	to	schedule		
pressure;	normalization	of	
deviance	
	
	
RM	disconnected	from	SE	
	
	
	
3.3.2	
	
Provider	actively	seeks	safety‐
relevant	information	from	
sources	external	to	the	system.	
	
	
1.	Provider	is	responsive	to	safety‐relevant	information	from	
industry	sources,	e.g.,	Government‐Industry	Data	Exchange	
Program	(GIDEP).	
	
2.	Provider	is	responsive	to	safety‐relevant	technology	
developments.	
	
	
Documentation	of	active	program	
to	seek	out	and	utilize	safety‐
relevant	information	from	external	
sources;	appropriate	safety‐related	
process	requirements	
	
Lack	of	documented	program,	or	
poorly	documented	program,	to	
seek	out	and	utilize	safety‐
relevant	information	from	
external	sources	
	
4.0	Provider	has	Adequately	Addressed	Unknown	and	Underappreciated	Scenarios	
	
	
4.1	The	Provider	has	incorporated	safety‐related	best	practices	and	lessons	learned	into	system	design/realization/operation	
	
Index	 Findings	 Related	Evaluation	Objectives	 Typical	Evidence	from	Provider	 Common	Assurance	Deficits	
	
4.1.1	
	
Provider	incorporates	safety‐
related	best	practices	and	
lessons‐learned	into	system	
design/realization/operation.	
	
1.	Verify	that	decision	alternatives	include	a	comprehensive	set	of	
safety‐related	best	practices,	e.g.:	
‐	Margin	
‐	Simplicity	
‐	Testing	
‐	Technology	maturation	
‐	Use	of	proven	technology	
‐	Automation	over	human‐in‐the‐loop	
‐	Inhibits	
‐	Fault	management	(redundancy,	defense	in	depth,	contingency,	etc.)	
	
	
2.	Verify	that	the	ability	of	each	decision	alternative	to	address	
unknown	and	underappreciated	sources	of	safety	risk	is	considered	
and	communicated	to	decision	makers	in	a	timely	and	effective	
manner.	
	
	
3.	Verify	that	there	is	a	process	to	identify	safety‐critical	items	and	
preserve	their	safety	function	during	operation/sustainment,	e.g.,	via:	
‐	Appropriate	deterministic	standards,	e.g.,	engineering	standards		
‐	Appropriate	surveillance,	testing,	maintenance,	etc.	
	
	
Documentation	showing	a	
comprehensive	review	and	
application	of	relevant	best	
practices	throughout	the	system;	
associated	safety‐related	
engineering	and	process	
requirements	
	
	
	
	
	
Documentation	of	process	used	
to	consider	and	communicate	UU	
risks	to	decision	makers	(e.g.,	
technical	bases	for	deliberation)	
	
	
ISA,	safety‐critical	items	lists,	
appropriate	safety‐related	
engineering	and	process	
requirements	
	
	
Poorly	documented,	or	
incomplete	review	of	best	
practices;	inadequate	adoption	of	
identified	best	practices	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Poorly	documented,	or	
inadequate	processes	for	
communicating	the	ability	of	the	
decision	alternative	to	address	
UU	safety	risks	
	
Safety‐significant	assumptions	
are	made	in	the	ISA	that	are	not	
translated	into	SCIs	(e.g.,	the	
functioning	of	a	component	
whose	high	reliability	depends	
on	effective	safety	management).	
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4.2	The	Provider	has	minimized	the	introduction	of	hazards	during	system	realization	and	operation	
	
	
4.2.1	
	
The	Provider	has	minimized	the	
introduction	of	hazards	during	
system	realization	and	
operation.	
	
	
1.	Verify	that	effective	quality	assurance	(QA)	processes	are	in	place,	
e.g.:	
‐	Qualification	testing	
‐	Process	inspections	
‐	Acceptance	testing	
	
2.	Verify	that	effective	configuration	control	(CC)	and	data	
management	are	in	place.	
	
	
QA	plans	and	process	
documentation;	associated	safety‐
related	process	requirements	
	
	
	
Documentation	of	CC	and	data	
management	processes,	protocols,	
and	system;	documentation	of	
compliance	with	process	standards	
such	as	ISO	9000,	CMMI,	etc.	
	
	
Inadequate	QA	plans	and	
processes		
	
	
	
	
CC	processes	are	inadequate,	
poorly	documented,	or	not	
followed;	lack	of	compliance	with	
industry	standards	such	as	ISO	
9000	or	CMMI	
	
5.0	The	Provider	Complies	with	Safety‐Related	Engineering	and	Process	Requirements	
	
	 	 	 	 	
Index	 Findings	 Related	Evaluation	Objectives	 Typical	Evidence	from	Provider	 Common	Assurance	Deficits	
	
5.0	
	
The	Provider	Complies	with	
Safety‐Related	Engineering	
Requirements.	
	
	
1.	Verification	audit	of	selected	safety‐related	engineering	
requirements	
	
Verification	matrices	
	
Unverified	requirements;	
inadequate	adherence	to	
verification	procedures	
	
	
5.1	
	
The	Provider	Complies	with	
Safety‐Related	Process	
Requirements.	
	
	
1.	Verification	audit	of	selected	safety‐related	process	requirements	
	
SSMP,	RMP,	RM	Process	
requirements	
	
Disconnect	between	processes	as	
documented	and	processes	as	
implemented	
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7.4 Example for Chapter 7 – RISC Evaluation for New Technology on a Robotic 
System (Electric Ion Thruster) 
This section continues the example developed in Section 6.6. The RISC presented in that section 
pertained to the life expectancy of the ion electric thrusters that are to be used as part of a robotic 
interplanetary exploration system. Section 6.6 provided a statement of the problem, presented a safety 
claims tree, identified the sources of evidence, and discussed suppositions, assumptions, and contexts 
associated with the mission and the evidence needed to substantiate the RISC. This section identifies the 
sources of assurance deficit in that evidence, addresses the ranking of those assurance deficits, and 
discusses the experts’ estimates of confidence that the risk of premature wearout is sufficiently low. 
7.4.1 Identification and Analysis of Assurance Deficit Sources 
Based on the information provided in Section 6.6, an analysis has been performed to identify the potential 
sources of assurance deficit for the example, and to rank them in terms of their potential effect on the 
confidence that the electric thrusters will last for their intended lifetime. Table 7-4 illustrates what the 
results of such an analysis might look like. 
7.4.2 Experts’ Assessment of Overall Confidence 
Having developed the information in Table 7-4, each expert is now asked to provide his/her overall 
estimate of confidence that the electric ion thrusters will meet their lifetime requirements before wearing 
out. Example estimates are as follows: 
• Experts 1 and 2 believe that the overall confidence ranking should be around 90%. They reason 
that the analyses employ a large amount of conservatism and the design margins for the thrusters 
are large. The fact that the models have not been validated in real world conditions for the actual 
hardware is compensated by the fact that the amount of testing on analogous hardware in a 
variety of environments is rather extensive. 
• Expert 3 believes the overall confidence ranking should be around 50%. He believes that a higher 
confidence ranking would not be justified until there is operational data in environments that 
stress the system to its maximum. He believes that while there is some redundancy from the fact 
that there are more ion thrusters than needed to meet the minimum success criterion, the 
protection against wearout failures would be greater if some of the redundant thrusters were 
normally kept in a standby mode. The current design calls for all of them to be active.
Furthermore, he believes that wearout data from operational military fighter aircraft should have 
been considered to provide perspective on the likelihood of UU wearout failure modes. 
7.4.3 Request for Additional Information 
Because of the concerns of Expert 3, an RAI is issued asking the Provider to explore the following 
possibilities and obtain the following additional evidence: 
 Perform tests at beyond-design-basis environmental conditions to explore the possibility of 
unknown nascent wearout failure modes. 
 Determine the feasibility of keeping redundant thrusters in standby mode during normal 
operation and isolating them from the active thrusters. 
 Explore whether wearout experience from military fighter aircraft operation is relevant to the 
determination of margins to prevent UU wearout failure modes in ion thrusters. 
The response to this RAI will enable the Evaluation Team to form a consensus on whether the system is 
adequately protected from wearout failure. 
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Table 7-4. Example Analysis of Assurance Deficits Affecting Confidence in Long-Term Thruster Operation. 
Item	 Source	of	Assurance	Deficit Hypothetical	
Ranking	
Rationale	
1	 The	testing	time	for	individual	thrusters
may	not	have	been	sufficiently	long	to	
establish	that	there	are	no	unexpected	
wearout	failure	modes	that	could	occur	
toward	the	end	of	life.	
2 Bounding	analysis	using	
Weibull	maximum	likelihood	
estimation	indicates	
likelihood	to	be	less	than	
0.20.
2	 The	number	of	life	tests	may	not	have	
been	sufficiently	large	to	rule	out	the	
possibility	of	a	wearout	failure	mode	not	
having	been	observed	due	to	the	luck	of	
the	draw.	
2 Binomial statistical	analysis	
indicates	probability	to	be	
10%	at	a	95%	confidence	
level.	
3	 The	environments	for	life	testing	may	
not	have	simulated	the	environments	
that	will	be	seen	during	actual	operation	
closely	enough	(e.g.,	the	combination	of	
zero‐gravity,	vacuum,	radiation,	and	
orientation	of	the	thrusters	to	the	
direction	of	acceleration).	
3 Based	on	expert	judgment	
elicitation	considering	the	
results	of	testing	on	similar	
systems	and	components	in	a	
variety	of	environments	
4	 The	item	may	not	have	been	life‐tested	
at	conditions	beyond	the	design	basis	
environments	to	establish	its	robustness	
in	the	event	of	abnormal/unexpected	
environments.	
2 Based	on	expert	judgment	
elicitation	considering	the	
historical	record	concerning	
occurrences	of	unanticipated	
environments	and	the	
amount	of	margin	in	the	
thruster	design	
5	 The	testing	in	the	full‐up	system	
configuration	may	not	have	covered	the	
full	range	of	operational	time	and	
environments.	
3 Based	on	expert	judgment	
elicitation	considering	the	
historical	record	concerning	
occurrences	of	unexpected	
interactions	
6	 Some	relevant	sources	of	wearout	data
many	not	have	been	examined	and	
included	in	the	analysis	where	relevant.
3 Wearout	data	for	DoD	
military	systems	have	not	
been	examined.	
7	 Impingement	of	erosion	products	on	
other	subsystems	may	cause	adverse	
cross‐system	effects.	
2 Significant	grid	erosion	would	
lead	to	ion	thruster	failure	
before	failure	of	other	
subsystems.	
8	 Control	logic	errors	may	cause	
deleterious	cycling	of	the	ion	thrusters.
2 The	control	logic	has	been	
tested	thoroughly.	
9	 Margins	on	environmental	and	design	
parameters	are	insufficient.	
2 Experts	agree	that	the	
margins	are	reasonable	and	
sufficient.
10	 Redundant	ion	thrusters	intended	for	
failure	tolerance	may	be	subject	to	
wearout	if	used	actively	during	the	
mission	or	collocated	with	active	
thrusters.	
4 All	of	the	thrusters	are	active	
during	the	mission	and	are	
collocated.	
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Table 7-4 (Cont.). Example Analysis of Assurance Deficits Affecting Confidence in Long-Term Thruster 
Operation. 
Item	 Source	of	Assurance	Deficit Hypothetical	
Ranking
Rationale	
11	 The	failure	models	for	electron	back‐
streaming	due	to	accelerator	grid	
erosion	and	the	failure	rate	statistical	
models	in	general	may	not	successfully	
satisfy	the	M&S	Standard	verification	
criteria.	
1 The	tools	have	been	verified	
to	be	free	of	error.	
12	 The	failure	models	for	electron	back‐
streaming	and	the	failure	rate	
statistical	models	in	general	may	not	
successfully	satisfy	the	M&S	Standard	
validation	criteria.	
3 Cannot	validate	completely	
because	there	is	no	real	
world	or	experimental	data	
leading	to	failure	for	the	
present	hardware.	
13	 The	failure	models	for	electron	back‐
streaming	and	the	failure	rate	
statistical	models	in	general	may	not	
successfully	satisfy	the	M&S	Standard	
criteria	for	people	qualifications	or	for	
management	oversight.	
1 The	analysts	have	adequate	
experience	with	failure	
analysis	and	the	use	of	these	
tools,	and	the	management	
oversight	is	sound.	
14	 The	failure	models	for	electron	back‐
streaming	may	not	successfully	satisfy	
the	M&S	Standard	criteria	for	input	
pedigree,	results	uncertainty,	and	
results	robustness.	
2 The	input	data	agree	well	
with	real	world	data,	the	
uncertainty	that	these	
calculations	are	bounding	is	
very	small,	and	the	
sensitivity	of	the	results	to	
parameter	variations	has	
been	well	established.	
15	 The	failure	models	for	electron	back‐
streaming	may	not	successfully	satisfy	
the	M&S	Standard	criteria	for	use	
history.	
3 The	models	have	been	used	
many	times	but	not	for	the	
same	or	similar	applications.	
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7.5 Generic RISC Evaluation Tree 
This section presents an overview of a generic evaluation tree that the Acquirer’s Evaluation Team can 
use to rate their confidence in the Provider’s RISC. The evaluation tree in this section has the same form 
as a safety claims tree that a Provider might produce, but the claims on it are more generic and not 
specific to a particular program or project. The intent is to facilitate the Evaluator’s task of determining 
where there may be gaps in the logic of the Provider’s RISC or where there may be significant assurance 
deficits in the evidence presented by the Provider. 
In addition to being an aid to the Evaluator, the generic RISC evaluation tree in this section could serve as 
a starting point for the Provider in developing a system safety claims tree for the system that the Provider 
is developing. If the Provider were to use this tree as a starting point, some tailoring of the tree would 
probably be necessary to make it specifically applicable to the Provider’s system and suitable to the 
Provider’s needs. 
The Evaluation Tree uses a Goal Structuring Network (GSN) format, for which the relevant symbology is 
summarized in Figure 7-2. The Evaluation Tree itself is presented in Figures 7-3 through 7-15. 
The following paragraphs provide a brief verbal summary of the tree. 
The Overall Safety Argument for the System 
The overall safety argument for the system (Figure 7-3) follows the top-level safety objectives from the 
operational objectives hierarchy presented earlier in Figure 3-2, specifically demonstrating that the system 
is safe through providing argument and evidence that:  
1) “The system meets the minimum tolerable level of safety for known risks and will continue to do 
so” (G1), and 
2) “The system is (and will continue to be) As Safe as Reasonably Practicable” (G2). 
These top-level claims are then decomposed further to the point that evidence for their truth can be 
provided. 
Claim G1: The System Meets the Minimum Tolerable Level of Safety 
Figure 7-4 sets out the arguments and evidence that Claim G1 is met. The arguments for satisfaction of 
Claim G1 include:  
1) The ISA demonstrates that the system meets all relevant safety performance requirements (G1.1). 
2) The SSMP demonstrates that the system will continue to meet the minimum tolerable level of 
safety in the future (G1.2). 
Sub-Claim G1.1: The ISA demonstrates that the system meets all relevant safety performance 
requirements 
The arguments leading from sub-claim G1.1 down to the level where evidence is expected are presented 
in Figures 7-5 through 7-7. The base claims that eventually flow down from G1.1 in this set of figures are 
listed below: 
1) ISA results show that system safety performance is within levied safety performance 
requirements (G1.1.1). 
2) The system is correctly modeled in the ISA (G1.1.2.1). 
3) The ISA is scenario-based and adequately accounts for all credible failure scenarios (G1.1.2.2). 
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4) The ISA is appropriately scoped (G1.1.2.3). 
5) The tools and techniques used in the ISA are appropriate to the life-cycle phase of the system 
(G1.1.2.4). 
6) Uncertainty and sensitivities have been adequately addressed in the ISA (G1.1.2.5). 
7) The ISA is consistent with analysis procedures (G1.1.2.6). 
8) The ISA adequately addresses Safety Critical Items (G1.1.2.7). 
9) The ISA is consistent with applicable safety-related test results (G1.1.2.8). 
10) All derived safety-related engineering requirements are met (G1.1.4). 
NOTE: The next group of base claims (#11 through #22) descends from intermediate goal G1.1.2.8: ISA 
is consistent with applicable safety-related test results.  
11) The system meets safety-related test requirements (G1.1.2.8.1.1). 
12) Techniques used to analyze and report test results are correct and applied appropriately 
(G1.1.2.8.2.1). 
13) Tests are appropriate to the life-cycle phase of the system (G1.1.2.8.2.2). 
14) Tests have been designed to test, as closely as possible, the actual operating environment, 
including extremes of the performance envelope and off-nominal situations (G1.1.2.8.2.3). 
15) Testing is appropriately scoped (G1.1.2.8.2.4). 
16) Uncertainty and sensitivities have been adequately addressed in the test results (G1.1.2.8.2.5). 
17) Test results are up-to-date, and for the current version of the system (G1.1.2.8.3.1). 
18) Tests have been adequately documented (G1.1.2.8.3.2). 
19) Models and simulations used to analyze test results adhere to the NASA Modeling and 
Simulation Standard (NASA-STD-7009) (G1.1.2.8.3.3) 
20) An effective Configuration and Change Management process is in place for test results 
(G1.1.2.8.3.4). 
21) Tests have been performed by appropriately qualified personnel (G1.1.2.8.3.5). 
22) Bounding analyses using historical and similar systems are consistent with the safety performance 
claims derived via testing (G1.1.2.8.3.6). 
NOTE: The next group of base claims (#23 through #28) descends from intermediate strategy S1.1.3: 
Argue that the ISA has been performed properly and is trustworthy.  
23) The ISA is current and accurately represents the system (G1.1.3.1). 
24) The ISA has been adequately documented (G1.1.3.2). 
25) Models and simulations used in the ISA adhere to the NASA Modeling and Simulation Standard 
(NASA-STD-7009) (G1.1.3.3). 
26) An effective Configuration and Change Management process is in place for the ISA (G1.1.3.4). 
27) The ISA has been performed by appropriately qualified personnel (G1.1.3.5). 
28) Bounding analyses using historical and similar systems are consistent with the safety performance 
claims (G1.1.3.6). 
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Sub-Claim G1.2: The SSMP demonstrates that the system will continue to meet all relevant safety 
performance requirements in the future 
The arguments leading from sub-claim G1.2 down to the level where evidence is expected are presented 
in Figures 7-8 and 7-9. The evidence is expected to address the following base claims: 
1) The SSMP provides the link between baselined safety requirements and system safety activities 
(G1.2.1.1). 
2) The SSMP adequately details the specific actions and arrangements required to operate the 
System Safety Program and defines system safety milestones for the project (G1.2.1.2). 
3) The SSMP has been adequately reviewed and updated regularly throughout the current life-cycle 
phase (G1.2.1.3). 
4) The SSMP adequately delineates the framework for the Provider’s organization to direct and 
control its safety management activities, including the organizational structure, processes, 
procedures, techniques, and methodologies (G1.2.1.4). 
5) The SSMP describes, in appropriate detail, plans for development of the RISC for each major 
milestone review (G1.2.1.5). 
6) The SSMP adequately addresses the activities necessary to ensure safety throughout the system 
life cycle (G1.2.1.6). 
7) The SSMP is current and accurately represents the system (G1.2.2.1). 
8) The SSMP has been adequately documented (G1.2.2.2). 
9) An effective Configuration and Change Management process is in place for the SSMP (G1.2.2.3). 
10) The SSMP has been performed by appropriately qualified personnel (G1.2.2.4). 
Claim G2: The System is ASARP (As Safe as Reasonably Practicable) 
Figure 7-10 sets out the arguments and evidence that Claim G2 is met. The arguments for satisfaction of 
Claim G2 include: 
1) Best practices and lessons learned have been incorporated into the system (G2.1). 
2) The introduction of hazards has been minimized (G2.2). 
3) Safety has been prioritized during decision making (G2.3). 
4) Safety requirements have been risk-informed (G2.4). 
5) New safety-related information is adequately addressed (G2.5). 
6) Organization functions effectively and prioritizes safety (G2.6). 
The arguments leading from claim G2 down to the level where evidence is expected are presented in 
Figures 7-11 through 7-15. The evidence is expected to address the following base claims: 
1) Decision alternatives include a comprehensive set of safety-related best practices (G2.1.1). 
2) A process is in place to ensure that lessons learned are effectively incorporated into the system 
(G2.1.2). 
3) A process is in place to actively seek and respond to safety-relevant information from the system 
(G2.5.1). 
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4) A process is in place to actively seek and respond to safety-relevant information from sources 
external to the system (G2.5.2). 
5) Design complexity has been minimized (G2.2.1). 
6) An effective quality control process is in place (G2.2.2). 
7) An effective configuration control and change management process is in place (G2.2.3). 
8) A process is in place to effectively monitor and manage SCIs (G2.2.4). 
9) A system is in place to monitor, report, and correct anomalies and precursors (G2.2.5). 
10) An effective CRM process is in place (G2.2.6). 
11) Plans have been correctly implemented and adhered to (G2.2.7). 
12) An adequate roadmap for achieving safety performance during the remainder of the life cycle is 
in place (G2.2.8). 
13) The design is kept within the validated domain (G2.2.9). 
14) Budgets and schedules are realistic (G2.2.10). 
15) An effective RIDM process is used to identify and analyze credible decision alternatives (G2.3.1). 
16) Decisions made are in the interests of safety performance, within technical, cost, and schedule 
constraints (G2.3.2). 
NOTE: The next several claims (#17 through #22) pertain to the risk of not satisfying derived and 
allocated requirements. The evidence presented to support the claims associated with integrated analysis 
will include including engineering studies, detailed probabilistic safety analyses, test data, etc., that are 
part of the ISA. The evidence for demonstrating adequate margins for these types of claims associated 
with derived requirements will include similarity analyses, applicable and tailored best practices and 
lessons learned from relevant systems, and analyses of historical systems contained in the ISA. The 
evidence for demonstrating adequate assessment of the risk of qualitative or process related requirements 
will include the SSMP, the RM Plan, and RM process requirements. 
17) Integrated analysis has been used to assess the known risks associated with derived requirements 
(G2.4.1.1). 
18) Sufficient margin has been included in the derived requirements to account for UU risks 
(G2.4.1.2). 
19) A process is in place to adequately assess the risk of qualitative or process related derived 
requirements (G2.4.1.3). 
20) Integrated analysis has been used to assess the known risks associated with allocated 
requirements (G2.4.2.1). 
21) Sufficient margin has been included in the allocated requirements to account for UU risks 
(G2.4.2.2). 
22) A process is in place to adequately assess the risk of qualitative or process related allocated 
requirements (G2.4.2.3). 
NOTE: The last several base claims (#23 through #27) descend from intermediate claim G2.6: The 
organization functions effectively and prioritizes safety.  
23) Management clearly demonstrates a commitment to safety through policies that promote safety 
(G2.6.1). 
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24) Organization is motivated and communicates safety-related concerns effectively (G2.6.2). 
25) Organization is involved in safety-related concerns and is committed to safety (G2.6.3). 
26) Roles and responsibilities have been clearly defined and are adequate to ensure safety (G2.6.4). 
27) Effective oversight of subcontractors is maintained (G2.6.5). 
Symbol Meaning
 
Claim for the safety argument 
 
Strategy or solution for the argument 
 
Context for a claim 
 
Evidence to support the claim 
 
Argument continued from above 
 
Argument completed below 
 
Argument yet to be completed 
 
 
Figure 7-2. Illustration of Symbols Used in Goal Structuring Notation   
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Figure 7-3. Overall Safety Argument 
 
Figure 7-4. The System Meets the Minimum Tolerable Level of Safety for Known Risks 
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Figure 7-5. ISA is Consistent with Applicable Safety-related Test Results 
 
Figure 7-6. Argue that Testing Has Been Performed Properly and Is Trustworthy 
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Figure 7-7. Argue that the ISA Has Been Performed Properly and Is Trustworthy 
 
Figure 7-8. The SSMP Demonstrates that the System Will Continue to Meet all Relevant Safety Performance 
Requirements in the Future 
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Figure 7-9. Argue that the SSMP Has Been Prepared Correctly and Is Trustworthy 
 
Figure 7-10. The System Is ASARP 
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Figure 7-11. The Introduction of Hazards Has Been Minimized 
 
Figure 7-12. Safety Has Been Prioritized during Decision Making 
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Figure 7-13. Safety Performance Requirements Have Been Risk-Informed 
 
Figure 7-14. Argue that an Adequate Assessment of Allocated Requirements Has Been Performed for Known 
and UU Risks 
  
 
180
 
Figure 7-15. Organization Functions Effectively and Prioritizes Safety 
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Appendix A – Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
ALARA   As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
ALARP   As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
APU    Auxiliary Power Unit 
ASAP    Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
ASARP   As Safe As Reasonably Practicable 
CAS    Credibility Assessment Scale 
CDR    Critical Design Review 
CERR    Critical Events Readiness Review 
CREAM   Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method 
CRM    Continuous Risk Management 
CSRM    Concept-based Software Risk Model     
DFMR    Design for Minimum Risk 
DM    Decision maker 
DoD    Department of Defense 
DR    Decommissioning Review 
ETA    Event Tree Analysis 
FAA    Federal Aviation Administration 
FEA    Finite Element Analysis 
FFA    Functional Fault Analysis 
FMEA    Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FMECA   Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
FTA    Fault Tree Analysis 
GIDEP    Government-Industry Data Exchange Program 
GSN    Goal Structuring Notation 
HA    Hazard Analysis 
HAZOP   Hazard and Operability Analysis 
HRA    Human Reliability Analysis 
IHA    Integrated Hazard Analysis 
ISA    Integrated Safety Analysis 
ISS    International Space Station 
JCL    Joint Confidence Level 
JSC    Johnson Space Center 
KDP    Key Decision Point 
KMO    Key Mission Objective 
LAS    Launch Abort System 
LEO    Low Earth Orbit 
LOC    Loss of Crew 
LOM    Loss of Mission 
LOV    Loss of Vehicle 
M&S    Modeling and Simulation 
MBSE    Model-Based Systems Engineering 
MGA    Mass Growth Allowance 
MLE    Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
MMOD   Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris 
MOP    Measure of Performance 
NASA    National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NPR    NASA Procedural Requirements 
OSMA    Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
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PDR    Preliminary Design Review 
PPE    Personal Protective Equipment 
PRA    Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
QA    Quality Assurance 
RAI    Request for Additional Information 
RBD    Reliability Block Diagram 
RISC    Risk-Informed Safety Case 
RIDM    Risk-Informed Decision Making 
RM    Risk Management 
R/M    Reliability/Maintainability  
S3G    System Safety Steering Group 
SCI    Safety-Critical Item 
SCP    Satellite Control Processor 
SDR    System Definition Review 
SE    Systems Engineering 
SIR    System Integration Review 
SMA    Safety and Mission Assurance 
SPF    Safety Performance Factor 
SRB    Solid Rocket Booster 
SS    System Safety 
SSMP    System Safety Management Plan 
SSRA    System Safety Requirements Analysis 
STS    Space Transportation System 
T&E    Test and Evaluation 
TA    Technical Authority 
TPM    Technical Performance Measure 
TPS    Thermal Protection System 
TRL    Technology Readiness Level 
UFE    Unallocated Future Expenses 
UU    Unknown and/or Underappreciated 
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Appendix B – Definitions 
Acquirer – A NASA organization that tasks a subordinate organization to produce a product or deliver a 
service.  
As Safe as Reasonably Practicable – A philosophy that states that safety should be increased as 
opportunities arise if the impact on cost, schedule, technical performance, or any other domain of interest 
to NASA is reasonable and acceptable. 
Assurance Deficit – Any knowledge gap that prohibits perfect (total) confidence. Assurance deficits are 
caused by variability or lack of knowledge concerning the data or models being used to produce the 
evidence, the parameter inputs to the models, and the interpretation of model outputs. 
Availability – The fraction of time that an item is in-service. 
Base Claim – A safety claim that is not decomposed to lower levels. It is demonstrated to be true as 
asserted to a high degree of confidence by providing evidence and by showing that all deficits in the 
evidence that erode confidence in the base claim are sufficiently minimal. 
Capability – The maximum operating load or stress for which an item is certified. 
Condition – A current fact-based situation or environment that is causing concern, doubt, anxiety, or 
uneasiness. 
Consequence – The foreseeable, credible negative impact(s) on the organizational unit’s ability to meet 
its performance requirements. 
Continuous Risk Management (CRM) – A specific process for the management of risks associated with 
implementation of designs, plans, and processes. The CRM functions of identify, analyze, plan, track, 
control, and communicate and document provide a disciplined environment for continuously assessing 
what could go wrong, determining which concerns are important to deal with, and implementing 
strategies for dealing with them.  
Control – In the safety context, any provision taken to reduce the likelihood and/or severity of an 
accident. Controls can include design modifications to address specific risks, improvements in quality 
assurance, modification of procedures, improvements in personnel training, provisions to improve 
management oversight where needed, etc. 
Departure Event – An undesired event that might occur at a future time representing a change from the 
current plan and leading potentially to a consequence. It is the uncertainty in the occurrence or non-
occurrence of the departure event that is the initially identified source of risk. 
Design for Minimum Risk – The inclusion of specific design features that minimize the probability of 
occurrence of failure modes, such as application of stringent factors of safety or other design margins. 
Direct Evidence – Information that is mostly quantitative and that supports a base claim by showing that 
the risk of not meeting it is acceptably low. Examples of direct evidence include failure rates from test 
data or operational experience, analyses of system response to various environments, results of 
probabilistic risk assessments, analysis of anomalies, and adherence to best practices. 
Evaluation Protocol – A set of techniques, standards, and practices to be applied in demonstrating the 
level of satisfaction of a performance requirement (e.g., a safety goal). An evaluation protocol may 
include mandated assumptions, may specify a particular process of analysis, and may limit the degree of 
credit that can be taken for a particular design feature. 
Hazard – A state or a set of conditions, internal or external to a system, that has the potential to cause 
harm. Examples of hazards include materials, energy sources, or operational practices that in uncontrolled 
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situations can lead to scenarios that could produce death, injury, illness, equipment loss or damage, or 
damage to a protected environment. 
Hazard Analysis – An application of systematic and replicable methods to identify and understand 
hazards, and to characterize the risk of mishaps that involve hazards. Risks originate from hazards – the 
absence of a hazard implies a freedom from the associated risk. 
Initiating Event – A departure from a desired operational envelope to a system state where a control 
response is required either by human, software, or machine intervention. 
Integrated Safety Analysis – The development and analysis of scenarios that may lead to undesirable 
consequences with respect to safety. ISA includes both hazard-centric and non-hazard-centric methods for 
identifying and characterizing potential accident scenarios. This includes accident causes, contributing 
factors, effectiveness of controls (both existing and proposed), analysis of physical responses of the 
system to the environments it encounters, and analysis of the probability that the undesirable 
consequences will be realized. The analysis of any particular scenario can be either quantitative or 
qualitative, as appropriate for the scenario being considered and the nature of the undesired consequence. 
Intermediate Claim – A claim that is further decomposed into lower level sub-claims that feed into it. It 
is demonstrated to be true as asserted to a high degree of confidence by demonstrating that all of the sub-
claims feeding into it are true as asserted to a high degree of confidence. 
Key Decision Point – The event at which the Decision Authority determines the readiness of a 
program/project to progress to the next phase of the life cycle (or to the next KDP). 
Key Mission Objective – Different multiple objectives within a single mission for which the decision 
maker needs to be presented with safety sub-cases in order to make decisions affecting the 
program/project as a whole. For a planetary exploration mission that has many rendezvous events, each 
major rendezvous event would be considered a key mission objective. For a mission consisting of many 
flights with each flight having one destination, any flight that marks a significant change from previous 
flights would constitute a separate key mission objective. 
Known Risk – A scenario affecting safety performance that has been correctly identified and accurately 
assessed with respect to its likelihood of occurrence and potential severity of harm or loss. 
Limiting Condition for Operation – A limiting condition for operation defines the limits that represent 
the lowest functional capability or performance level of an SCI required to perform safely. 
Limiting Control Setting – A limiting control setting defines the setting on an SCI that controls process 
variables to prevent exceeding a safety limit. 
Minimum Tolerable Level of Safety – The level of safety performance below which a system is 
considered unsafe. 
Model – A description or representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process. 
Objectives Hierarchy – An arrangement where objectives are decomposed into a set of quantifiable sub-
objectives, each of which is implied by the top-level objective. 
Operational Safety Objective – A safety objective that has been decomposed to a level where it can be 
clearly addressed by systems engineering processes. 
Performance Measure – A quantifiable attribute of a decision alternative, used to support decision-
making. Performance measures are typically defined for all mission execution domains and for 
institutional performance. For purposes of System Safety at NASA, performance measures include 
metrics related to human safety, asset protection, and environmental protection. 
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Performance Requirement – A value of a performance measure to be achieved by an organizational 
unit’s work that has been agreed-upon to satisfy the needs of the next higher organizational level. [NPR 
8000.4A] 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment – A structured, probabilistic treatment of scenarios, likelihoods, 
consequences using a graded approach. Within this approach, the word “probabilistic” refers explicitly to 
a Bayesian treatment of uncertainty. 
Provider – A Provider is a NASA or contractor organization that is tasked by a customer or supervising 
organization (i.e., the Acquirer) to produce a product or service. 
Reliability – The probability that an item will perform its intended function for a specified interval under 
stated conditions. 
Risk – The potential for shortfalls, which may be realized in the future, with respect to achieving 
explicitly stated performance requirements. Risk is characterized by a set of triplets: 1) the scenario(s) 
leading to degraded performance in one or more performance measures, 2) the likelihood(s) of those 
scenarios, and 3) the consequence(s) of the impact on performance that would result if those scenarios 
were to occur. 
Risk Driver – A significant source of performance risk. Operationally, a risk driver can be a single 
performance parameter, a single event, a set of performance parameters collectively, or a set of events 
collectively that, when varied over their range of uncertainty, causes the performance risk to change from 
tolerable to intolerable (or marginal). 
Risk-Informed Decision Making – A decision making approach that uses a diverse set of performance 
measures (some of which are model-based risk metrics) along with other considerations within a 
deliberative process to inform decision making. 
Risk-Informed Safety Case – A risk-informed safety case (RISC) is a structured argument, supported by 
a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is or will be 
adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. 
Risk Management – A process that includes risk-informed decision making and continuous risk 
management in an integrated framework. This integration is done in order to foster proactive risk 
management, to better inform decision making through better use of risk information, and then to more 
effectively control implementation risks by focusing the continuous risk management process on the 
baseline performance requirements emerging from the RIDM process. [NPR 8000.4A] 
Risk Statement – A statement of a concern about a scenario that could affect the ability to achieve one or 
more safety requirements. Each risk statement contains a condition, a departure, an asset, and a 
consequence. 
Safety – Freedom from those hazards that can result in failure to meet one or more safety objectives by 
causing death, injury, or illness in humans, adversely affecting the environment, and/or causing damage to 
or loss of equipment or property.  
Safety Assurance – The development of confidence that safety has been sufficiently ensured. 
Safety Case – A documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a 
system is adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. 
Safety Claim – A statement asserting the level of safety of a system or subsystem. 
Safety-Critical Item – A system feature whose performance (e.g., capability, reliability, and availability) 
at levels documented in the ISA is necessary for the satisfaction of system-level safety performance 
requirements, or which is designated as such. 
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Safety Ensurance - The reduction and elimination of system hazards and the achievement of adequate 
safety performance. 
Safety Factor – The structural capacity of an item beyond the expected loads or actual loads. 
Safety Goal – A target level of safety performance that is expected from continuous safety upgrades and 
improvements to the system. 
Safety Growth – The rate at which safety performance increases due to safety upgrades and 
improvements to the system. 
Safety Limit – A limit on a process variable that, if exceeded, could directly cause the failure of a barrier. 
Safety Margin – Extra performance allocated to systems, structures, and components to preserve safety 
over the range of credible variations in the loads (stresses, temperatures, etc.) to which they will be 
subjected.  
Safety Performance Margin – An incremental margin subtracted from the evaluated safety performance 
to account for the estimated total effects of unknown and underappreciated hazards. It is estimated from 
analysis of historical experience with similar technologies taking into account the complexity of the 
system, the degree to which new technology is being used, and the degree to which new operating 
environments are being introduced.  
Safety Performance Factor – The ratio of the loss probability from all risks to the loss probability from 
known risks. 
Safety Threshold – The level of safety performance against which initial system performance is 
assessed. 
Scenario – A sequence of credible events that specifies the evolution of a system or process from a given 
state to a future state. In the context of risk management, scenarios are used to identify the ways in which 
a system or process in its current state can evolve to an undesirable state. 
Sensitivity – The variation in the output of a model as a function of variation in the model inputs and 
parameters. 
Supporting Evidence – Information that is mostly qualitative, provides confidence in the direct evidence, 
or demonstrates a general responsiveness to safety concerns. Examples of supporting evidence include 
personnel qualifications, verification and validation of analysis tools, applicability of experiments, quality 
of documentation, quality of external reviews, effectiveness of communication protocols, and safety 
culture of the organization. 
Synthetic Analysis Methods – Methods that produce system-level risk estimates by aggregating the 
effects of explicitly identified individual contributors to that risk. 
System Safety – A disciplined, systematic process for the consideration of risks resulting from hazards 
that can affect humans, the environment, or mission assets. Per NPR 8715.3C, System Safety is the 
rational pursuit of safety within a systems perspective, where the degree of “safety” is to be understood in 
the context of a particular application. The system safety process does not expect to attain absolute safety, 
but strives to attain a degree of safety that fulfills obligations to the at-risk communities and addresses 
Agency priorities. 
Uncertainty – An imperfect state of knowledge or a physical variability resulting from a variety of 
factors including, but not limited to, lack of knowledge, applicability of information, physical variation, 
randomness or stochastic behavior, indeterminacy, judgment, and approximation. 
Underappreciated Risk – A scenario affecting safety performance that has been correctly identified but 
for which the likelihood of occurrence and/or potential severity of harm or loss are underestimated. 
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Unknown Risk – A scenario affecting safety performance that has not been identified and is therefore 
unknown at the time of analysis. 
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